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Abstract 
Do Strategic Alliances Add Value? 
An Empirical Examination at Industry and Firm Levels in European Banking 
Strategic alliances are a prevalent form of business organization. The critical 
characteristics of strategic alliances are detailed using Coase (1937) and the resulting 
definition tested through primary research and the alternative form, the infrastructure 
alliance posited. The thesis examines whether strategic alliances add value in the 
European banking sector through four types of analysis at two levels of engagement -a 
23 historical review (at industry level); a review of over 400 papers in the academic 
literature; a questionnaire survey (at firm level) and in-depth interviews (at firm level). 
Bankers high pre-existing propensity to enter into strategic alliances is determined and 
three lifecycles, and the underpinning, conditions identified - Clubs and Consortium 
Banks, Bankassurance and the Virtual bank - the latter involving a fundamental change in 
Coase (1937) enabled by the underpinning technology. Bankers were found to be 
followers of potential business steams and the strategic alliance was one form of market 
entry. The questionnaire research, however, identified European bankers prefer to enter 
into alliances (as opposed to own branch or M&A) only in countries which had the 
appropriate supporting conditions such as definable, enforceable and terminable 
contracts, the provision of accounting information, stable governments and economic 
freedom.. Direct discussions with senior bankers resulted in a number of valuable insights 
into the conceiving, forming, organizing evolving and dissolving of alliances. 
Further research into the infrastructure alliance, including `oscillation' between 
infrastructure and strategic forms is proposed. The Co-Evolution Model of Strategic 
Alliances is proposed and taxonomy consisting of parallel co-evolution, convergent co- 
evolution, divergent co-evolution and the subsidiary taxonomy of differential parallel co- 
evolution, differential convergent co-evolution and differential divergent co-evolution 
detailed and further research suggested. 
Strategic alliances are found to add value in European banking but this value is 
contingent on the strength of the business stream, the global, national and industry 
conditions and the nature of managerial decisions and drive. 
Key Words: 
Strategy, Strategic Alliances, Infrastructure Alliances, Alliances, Co-Evolution Model, 
Banking, Europe 
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Chapter One 
Introduction, Structure and Subject 
1.1 Introduction and Research Question 
Strategic alliances are being used to access know-how, products and markets. In 
the middle of the `organic growth-strategic alliances-mergers & acquisitions' 
continuum they provide a method of rapidly addressing business opportunities that 
arise whilst sharing know-how, costs and risk, as well as reward, with partners. 
There is no question as to the popularity of strategic alliances. The key question 
is: 
Do strategic alliances add value? 
The thesis examines this question through four types of analysis at two levels of 
engagement - through a 23 year historical review (industry level); through a 
review of over 400 papers in the academic literature; through a questionnaire 
survey (at firm level) and through in-depth interviews (at firm level). The industry 
examined was the European banking industry. 
1.2 Structure 
This thesis has seven chapters. Chapter One considers the nature of the subject 
under analysis, the strategic alliance, and differentiates this from the infrastructure 
alliance, both prevalent forms of cooperation in the banking sector. Chapter Two 
develops a view as to the historical propensity of banks to collaborate. It reports a 
longitudinal analysis of the forms of collaboration prevalent in this sector between 
1960 and 1993 and considers the research question at an industry level. Chapter 
Three identifies the theoretical underpinnings of strategic alliances and the 
perspectives adopted by previous research and those employed in this thesis. 
Chapter Four discusses a number of research perspectives and the chosen 
perspective of Realism (after Lawson, 1997). The chapter also discusses the 
desk, postal survey and thematic interview research methods used in gathering and 
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analyzing the data. Chapter Five sets out the method used to analyse the postal 
survey responses and reports the findings, relating them to the research question. 
Chapter Six reports the analyses of the thematically based interviews and relates 
the findings to the research question. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis and 
suggests two areas for future research. 
So as to be relatively comprehensive and obtain deep insights into the use of 
strategic alliances in the European banking sector, four lenses or perspectives are 
used: historical, theoretical, practical and motivational (Chapters Two, Three, Five 
and Six respectively). Furthermore the focus of inquiry moves from changes in 
the external context to firm level decision making to the motivations of managers 
(Chapters Two, Five and Six respectively). Table 1.1 below summarizes the 
structure of this thesis. 
1.3 Subiect 
1.3.1 Strategic Alliances - Definition and Taxonomy 
1.3.1.1 Strategic alliances - definition. Strategic alliance theory is a sub-set of 
theories governing the structure of organizations. Coase (1937) set out to explain 
why firms exist - that is, why market based transactions do not in all situations 
result in the most efficient allocation of resources. 
The rationale of the firm (as expounded by Coase and developed by Williamson 
[1986]) is, at its simplest, that the existence of transaction costs and uncertainty 
('bounded rationality') may make it less costly, less risky or both to internalise 
inherently separate economic activities within the boundaries of the firm. 
This internalisation is held to be preferable to each such activity being undertaken 
by a separate economic agent. Costs to be avoided include those of drawing up 
separate contracts specifying precisely the rights and obligations of every party to 
every economic transaction. Risks to be avoided include those of opportunistic 
behavior by counter-parties to an insufficiently specified contract and of failing to 
find a market for the output of functionally specialized ('idiosyncratic') 
investments. 
Table 1.1: Structure of Thesis Entitled: Do Strategic Alliances Add Value? 
An Empirical Analysis of Industry and Firm Level in European Banking 
CbaptorNamrer 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 
und Area Introduction Industry Theoretical Methodological Firm Level Firm Level Conclusion 
Level Foundations Issues Postal Survey Thematic Interview Fugue 
Lifecyde Findings Findings Research 
Findings 
Ezterml EMS Internal Internal to 
Internal Focus to Firm and Manager Menage and Firm 
Data Source Econanut Journal Atbdm Me hodology Quahonnames Intewews 
Financial Times Books - Single Author Books Returned Held 
Bank of England and Edited Volume 
Proo-duW 
'LonU' x Histoncal 'ßroordial Firma Practice Manageraal 
Perspective Motivations 
Phillips said Patti Conmbuton Focal Theory (I) Foal (2) and Dw Theory Data Theory Contribution 
(1994) Class Conthl u6on Background Contribubw Contribution 
Theory 
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Benefits of internalisation resulting from reduced transaction costs and uncertainty 
may manifest themselves as variously: 
- security of supplies and markets 
- technical or engineering economies 
- marketing economies 
- financial economies 
- managerial or administrative economies. 
These will increase in importance with the frequency of transactions (Williamson, 
1970). 
The work of Coase, Robinson and Williamson also assists in explaining the 
presence of organizational forms other than the firm. Williamson (1982) has 
developed the Coasean markets-hierarchy dichotomy to derive a more general 
theory of organizational form and to provide a foundation for the so-called 
`transaction cost school' and some of the varied definitions of strategic alliances 
proposed and used in the literature. 
In an area where theory, practice and analysis have been evolving so rapidly, 
definitional inconsistencies may reflect some more fundamental differences in 
approaches. Thus it is necessary to define a `strategic alliance' as the term will be 
considered and used in this thesis. 
A strategic alliance can be defined by reference to any combination of the 
following: 
i) the legal, structural or ownership form that the alliance takes 
ii) the nature of the resulting relationship between partners through 
integration or interdependence 
iii) the purpose of the relationship 
iv) the importance of the relationship. 
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In addition, which complicates matters, each definitional criterion may be of 
asymmetric importance to some or all of the partners in an alliance. 
i) Form 
A strategic alliance is located on a continuum between, on the one hand, market 
based, arm's length transactions and relationships and, on the other, hierarchic, or 
intra-firm, transactions or relationships. The broad range of alliance types (see 
Figure 1.1) range from formal cooperative ventures through joint ventures and 
joint ownership to strategic investment in a partner. 
A formal cooperative venture exists where two or more independent firms 
formally agree to work together for their mutual benefit. This agreement may be 
supported by a formal document (such as the 17 page BNP-Dresdner Cooperation 
Agreement) or perhaps by little more than an oral agreement between the 
respective chairmen. 
A joint venture is a separate company in which all the founding firms have an 
equity stake. A joint venture is usually governed by its own board of directors. 
Joint ownership arises where two or more independent firms jointly own an asset, 
such as a manufacturing or bottling plant, to serve the interests of the owning 
firms. 
A strajegic investment in a partner typically involves one firm in taking a small 
invcstment in another to support their agreement to work together. This often 
takes the fq, rm of a share-swap, as a gesture of mutual commitment rather than as 
a precursor to a merger or to exploit formal ownership rights. 
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ii) Nature 
A strategic alliance is a sub-set of the relational-contractual part of the markets- 
hierarchy continuum (see Figure 1.2) and more especially the obligational- 
contractual part of that continuum. Firms that know each other, and have worked 
together or entered into one-off contracts in the past, can be deemed to have a pre- 
existing `relationship' by virtue of having freely entered into new contracts. This 
is termed a relational-contractual arrangement. By entering into strategic 
alliances, firms go a crucial stage further by obligating themselves to enter into 
future contacts and transactions with their alliance partners. This is termed an 
obligational-contractual arrangement. 
iii) Purpose 
A strategic alliance represents an attempt to strike an optimal balance between the 
conflicting needs and purposes of economic activity, as outlined in Figure 1.3 
below. It seeks to balance the various benefits to be received from collaboration 
against the external and internal forces that may push the alliance in the direction 
of evolution (to a full merger, say) or to dissolution. 
iv) Importance 
Another way of classifying alliances is to differentiate between `non-strategic' and 
`strategic' alliances. The `strategic' alliance is typically one which displays high 
levels of resource commitment, is (or is expected to be) of long or open-ended 
duration and whose purposes represent a core activity of a strategic nature for one 
or more of the partners. Figure 1.4 summarizes this differentiation. 
From the above analysis we can derive a general definition of a strategic alliance 
as proposed by Hamilton, Morison, ul-Haq, 1996 thus: 
0 
Ü0 two 
bW 
"a 
O 
N 
'L3 
N 
r. + 
r. + 
ý° ä V td ý+ 
yU 
w. N 
^' 
Co 
"al 
I 
71 
öi 
N 
ö0 
zý 
C 
Ny 
UU 
. -r 
U 
. Eh N 
v, ^ 
00 
"r 
p 
40 
G 
.. 'b ei < 
1-4 N 
bL 
0 
N 
w Ü 
rý', vUi Ll, 
:O 
N 
CC 
O ... y 
y i00 týC 
4Ui O 
OO 
NN 
Cß 
ý5 
,7OýU cd v) O( 
r v) -o 
1 0 
N 
b 
C 
I 
r 
1 
cN 
o (, N 
U 
N 
oo1 
4.4 Cn N 
o. 
-" po 
N QN 
" äv; 
ü "y o> 
1 
N 
.. r 
42 
H 
v .,., ý".. 
e. 
'ý. 
ý" 
ýw, 
ý 
Il 
N 
ýi 
O 
U 
td 
j 
H 
w 
u 
"r 
u "r 
L 
w 
M.. 
O 
H 
O 
a 
E 
0 an .r 
w 
v. 
10 I 
C7 
ýi 
U 
O 
I 
21 
.00 Cd Cd 
00 
ow) O 
NU 
N 
a) 
O 
.. r 
. ii 
irr 
N 
bÖO 
'Cd c .5O r0+ N., li o 
.pU R3 cý 
Cý 
x 
x 
(n 
äý U 
... . -. 
a 
N 
N 
U 
I 
a 
r- 
0 
3 
0 a 
c 
"r 
u 
0 
u 
0 
E 
v 
an 
"° rn o. ' 
0 
x I 
y 
. ýr 
0 
ch 
U 
Ö 
I 
11 
A durable relationship established between two or more independent firms, 
involving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a mechanism (corporate or 
otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or activities of strategic importance 
to one or more of the partners for their mutual economic advantage. 
1.3.1.2 Strategic alliances -a taxonomy. Faulkner (1995) expands the work of 
Lorange and Roos (1992) and Williamson (1986) by classifying strategic alliances 
on three dimensions, which he defines as the scope of the alliance, the legal status 
of the alliance and the number of partners in the strategic alliance. 
In the case of the scope of the alliance, Faulkner differentiates between Focussed 
[F] and Complex [C]. Focussed Scope refers `to a collaborative arrangement 
between two or more companies, set up to meet a clearly defined set of 
circumstances in a particular way' (Faulkner, 1995). Complex Scope refers to 
cooperation over a wide range of areas either as whole organizations or various 
parts of organizations. 
In the case of the legal status of the alliance, Faulkner differentiates between the 
Joint Venture [JV], which requires the creation of a separate company, and the 
Non-Joint Venture [NJV], which has flexible and fluid boundaries. He also 
describes the NJV as a collaboration which may range from limited to broad in its 
scope and is most appropriate when the `extent of the possible relationship is 
impossible to foresee at the outset'. 
In the case of the number of partners, Faulkner differentiates between Two 
Partners [2] or More Than Two Partners [>2] . He also calls the 
latter `a 
consortium'. Faulkner's classification system complements this analysis by 
expanding the number of axes to include the scope of the alliance. 
Table 1.2: Comparison of Taxonomies 
Lorange and Roos Faulkner Codes Faulkner Codes Williamson 
Classes Focussed Scope Complex Scope Class 
Formal Cooperative FNJV2 CNJV2 
Venture FNJV>2 CNJV>2 
Joint Venture FJV2 CJV2 Obligational 
FJV>2 CJV>2 
Joint Ownership FNJV2 CNJV2 Contractual 
FNJV>2 CNJV>2 
Strategic Investment in FNJV2 CNJV2 
Partner FNJV>2 CNJV>2 
Source: Lorange and Roos, (1992); Faullmer, (1995); Williamson, (1986) 
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Alliances could be focussed on a pre-defined set of objectives (for example, the 
transfer of specific knowledge from one firm to another) or a complex set of 
objectives, where separate firms agree to cooperate over a diverse range of 
activities (or a range in between). An example of the former is the product- 
specific alliance between Royal Bank of Scotland and Scottish Widows and of the 
latter the geographically global and multi-dimensional alliance between Banque 
National de Paris (BNP) and Dresdner Bank. Table 1.2 above provides a 
comparison of these taxonomies. 
1.3.2 The Strategic Alliance vs The Infrastructure Alliance 
The strategic alliance has, at its core, the characteristics proposed in the definition 
put forward by Hamilton, Morison, ul-Haq (1996): 
i) it has durability which may be of infinite duration; 
ii) it involves the sharing or pooling of resources; 
iii) it creates a mechanism - this may be a cooperation secretariat as at the 
core of the BNP-Dresdner strategic alliance or it may be a separate 
joint venture company as in the new, mainly Eastern European, 
overseas ventures in the same strategic alliance; 
iv) it is of strategic importance to at least one of the partners; it may very 
well be of varied degrees of importance to the members of the strategic 
alliance; 
v) it is of mutual economic advantage, or more specifically confers a 
discernible competitive advantage to each of its members. 
The infrastructure alliance, on the other hand, shares most of the characteristics of 
the strategic alliance (in particular items i-iv above) but differs in the crucial issue 
of item v. That is, the infrastructure alliance does confer a mutual economic 
advantage but does not confer a differential competitive advantage to its members. 
These differences are examined below. 
1.3.2.1 Strategic alliances. The strategic alliance is entered into to confer a 
competitive advantage to its members. Thus the 18th century goldsmith banker 
who had a good reputation and reciprocal obligational-contractual links with other 
goldsmiths could enjoy the economic return of lending via the issuance of notes 
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and was thereby conferred a competitive advantage. Those goldsmiths who did 
not enjoy such obligational-contractual relationships could not benefit from this 
trade and suffered a competitive disadvantage in comparison to the former. An 
example of the former are the Medici or early Rothschilds, who had international 
obligational-contractual relationships and could achieve an economic benefit from 
participating in the letter of credit business and thereby enjoy a competitive 
advantage. Because these relationships were based on specific links made 
between goldsmiths and were of an obligational-contractural nature, we can 
therefore call them strategic alliances. Other ad-hoc links based on the general 
reputation of the goldsmith would be termed relational-contractural relationships 
and therefore not strategic alliances. 
Being able to enter into these obligational-contractual relationships to access, 
variously, counterparties, fund transfer, credit etc. capabilities, confers a 
competitive advantage in comparison with those who were unable to enter into 
such relationships. These types of inter-bank relationships can be termed strategic 
alliances. The Figure 1.5 below summarizes this. The figure uses two axes - 
membership status and degree of competitive advantage conferred. A member of a 
strategic alliance will only remain if membership provides a gain over non- 
membership. This rationale is shown in quadrant Q l. Non-members will be at a 
disadvantage, Q3, and will enter the alliance if there is some advantage to be 
gained by moving to Q1. The quadrants Q2 and Q4 are untenable. In the former a 
member will exit the alliance if there is a no competitive advantage to be gained 
from membership of the alliance, in the latter, a non-member cannot gain the 
advantages conferred by membership without being a member. 
1.3.2.2 Infrastructure alliances. The infrastructure alliance is at the theoretical 
opposite end of the continuum from the strategic alliance. In its purest form it 
does confer a competitive advantage to its members, but membership is so broad 
that, in effect, all banks have access to its advantages and the infrastructure 
alliance acts as a basic foundation for the business being conducted by banks. This 
would mean that no one member of the industry would obtain a competitive 
advantage in comparison with another because all members of the industry would 
receive the same advantage, thus making it a `base line provision'. Figure 1.6 
below summarizes this analysis. 
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Membership 
Status 
member 
non- 
member 
Q2 Q1 
advantage 
Q3 Q4 
disadvantage 
Negative Positive 
Degree of Competitive Advantage Conferred 
Figure 1.5: Strategic Alliances 
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Degree of Competitive Advantage Conferred 
Figure 1.6: Infrastructure Alliances 
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The figure uses two axes - membership status and degree of competitive advantage 
conferred. A member of an infrastructure alliance will remain because it provides a 
base line provision for its industry. This rationale is shown in quadrant Q1. Non- 
members will be at a disadvantage, Q3, and will be forced over time to enter the 
alliance to secure access to the same base line provision as its competitors provide 
unless it decides not to provide the services that this infrastructure alliance 
facilitates. The quadrants Q2 and Q4 are untenable so there is only a binary choice 
between Q1 or Q3. 
To provide an example: Z-Bank decides to provide credit card services in the UK. 
To do so it will need to enter at least two infrastructure alliances, one to gain 
access to the payment systems that allow credit cards to be used in retail outlets, 
internet and telephone transaction - VISA or MASTERCARD, and another to gain 
access to the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) systems to allow cash 
withdrawals. For Z-Bank to not join these infrastructure alliances is to make the 
provision of credit card services impossible and would disadvantage them. 
However, membership has a neutral effect as competition in credit card services in 
the UK is based on price, additional services and products, for example, and no 
longer on ATM network provision. If Y-Bank does not wish to provide credit card 
services, then membership of the two infrastructure alliances discussed above is 
counterproductive because of the added cost with no benefit. 
The above details the two extreme positions, on the one hand strategic alliances 
and on the other, infrastructure alliances. Neither position is considered to be an 
actuality. Most alliances probably lie on an intermediate position on a continuum 
with multiple choices co-existing and different opportunities being available. 
The characteristics of the infrastructure alliance are complex and are examined in 
more detail below. The form of such an alliance may range along the continuum in 
Figure 1.1 above, and in particular it may be embedded within either a joint 
venture company or a network type relationship. 
The strategic alliance was analysed in Figure 1.2 above in terms of three criteria 
after Williamson (1986): 
is 
i) the degree of certainty 
ii) the frequency of transactions 
iii) the requirement for idiosyncratic investments. 
On these criteria the infrastructure alliance differs greatly from a strategic alliance. 
i) The degree of certainty. 
Infrastructure alliances typically provide a base line service that supports a day-to- 
day activity of the banking sector - for example, national or international payment 
systems. Such systems require a high degree of certainty in a number of areas. 
Two examples are given below: 
- the accuracy and reliability of the data transmitted to and from users of the 
system embedded in the infrastructure alliance and the ability to verify the 
identity of the transmitter and the recipient are critical; 
- the robustness of the system in processing huge numbers of transactions over 
continuous periods with low error rates is essential. 
These requirements lead to a need for clear operating parameters to be built into 
the design of the infrastructure alliance. The alliance has to operate according to 
those design parameters with change in the parameters only occurring occasionally 
and usually requiring some a major event such as the establishment of the new 
venture to justify the change. 
Payments systems require accurate, continuous, anticipatable and reliable 
operation. This can be characterised as a need for a high degree of certainty in the 
infrastructure alliance. 
ii) The frequency of transactions. 
Infrastructure alliances such as payment systems are built on the requirement to 
process high volumes of transactions. These transactions may be generated by the 
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increased globalisation of trade in services and physical goods and the resulting 
need to transfer local and foreign currency internationally; by the increasing 
prevalence of bank accounts to receive salaries and direct debits and standing 
orders to pay bills; or by the increasing volume of foreign exchange, equities and 
funds traded domestically in the City of London or internationally in the global 
financial system. 
This system-wide need for the processing of pre-identified frequent transactions is 
served by the infrastructure alliance. 
iii) The requirement for idiosyncratic investments. 
Idiosyncratic investments are `specialized human and physical assets [that] 
become more specialized to a single use, and are hence less transferable to other 
uses' (Williamson, 1982). Infrastructure alliances are generally intra-firm 
arrangements that are established to process specific transactions repeatedly in 
large volumes. The investments made - whether human capital, training, physical 
assets or machinery - are specific and specialized to particular transactions, they 
are idiosyncratic, and the requirement for such investments is high and economies 
of scale are forthcoming. 
In summary, the infrastructure alliance requires a high degree of certainty in its 
scope, frequent transactions are the norm and a high requirement for idiosyncratic 
investments is displayed. 
In modem Europe the majority of banks, even those that have a small and local 
scope, enjoy local and international relationships through direct membership of (or 
access through contracts with direct members of) infrastructure alliances such as: 
CHAPS - The Clearing House Automated Payments System. This is a domestic 
UK based clearing system. It is a joint venture owned by a collection of banks, 
and all UK based banks can have access to its services through a contract with a 
member; the umbrella body is APACS. 
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SWIFT - The Society of Worldwide Interbank Funds Transfer. This is an 
international payments system which all banks may gain access to. 
VISA and MASTERCARD - International payment systems that facilitate and 
underpin the use of credit cards. 
ATMs - Automated Teller Machines. This is a cash notes issuance machine that is 
prevalent in large quantities in the domestic and international markets. Banks have 
access to other banks' ATMs either through an individual agreement or through 
membership of networks such as LINK. 
EUROCLEAR and CEDEL - Other such infrastructure alliances exist in the 
clearing of bonds, equities and gilts, including the registration of ownership, and in 
a host of other areas. 
These infrastructure alliances may originally have been strategic alliances that 
conferred a competitive advantage to the establishing members. One example of 
this is the strategic alliance between Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander 
established in 1988. The partners developed a pan-European funds transfer 
system, IBOS, to provide a mechanism for the banks to deliver a service to their 
customers in small value European currency funds transfers. This placed `two 
fairly small banks at the technological cutting edge of banking applications' 
(Faulkner, 1995). At the time of the establishment of IBOS, funds transfers of this 
type were made by sending bank drafts for collection. This was a time-consuming 
and costly procedure. By establishing IBOS, the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Banco Santander were able to provide a cost effective and efficient service to their 
customers, a service that was not provided by other banks, and this conferred a 
competitive advantage to the member banks. Over time, IBOS became more 
international through establishing a New York link and allowed more members to 
join, thereby sharing the competitive advantage conferred by membership with 
more members. Eventually the membership is likely to be so broad that the service 
provided by the alliance may become a base line provision and the strategic 
alliance will become an infrastructure alliance. 
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An example of the broad membership of an infrastructure alliance is the 
Association of Payment Clearing Services, APACS, the umbrella body of the UK 
payments systems structure. Its operations consist of BACS (bulk electronic 
clearing for direct debits and credits), CCC (cheque and credit clearing), CHAPS 
and, since 1999, EURO CHAPS (same day electronic payments). Its total 
membership of 27 banks, from the USA, Australia, Germany, Holland, Japan and 
the UK affords `remote access' to non member firms, in the case of EURO 
CHAPS, to over 35,000 sponsored users of BACS. 
Current infrastructure alliances such as the ATM networks, now consisting of over 
23,000 machines in the UK, generally provide access for all users. They tend to 
produce a `level-playing-field' in this area of provision. If such service provision 
were restricted, increasing the barriers to entry, the regulatory authorities would 
doubtless step in to ensure access. 
Indeed the infrastructure alliance is a core facilitator of banking activity. Without 
CHAPS, 1BOS and SWIFT the transfer of funds would be more time intensive and 
cost prohibitive; without VISA and MASTERCARD the global credit card service 
would fail; without globally interlinked ATM Networks the multi-currency 
availability of cash on demand 24 hours per day service would fail. Infrastructure 
alliances are the foundation on which the provision of banking services is built. 
These are indicative of the pre-existing high propensity of banks to cooperate as 
discussed further in Chapter two. 
Nevertheless a bank may attempt to offer differentially priced access to a 
competitor in the financial services sector such as occurred in the Barclays- 
Nationwide dispute in 2000. Here Barclays attempted to impose an ATM access 
charge to Nationwide customers while not charging its own customers. Barclays' 
rationale was that it had invested heavily in its extensive ATM network for the 
benefit of its customers and to generate a competitive advantage. Nationwide had 
also invested in an ATM network, though both the network and associated 
investment were smaller. Barclays considered that higher charges to Nationwide 
customers were justified to balance out the unequal distribution and size of 
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networks and to provide a competitive advantage to Barclays in recruiting and 
retaining customers. 
It is not always clear, however, where the comparative advantage lies, and there is 
often an oscillation, along the continuum mentioned earlier, between the strategic 
and infrastructure alliance. Over time, the variety of service networks available 
and competition between providers will tend to drive prices to a temporally `stable' 
point and reconvert this type of oscillating infrastructure alliance into an 
infrastructure alliance. 
An established infrastructure alliance therefore usually generates a limited 
competitive advantage to its members. It may provide a short-term competitive 
advantage to members in comparison with entrants to the financial services 
industry who are not members, but these new entrants will also obtain access to 
this `base line provision' and the position will move back into a stable `dynamic 
disequilibrium'. 
A bank can generate a long-tem competitive advantage by establishing a new 
service as a start-up strategic alliance. This service, over a period of time, may 
confer an advantage to its members and a disadvantage to non-members. 
Eventually this service may become a base line provision, an infrastructure 
alliance. To give one example, Morgan Stanley was the primary founding member 
of the Euroclean equity clearing system and enjoyed the advantage of this strategic 
alliance with a small number of co-founding members. Now the system is taking 
on an infrastructure status, with Morgan Stanley and the other co-founders no 
longer enjoying a relative competitive advantage through being users of the 
Euroclear services but instead receiving a return on their investment as the equity 
owners of Euroclear. 
Establishing a start-up strategic alliance of this technology-based type, perhaps 
destined later in its lifecycle to become an infrastructure alliance, leads to: 
i) competitive advantage (in service provision and returns) in the short 
term 
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ii) additional extraordinary (ownership) financial returns upon its 
conversion, in the longer term, to an infrastructure alliance. 
The key differences between strategic alliances and infrastructure alliances are 
displayed in Figure 1.7 below. The two forms are at the opposite ends of a 
continuum. 
The strategic alliance is bilateral in membership; it provides a differentiated service 
that is only accessible to members; membership confers a strategic advantage to 
members and the alliance is less embedded in the nature of banking, rather it is a 
temporary choice to carry out a particular set of activities together. The strategic 
alliance governance and direction is dependent on the founding members. 
The infrastructure alliance, on the other hand, enjoys a multilateral membership; it 
provides a service which is commodity like in its nature; it generates a strategic 
disadvantage to those excluded from membership; it is deeply embedded in the 
practice of banking and it is generally a separate form with its own managerial 
precepts, structure and direction. 
The strategic alliance and infrastructure alliances are defined as opposite ends of 
the continuum. In practice a particular alliance will lean towards one or the other 
end in each characteristic and the balance position of the individual characteristics 
will determine if it is characterized as strategic or infrastructure. An example of 
this is correspondent bank relationships. These hybrid arrangements are made up 
by a set of bilateral agreements between individual banks that collectively establish 
a value network or multilateral partnership. Each individual bank may be a 
member of a number of value networks, which co-exist, and some provide the 
basis for later strategic alliances. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the core question being examined, detailed and 
reviewed the structure of the thesis and introduced its content. It has defined the 
subject of the thesis, the strategic alliance, and differentiated between the strategic 
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alliance and the infrastructure alliance. Strategic and infrastructure alliances have 
been found to be important, but different, forms of business collaboration for banks 
and are necessary to facilitate their provision of services. 
In this chapter the question `Do strategic alliances add value? ' has not been 
answered. Rather it is clear, at this point, that infrastructure alliances do add value 
to all the members through providing a `base line provision' to enable banking 
activity. 
Chapter Two examines how deeply embedded strategic alliances are in the banking 
sector and reviews the particular use of strategic alliances in Europe from 1960. 
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Strategic Alliance 
Multilateral 
Differentiation 
strategic advantage from 
inclusion 
less embedded 
totally dependent on will of 
founding partners 
Correspondent Banking 
-bilateral agreements 
leading 
to a multilateral partnership 
Infrastructure Alliance 
Multilateral 
commodity 
strategic disadvantage from 
exclusion 
more embedded 
greater self sufficiency 
Figure 1.7: The Key Characteristics of Strategic vs. Infrastructure Alliances 
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Chapter Two 
Industry Level - The Life Cycle of Strategic Alliances 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will identify and analyse the antecedents of the main forms of 
collaboration now prevalent in the European banking sector and use this analysis 
to develop a general theory of the lifecycle of strategic alliances in the European 
banking sector. To do this, the chapter will review the history of cooperation and 
determine the extent of the historical propensity of banks to cooperate. It will 
present a longitudinal analysis of the use of strategic alliances in three time 
periods: the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s. The first time period will be 
analysed in depth, the latter two more briefly. This analysis will delineate the 
mutually-influencing, co-evolving relationship between the formation and 
evolution of such alliances (the `events') that have occurred over the periods and 
the links with broader changes in the economic, regulatory, business and banking 
environments over the same period (the `mechanisms'). The terms `events' and 
`mechanisms' are as used by Lawson (1997), whose taxonomy is detailed in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Finally this chapter will provide some observations regarding the lifecycle of 
strategic alliances in this sector and relate the findings back to the research 
question - Do strategic alliances add value? 
2.2 The Bankers' Propensity to Cooperate 
Trade, that is the buying and selling of goods and services, is an integral part of 
daily life. The Phoenicians traded, or bartered, dyes and spices for tin obtained 
from Cornwall and the Scilly Isles. This trade required the existence of three 
primary factors: a double coincidence of wants, a mutually agreed measure of 
value and a store of wealth. 
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`A double coincidence of wants' refers to the need of both parties to the trade 
transaction to want to exchange what they have for what the other party in the 
proposed transaction has. If this coincidence subsists, then the parties to the trade 
transaction need to agree the relative value of item one in terms of item two. 
These two conditions are sufficient in the case of the direct, and relatively 
immediate, trade of items such as one basket of fruit for two fresh fish. However, 
if the trade is not immediate then some items will also need to act as a store of 
value. Fruit and fish are perishable items, and as their value reduces over time a 
suitable non-perishable store of value needs to be found. This trading has been 
noted in all locations and has been conducted using a vast number of differing 
mediums of exchange and stores of value, including cowrie shells, sheep, cattle, 
knotted string and later metals such as bronze ingots. Copper was used in Rome, 
silver coins in Greece and iron in Ancient Britain. 
The development of coinage, followed by paper notes and then international 
letters of credit is long and interesting. Only a few highlights will be mentioned 
here, as a prelude to contemporary cooperation among banking institutions. 
Over time, gold and silver (the Persian silver-coin, the Abassi, for example) 
emerged as the preferred metals due to their longevity (they do not rust or rot) and 
the low bulk and high-ascribed-value combination. Thus gold and silver became 
generally acceptable in exchange for goods and services (Perry, 1981). 
Subsequently the gradual establishment of non-debasable coinage as the primary 
form of exchange took place. 
To consider how these developments underpinned inter-bank relationships in 
Europe we take the English case. The use of notes developed in the seventeenth 
century from the deposit of gold and silver coin and bullion in the vaults and safes 
of goldsmiths and silversmiths and the issuance of ownership rights in the form of 
gold and silversmiths' notes over that physical bullion, which both receipted the 
deposit and promised to return the deposit on demand. Over time, the receipts or 
notes, rather than the underlying gold and silver, were exchanged for goods and 
services, with goldsmiths honouring the notes issued by other reputable 
goldsmiths. To facilitate trade these notes were later issued in fixed and easily 
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tradable amounts and were made bearer-notes, payable to the holder. Accordingly 
gold and silversmith notes became easily exchangeable between traders of goods 
and services. 
Goldsmiths' noting the tendency for substantial deposits to be left in the vaults 
and the requirement to generate a return from these static holdings led to 
goldsmiths `lending' the property rights. This took place through the issuance of 
additional notes, for a finite period of time, to `borrowers' who needed to finance 
their trading activities. Thus the gold and silversmiths acted as financial 
intermediaries, or bankers, between depositors and lenders in exchange for an 
acceptable return. These early bankers were involved in the business of `offering 
services, such as the safekeeping and lending of money at interest' (Collins, 
1995), and their involvement became an integral part of the activity of trade. 
This borrowing and lending activity has, at its foundation, the need for strong 
reciprocal rights and obligations, and therefore a high degree of mutual trust. For 
example, the provision of coins to a trader by Goldsmith A against the 
presentation of a note issued by Goldsmith B requires Goldsmith A to believe that 
Goldsmith B will have sufficient resources and the will to honour its own note 
when presented for payment by Goldsmith A. 
The general principles of financial intermediation discussed above are still 
evident. The goldsmiths' notes were eventually replaced by bank notes issued by 
The Bank of England against deposits of gold and silver. Banks thus took on the 
financial intermediation role between depositors and borrowers. 
On the international side, goldsmiths' notes came to facilitate cross-border trade. 
A London based merchant would go to his banker, say Rothschilds, and request 
the issuance of a `letter of credit' payable at Rothschilds' overseas branches and at 
its partner banks in other countries. The merchant would travel to, for example, 
Paris and approach the Rothschild branch or partner bank. At this branch or bank 
the merchant would draw funds against the letter of credit to pay for goods and 
services in Paris without carrying the risk of having gold or silver coin on his 
person. This international intermediation role developed into the issuance and 
I 
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negotiation of letters of credit, which - like the borrowing and lending activity 
described above - required the establishment of a strong reciprocal relationship 
with rights and obligations, and a high degree of trust, between banks in a number 
of countries. 
This process was seen as early as the fourteenth century in continental Europe 
when, for example, the Medici bankers of Italy established international 
partnerships and branches to facilitate banking business. Lane (1985) notes that 
these international bankers `needed large organizations to carry out their extended 
operations, and in order to mobilize the necessary capital, they developed forms of 
business organization that constitute a major contribution to the development of 
capitalism'. Prior to the 1340s these firms consisted of a head office with directly 
controlled branches overseas. In the post-1340s period the Medici developed 
business structures that involved a head office holding company with subsidiary 
firms in the overseas locations. The international bankers utilized international 
bills of exchange to facilitate short-term borrowing and lending, and through this 
trade in bills created `sophisticated money markets' (Lane, 1985). The 
development of European banking ranged through the areas of influence of the 
Florentine, Genoese, Tuscan, French, southern German and London bankers. 
In order to carry out their functions of facilitating trade through the borrowing and 
lending of money nationally or internationally, bankers need to have a range of 
cooperative relationships with other bankers. This need for cooperative 
relationships is an integral and essential requirement to carry out the business of 
banking successfully. Bankers retain the right to choose with whom they establish 
cooperative relationships, and the configuration of these relationships, but the 
need to establish cooperative relationships is embedded in the nature of banking 
activity as detailed above. 
The banker can, therefore, be said to have a high pre-existing general propensity 
to enter into cooperative relationships with other bankers, whether locally or 
internationally located, and these relationships are integral and essential to 
carrying out the business of banking. 
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This underlying general propensity to cooperate is seen in payment systems, in IT 
infrastructures and in money trade and exchange patterns. Infrastructure alliances, 
as discussed in chapter one, are at the core of banking and an example of the 
general propensity to cooperate; but this is not limited to multilateral networks. 
Indeed bilateral networks such as correspondent bank relationships (defined as 
`agency relationships' where the agent is `entrusted with the business of another' 
[Perry, 1979]) are usually built on relationship preferences. Banks do have a 
choice in determining the number, location and type of counterparties in 
correspondent bank relationships but generally not whether correspondent bank 
relationships are necessary to carry out their international business. 
The next section will analyze more recent tangible forms of this general 
propensity to cooperate as seen during the 1970s through Club and Consortium 
Banks, during the 1980s through bankassurance, and during the early 1990s at the 
start of the use of virtual banks. 
2.3 The Use of Strategic Alliances in the European Banking Sector 
2.3.1 The Data Sources and Analysis Methods 
Three public sources of data were obtained and analyzed: The Financial Times 
World Banking special edition, published annually; The Economist Survey of 
International Banking, published annually; and the Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin section on Developments in International Banking and Capital Markets. 
These documents were obtained from 1970 for the 23-year period ending 
December 1993. 
This chapter reviews the `mechanisms' and `events' that occurred over the period. 
Mechanisms are, according to Lawson (1997), `structured things.. . that possess 
causal powers which, when triggered or released, act as generative mechanisms to 
determine the actual phenomena of the world'. Mechanisms are the changes in the 
underlying economy, regulation, technology etc. that lead to new observed 
opportunities, the `events' that are within the `actual domain of reality' (Lawson, 
1997). These events may include, for example, increased competition, more 
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demanding consumers, the opening up of cross-border activities (such as a result 
of the European Union). The terms are as used by Lawson and are discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
The analysis determines and identifies the close interrelationship between the 
mechanisms and changes in mechanisms and the occurrences and changes in the 
events. 
The broad analysis method was to: 
i) identify the broad changes in the economic, regulatory, business and 
banking environments (the mechanisms) over the period that underpin 
the events identified below; 
ii) identify the concrete strategic alliance events mentioned in the data 
sources; the data sources are the primarily annual (quarterly in the case 
of the Bank of England) reviews of trends in the banking sector; a 
mention in these data sources was considered to be reflective of the 
perceived high importance of the event in the sector and over the time 
period. Over the period under review this method would allow one to 
track the major events in the sector; 
iii) establish the relationship between these trends in observed events and 
the trends in changes in the underlying environments. 
2.3.2 The 1970s - The Era of Clubs and Consortium Banks 
2.3.2.1 Changes in mechanisms in the 1970s. In the post-war period there has 
been a global trend towards dismantling the pre-war and wartime controls that 
reduced freedom of choice and movement in capital and current account 
transactions. This liberalisation of capital movements was successful in 
facilitating a substantial and unprecedented growth in international trade. One 
important stage in this liberalisation trend was the establishment of Euromarkets. 
Euromarkets were established, primarily in London, in the 1960s. The term 
`Eurocurrency' refers to `deposits of [convertible] currency... which are held by 
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people who do not live in the country whose currency it is, and who keep the 
deposits in a third country' (Perry, 1979). The primary London Eurocurrency was 
US dollar funds held by non-USA nationals in banks based in London. 
The foundations of the Euromarkets, based on the interchange of funds between 
banks (and later corporations), were laid down in a number of economic and 
political events in the 1960s. 
First, the USA had levied a withholding tax on interest and dividends remitted 
abroad to residents outside the USA on their holdings of investments. The US 
dollar had by this time become, post Gold Standard, the international reserve 
currency, and the demand for dollars by international investors, institutions and 
governments was high. The effect of this tax was to increase the propensity for 
foreign investors to deposit their US dollar holdings outside the USA. 
Second, both UK and US authorities restricted overseas lending by their home 
country banks, thereby curtailing the ability of these banks to increase their 
exposure to foreign risk through the existing channels. 
Third, the imposition of Regulation Q (for internal economic management 
purposes) in the US put a ceiling on interest rates that could be paid on deposits 
held in the US. The position of the US dollar as the international reserve currency 
led to the need for external agents to hold US dollars, while Regulation Q capped 
the return on those holdings. Investors therefore sought locations outside the USA 
to place their US dollar deposits, locations where interest rates would be fully 
subject to the interplay of supply and demand. Given its established, strong and 
innovative financial services sector, London provided such a location. This type of 
mechanism also occurred when Switzerland banned interest on Swiss franc 
deposits held in Switzerland by non-resident holders and led to the transfer of 
Swiss Franc currency holdings to London. 
Fourth, the USSR had a requirement to hold assets in the reserve currency to meet 
its external liabilities. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis confrontation between 
the USA and the USSR in 1962 raised concerns in the Soviet Union that its US 
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dollar holdings in the USA could be sequestered or frozen by the USA 
government. The London based Moscow Narodny Bank was instructed to place 
US dollar deposits in non-USA banks located in London. The Moscow Narodny 
Bank was majority owned by and acted as the overseas arm of the Central Bank of 
Russia and would have a contractual relationship with the London based bank. 
The London based bank would be subject to supervision by the Bank of England 
(and its home country Central Bank) but would operate in London under UK laws 
and regulations. Thus the USA government would not have the power to sequester 
or freeze USSR owned funds held in London without application to and the 
agreement of the UK judiciary. 
These were the major factors that started the establishment of the Eurocurrency 
market, and its growth and development were substantial, integral and price 
sensitive: 
Substantial - By 1966 this market accounted for about US$10,000 million in 
deposits. By 1972 this figure had risen to over US$82,000 million (The 
Economist, 1973) of which the US dollar accounted for about 80% of transactions 
and balances. 
Integral - The Eurocurrency market is closely linked to the changes in national 
polices and international sentiment and is an integral part of global fundraising for 
governments and corporations. 
Price Sensitive - This market facilitates the cross-border flow of funds in 
accordance with changes in interest rate differentials or the pressures of 
speculation. 
Euromarkets (deposits, bonds, equities) extend beyond the physical boundaries of 
Europe and constitute an international money and capital market accessible to all 
participants. They are not subject to any form of central regulation. Euromarkets 
facilitated the flow of funds from countries that were in surplus to those countries 
that were in deficit and became an essential element in the international trade 
r 
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mechanism. This function is clearly seen in the OPEC-led oil price increase in 
1974 and the subsequent recycling of surplus. 
2.3.2.2 The Organization of Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 
1974 OPEC, a price cartel established by the major oil producing and exporting 
countries, increased the price of crude oil four-fold. This sudden increase in the 
price of raw material providing much of the energy requirements of the world had 
major effects on Euromarkets and the nature of the relationships between bankers 
and sovereign debtors. In addition to the more general economic effects there 
were four specific effects of the oil price increase. 
i) OPEC members generated substantial surplus funds. 
ii) Developed countries faced a decrease in surplus funds. 
iii) Developing countries faced a lack of funds to meet core oil based 
energy requirements. 
iv) The bankers' role in `petrodollar' recycling came to the fore. 
OPEC members, primarily based in the Middle East, received a substantial 
increase in funds from the oil purchasers. These funds were initially denominated 
in US dollars, as global sales of oil were and are denominated in US dollars per 
barrel. The OPEC countries placed these funds on deposit in banks, with a 
substantial portion placed in the London Eurodollar markets. Due to the, largely 
Arab, depositors putting a premium on liquidity, these deposits were mainly 
placed at the short-term end of the spectrum. This meant that depositors could 
withdraw their funds at short notice, although in most cases, at least in the early 
days of this deposit boom, funds were rolled over and, in effect, became medium- 
term deposits. The increase in funds in the Euromoney markets from this source 
was high and led to high liabilities and the need to find remunerating assets to 
balance the bankers' books. 
The developed countries were, and remain, the major global consumers of oil. The 
OPEC oil price increase led to a large increase in their energy costs. In the main, 
developed countries had relatively strong domestic economies and associated 
credit ratings so that they could increase their borrowings on the international 
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markets. Thus developed countries faced higher energy bills, which were paid for 
by increased borrowing on Euromarkets, including the issuance of Eurobonds. 
The non-OPEC developing countries were also dependent on oil, both to carry out 
their ongoing activities and to provide power to enhance the movement away from 
agriculture and commodity raw material dependence towards appropriate 
industrialisation. In general, developing countries did not have credit ratings to 
borrow on the Euromarkets on the same terms as developed countries. 
Bankers were receiving massive increases in their short-term liabilities through 
the deposit of petrodollars and were forced to seek asset investment opportunities. 
These would be required to generate a sufficient return to pay the interest cost of 
the deposits and operating costs, and profit needs, of the banks. In addition, the 
international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, along with developed 
country governments, were seeking global solutions to the requirement to recycle 
petrodollars to often less creditworthy borrowers (in this scenario, the developing 
countries). Some recycling through international agencies and government aid 
took place, but many plans for international public sector solutions to the issue of 
recycling petrodollars to non-OPEC developing countries were proposed, tabled, 
discussed but not enacted. Pressures on bankers, both from shareholders to find 
sufficiently remunerating assets to offset growing OPEC deposit based liabilities 
and from the international community to recycle petrodollars, led to sovereign 
borrowers being targeted. Commercial borrowers, though accessing the 
Euromarkets, were not sufficiently large to soak up these enormous surpluses. 
Developing countries had substantial funding needs to pay for their oil imports, 
and bankers eventually flocked to lend to them. 
Short-term funds received from OPEC-based depositors were lent on a long-term 
basis to developing countries directly to public (and private sector) borrowers. The 
generally held premise was that national governments would not default on their 
debts. Bankers accordingly carried out their intermediation roles and converted 
short-term deposits to long-term loans. This process simultaneously boosted the 
size of Euromarkets and their importance in the structure of global financial 
flows. International Bankers had put themselves in the peculiar position of holding 
extra-long term assets in the form of loans whose principal, it would transpire, 
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would not be re-paid by sovereign borrowers whose treasuries raised substantial 
funds through deposits sourced from the wholesale Euromarkets. This position led 
to the increasing need to continue to develop a global capital market larger than 
any one national location could support, and the need to draw smaller national, 
domestic banks into the provision of surplus funds to the wholesale Euromarkets, 
thereby ensuring the supply of funds. 
2.3.2.3 The internationalization of trade and banking. The policies, or changes in 
mechanisms, underlying the generation of a global capital market, as discussed 
above, were underpinned by post-war economic policy moves towards free trade 
and substantial growth in the international trade in goods and services. 
International trade activity by multinational firms requires financing in the form of 
letters of credit, bills of exchange and loans to build, for example, local and 
overseas manufacturing capacity. In addition, governments need to borrow to 
build the infrastructure to support these activities. Euromarkets provided the only 
source of funds of the size required to meet the scale of operations of 
multinational firms. 
Bankers follow, rather than lead, income streams generated by meeting the 
financing needs of business activity. Manufacturing and trading form the basis for 
internationalisation, and bankers internationalize in order to service their 
multinational corporate clients' requirements; bankers establish operations in 
countries where their multinational customers establish operations. As the Bank of 
England noted: `The expansion of international business has been accompanied by 
the development of world-wide banking networks, on a more sophisticated level 
then hitherto, to ensure that financial services are available to meet the needs of 
the biggest international companies. ' (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1973). 
This parallel drive towards the internationalisation of banking can be carried out 
in a number of ways: 
i) a mobilization strategy, 
ii) an `own branches' strategy, 
iii) a club (loose consortium) strategy, 
iv) a consortium bank strategy. 
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i) The mobilization strategy has at its core the view that what is critical is the 
capital or funds that a bank has access to or can mobilize, rather that the amounts 
it wields. London merchant banks hold this view. In the purest form they are not 
in themselves providers of funds but can mobilize substantial funds, on a 
transaction by transaction basis, through their contacts and relationships. 
ii) The own branches strategy is one where the bank believes that relationships 
with other banks, through club or consortium banks, are fraught with managerial 
difficulties and that such difficulties are substantially larger than the benefits 
provided. Followers of the own branch strategy would prefer to establish their 
own wholly owned branches, representative offices and subsidiaries in overseas 
countries, thereby controlling their own international network. The major USA 
banks that followed their corporate clients overseas by establishing their own 
networks preferred this strategy. 
iii) The club strategy is often a development from existing correspondent 
relationships (see Chapter One for a discussion of the Infrastructure Alliance - 
Strategic Alliance dichotomy). Here a set of banks which may know each other 
through these correspondent links agree to work together without setting up a 
separate joint venture company or undertaking a cross-shareholding. A statement 
of intent is often sufficient to initiate the collaboration. 
iv) The consortium bank strategy involves a diverse group of banks subscribing 
fresh capital to a newly formed joint venture company, the consortium bank. This 
approach enjoys elements of the mobilization and own branches strategies. 
The foregoing has considered the changes in the macro-environment, the 
`mechanisms' that underpin the development of new opportunities for the banks. 
The following subsection analyzes the growth, development and decline of clubs 
and consortium banks, the observed `events' that result from the change in 
opportunities discussed above and makes explicit the life cycle of such 
organizational arrangements. 
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2.3.2.4 Clubs and consortium banks. In 1964 Midland Bank entered into a club 
arrangement called Midland and International, based in London, with the Standard 
Bank of the UK, Commercial Bank of Australia and the (Canadian) Toronto- 
Dominion Bank. Midland bank was a leader in the adoption of this strategy. It: 
i) started earlier in using strategic alliances to internationalise, 
ii) finished later and still uses some element of alliances, 
iii) learnt through strong cooperation, 
iv) had relationships with major correspondent banks that underpinned the 
alliances. 
This club arrangement heralded the start of a trend to internationalise by 
establishing club and consortium banks that lasted into the 1970s. During this 
period the dominant change in the structure of banking practice was the increasing 
involvement of many older established banks, of various nationalities, in clubs 
and consortium banks. They offered merchant and/or commercial banking 
services in a multitude of international locations. The major banks were clearly 
divided between those that considered the club or consortium bank model the way 
forward and those that did not. This subsection will concentrate on the former. 
The clubs consisted of two or more banks that agreed to work together without 
formalising this agreement as a separate legal entity. Lorange and Roos (1992) 
would code these arrangements as `Formal Cooperative Ventures' (as discussed in 
Chapter One), and Faulkner would code them as `FNJV>2', a focused non joint 
venture alliance of more that two partners, or `CNJV>2', a complex non joint 
venture of more than two partners. In Faulkner's (1995) pantheon, `focused' refers 
to a alliance `set up to meet a clearly defined set of circumstances in a particular 
way' with `clear remits and understanding of respective contributions and 
rewards' while `complex' is where members of the alliance `recognize that, in 
combination, they form a potentially much more powerful competitive enterprise 
than they do individually, and while they are willing to co-operate with each other 
over a wide range of activities, they nevertheless wish to retain their separate 
identities and overall aspirations'. 
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The consortium bank model would be coded by Lorange and Roos as `joint 
ventures' (that is, a separate legal form with various [usually more than 2] 
shareholders and its own board of directors) and by Faulkner as a `FJV>2', 
focused joint-venture with more than two partners, or `CJV>2', complex joint- 
venture of more than two partners, or more broadly a consortium. 
The majority of clubs and consortium banks were set up in the late 1960s, with 
some earlier established groups such as Midland and International in 1964 and 
laggards such as the Orion group in 1970. 
Table 2.1 provides an analysis of the geographical scope of partners of the clubs 
and consortium banks. The table analyzes 18 club and consortium banks (Cs and 
CBs) set up during the period 1964 to 1970 as reported in The Economist (1970). 
After this report a number of changes occurred in the composition of Cs and CBs, 
with additions and deletions of members and associated changes in geographical 
scope. For purposes of this analysis, the position as at November 1970 is 
considered and the findings used to provide insights into this phenomenon. 
A number of observations can be made: 
i) the date of establishment of the Cs and CBs, 
ii) the location of the Cs and CBs, 
iii) the purpose of the Cs and CBs, 
iv) the membership spread of the Cs and CBs. 
i) The date of establishment reflects the timing of willingness to use cooperative 
solutions to the growing internationalisation needs in the case of member banks. 
This underlying propensity to enter into Cs and CBs is over and above the general 
propensity to enter into cooperative relationships displayed in all banks, as 
discussed above. Midland Bank entered into the Midland and International Club in 
1964 (item 1), predating the Banque Europeene de Credit ä Moyen Terme (item 
2), of which it is also a member, by three years. Midland Bank was therefore an 
early adopter of the club concept. This was based on its existing strong 
correspondent relationships used to facilitate international transactions. Midland is 
seen again as a member of four other Cs and CBs (items 2,5,15,17), which 
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would reflect its judgment that Cs and CBs deliver strategic advantages and 
tangible results. On the other hand, Williams and Glyns waited until the Cs and 
CBs concept was well established and only entered into the pan-European United 
International arrangement in 1970. 
ii) The preferred location of Cs or CBs is in London, with 12 of the 18 analysed 
based there. One is based in New York (item 5), one in Australia (item 17) and 
four in other European locations: Brussels (item 2), Paris and Luxembourg (item 
4), Paris (item 9), Switzerland (item 18). All but one of those not based in London 
have a London based member. This and the preferred location reflects the 
predominance of London at the centre of Euromarkets, the source of much of the 
funding provided to the multinationals whose internationalisation the Cs and CBs 
sought to serve. 
iii) The purpose of Cs and CBs is, in the main, to provide international banking 
services, leasing and advisory services on an international basis to (multinational) 
clients. In addition, Cs and CBs allow access to the Euromarkets for those banks 
that do not have an independent presence in London (for example Scandinavian 
Bank Ltd [item 12]). 
To take a hypothetical example: A UK based corporation may be expanding its 
operations into continental Europe and the USA. In the UK it can access funds 
through its local primary bank and make separate business arrangements with 
banks in, for example, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the USA and 
Canada. The UK banker, seeing this trend and wanting to both retain the UK 
relationship and capture part of, the income stream of the overseas activity, may 
enter into aC or CB arrangement. Thus the Rothschild Intercontinental 
arrangement has member banks that are present in all the countries mentioned 
above. The C and CB would assist customers thereby providing an international 
service without each member undertaking the heavy capital investment and 
additional risk of setting up dedicated branches overseas. In addition, the group 
would have a greater capacity to access Euromarkets for funds. 
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iv) The membership spread of the Cs and CBs as detailed in Table 2.1 shows a 
concentration on North America and Continental Europe, which would reflect the 
sources of major expansion of multinational business and trade in this era. The 
USA banks' involvement is not fully representative of the USA banking sector. 
The major money centre (largely New York located) USA banks preferred to 
establish their own wholly owned overseas branches or representative offices and 
displayed skepticism towards the benefits of the Cs and CBs concept. The more 
regionally and domestically concentrated USA banks, such as National Bank of 
Detroit and First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., entered into Cs and CBs as 
an access point to the Euromarkets. 
Within this general spread, individual Cs and CBs have particular foci. To take the 
example of the varied Cs and CBs of which Midland Bank is a member: Midland 
and International (item 1) builds links between the UK, North America and the 
Far East; Banque Europeene de Credit ä Moyen Terme (item 2) is solidly 
continental European; European-American Banking Corporation (item 5) is based 
in New York to access the New York markets and links with the UK and three 
continental European countries; EBIC (item 15) is continental European; and 
Euro-Pacific Finance (item 17) is based in Melbourne to service the Far East from 
the Far East. 
Whilst most C and CBs were alliances of banks, The Berne Bank for Investment 
and Credit (item 18) was established using a new idea, including major 
multinational firms as members of the C and CB for the first time. 
This membership or geographical spread can be categorized as: 
same country Cs and CBs. 
ii geographically focussed Cs and CBs, and 
iii geographically diffuse Cs and CBs. 
i) Same country Cs and CBs are established to provide member banks with a 
greater presence and capacity to borrow and lend. An example is the Scandinavian 
I 
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Banking Partners Ltd (item 12) a alliance with members from a number of 
Scandinavian countries. 
ii) Geographically focussed Cs and CBs concentrate on carrying out banking 
activity in a particular region or location in the world. An example of this is the 
Euro-Pacific Finance (item 17) concentrating on the Far East. 
iii) Geographically diffuse Cs and CBs have members or shareholders from a 
number of centers. They are not focussed on carrying out banking business in a 
particular geographical location but rather wish to capture the benefits of 
increased transaction size and risk sharing. An example of this is the United 
International (item 14) cross-European and North America Cs and CB. 
2.3.2.5 The lifecycle of clubs and consortium banks. The post Second World 
War period was characterized by an increased liberalisation of controls on capital 
and current account transactions. This process was successful in facilitating a 
substantial, and unprecedented, increase in international trade. Part of this change 
was the growth in the mobility of capital. During the 1960s a number of restrictive 
actions by governments - the USA imposing a withholding tax on US dollars, the 
USA and UK restricting overseas lending by their home banks, the USA 
Regulation Q capping interest rates paid on deposits and the USSR requiring to 
hold the international reserve currency (the US dollar) outside USA control - led 
to increased deposits in London based banks. These Euromoney deposits (broadly 
defined as currency held in a country where the held currency is not the home 
currency) started the development of the Euromarkets, centered on London. This 
rapidly growing Euromarket soon became the preferred source of funds for 
syndicated loans to companies expanding overseas to enjoy the benefits of 
liberalization in trade, particularly in the 1960s to 1970s periods. In 1974 OPEC 
(The Organization of Oil Producing Companies) increased the price of crude oil 
four-fold. This action resulted in OPEC members generating substantial funds; 
developed countries facing a decrease in surplus funds and developing countries 
facing a lack of funds to carry through oil based energy requirements. 
44 
Substantial deposits of `petrodollars' now boosted the size of the Euromarkets. 
Failed public sector initiatives to recycle the petrodollars from OPEC to 
developing countries led to a core role in recycling for the Euromoney bankers, 
with a substantial increase in lending to sovereign and overseas corporate 
borrowers. 
The internationalisation of trade led to the need for companies to source banking 
services overseas. Additionally governments required funds to develop 
infrastructure to support increased trade and further funds to provide, now 
increasingly expensive, oil based energy requirements. Euromarket bankers 
followed these income streams by meeting the financing needs of manufacturing 
and trading that form the basis for internationalisation. The bankers 
internationalised in order to service their multinational corporate clients' 
requirements and established operations in countries where their multinational 
customers established operations. 
Expansion by bankers would take three forms -a mobilization strategy 
(mobilizing funds on a contract by contract basis through their contacts and 
relationships); an own branches strategy (establishing one's own operations 
overseas); a club or loose consortium strategy (through establishing strategic 
alliances with other banks). The choice of form is dependent on the degree of 
perceived certainty of the income stream that the banker is following. An own 
branches strategy requires a high commitment of capital, increased risk, full 
returns and more difficult exit. The Cs and CBs strategy requires a low 
commitment of capital, reduced risk, shared return and easy exit. 
All Cs and CBs are a response to an opportunity or threat resulting from a change 
in the macro-environment, a change in the underlying `mechanisms'. 
Opportunities develop as changes in the market take place and the development of 
the European Union is a major factor. `Looking ahead, we in the Bank have been 
giving thought to the changes and problems in the banking world which we may 
expect to come as the nine nations of the Community progress along the road to 
economic and monetary union. In particular it seemed to us that the British 
banking industry might see advantage in some changes in structure in order to 
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more effectively compete in the wider market for banking services now opening 
up' (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1973). 
This opening up of the European banking sector led to the identification by, for 
example, Z-Bank directors of an opportunity to provide banking services to 
multinational customers in a third country. Z-Bank could realize this opportunity 
through a number of methods. It could merge with or acquire another bank in the 
overseas country; it could grow its own operations in the overseas location 
through varied degrees of involvement (for example a representative office [with 
marketing responsibility, transactions booked at home location] or a branch 
[marketing, management and transaction booking in the overseas location]); or it 
could enter into an alliance. Z-Bank directors would choose the appropriate 
method of realizing the potential gains, and mitigating the potential losses, of a 
macro-change, and the method used would vary as the conditions changed. The Cs 
and CBs strategy could be the first step into a new market place. As the market 
developed and Z-Bank gained more confidence in the continuation of the income 
stream, the bank could invest more resources in the operation e. g., setting up its 
own representative office or branch or merging with or acquiring an overseas 
partner. The Cs and CBs approach could be the appropriate method of entering 
into a new geographical, product or service market but the rationale could change 
over time and alternative methods could be utilized. 
As noted earlier, the establishment of Cs and CBs started in 1964 with the 
Midland and International grouping. A further three were established in 1967 and 
three more in 1968. In 1969 and 1970 the trend reached its zenith, with 5 and 6 Cs 
and CBs established. Thereafter the establishment of Cs and CBs was reduced. 
Scrutiny by the EEC of possible anti-competitive effects of Cs and CBs may have 
reduced the potential validity of this collaborative strategy. By 1974 very 
substantial growth in the activities and importance of the Euromarkets provided a 
stronger case for UK and continental European banks to change their 
internationalization strategy to an own branches and representative offices rather 
than a Cs and CBs strategy. The UK and continental European bankers used the 
Cs and CBs strategy only as long as it was viable. When the business case 
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changed and potential regulatory constraints were perceived, these bankers made 
pragmatic decisions to move away from the cooperative to the solo approach. 
Amongst the banks that entered into Cs & CBs there were a range of adoption 
rates - at the extremes early and late adopters. Midland Bank was an early-adopter 
of this strategy, commencing its first club arrangement in 1964. A late adopter 
Orion Group, by comparison, did not enter until 1970. Here Clubs are classified as 
banks that agree to work together without formalizing this agreement as a separate 
legal entity whilst a Consortium Bank has a joint venture structure. 
The analysis of 18 Cs and CBs in Table 2.1 is undertaken by reference to the date 
of establishment, the location, its purpose and its membership spread. The date of 
establishment was an indicator of propensity of particular banks to enter 
collaborative arrangements. Early adopters had a higher propensity, late adopters a 
lower propensity. The preferred location was London for 12 of the sample. The 
remainder whilst headquartered overseas all but one had London based members 
probably reflecting the London's position at the heart of the Euromarkets, the 
source of much of the funding that the Cs and CBs sought to provide to 
multinationals. This purpose was expanded with the addition of leasing, 
international banking and advisory services. The membership spread, mainly in 
North America, UK and Continental Europe, reflects the major expansion of 
multinational business and trade in this era. 
Within this group of 18 Cs and CBs the geographical spread is of interest. Same 
country groupings allow an enhanced presence and capacity, geographically 
focused groupings concentrate their activities in a particular region and 
geographically diffuse groupings' core driver is to enable increased transaction 
size and risk sharing. 
Table 2.2 shows 64 occurrences, as reported in The Economist, 1970, of UK and 
continental European banks belonging to Cs and CBs. These were the major banks 
in their country. In the UK all four major banks, Midland, Lloyds, Barclays and 
National Westminster, were involved in Cs and CBs with a total of 16 continental 
European banks, which are also, in the main, the major banks in their home 
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Table 2.2: Origins of Cs and CBs Participants 
country/region of origin no. of participations 
North America 22 
UK 20 
France 8 
Germany 7 
Holland 7 
Scandinavia 6 
Italy 5 
Belgium 4 
Far East 4 
Switzerland 3 
Corporates 2 
Source: Extracted from Table 2.1 Geographical Location of Members of Clubs 
and Consortium Banks. 
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country. The EEC feared that this would reduce cross-European competition with 
its attendant drawbacks. 
The original rationale for the Cs and CBs, to internationalise rapidly while 
minimizing the risk and costs of establishing strong international relations and 
accessing the expertise of the partners, was undermined by the increasing business 
rationale for an `own branches strategy'. 
In addition increasing regulatory attention and concern as to the anti-competitive 
potential of Cs and CBs also contributed to a declining rate of establishment of Cs 
and CBs arrangements. The growing importance of Cs & CBs to the City of 
London was recognized by the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Statistical 
Annex inserting a new category of banks, `Consortium Banks', in the 1976 
Bulletin (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1976) that did not exist in the 1975 
Bulletin (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1975). Over time as the rationale 
for Cs and CBs changed existing Cs and CBs were run down, resulting in residual 
elements remaining intact or continued as vehicles for a future trans-national 
merger (Scandinavian Banking Partners [item 12] being eventually liquidated in 
1997) or bought out by a partner bank and turned into a merchant banking flagship 
(Orion). 
The relationship between changes in `mechanisms' (the Euromoney markets, 
OPEC, internationalization, regulatory interest) and changes in `events' (the 
growth and decline of C and CB arrangements) is broadly summarized in Figure 
2.1 below. 
2.3.3 The 1980s: The Era of Bancassurance 
The previous section has reviewed in detail the growth and decline, the lifecycle, 
of Cs and CBs in the banking sector. Two further life cycles of strategic alliances 
in the UK banking sector can be identified: the growth of Bankassurance and the 
increased use of Virtual Banks. The purpose of the rest of the analysis in this 
chapter is to briefly review the events leading to the development of these 
collaborations and to draw attention to the continuation of these trends, and not to 
provide a comprehensive analysis. 
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UK banks were in a unique position to adopt a Bankassurance strategy. Whilst in 
the USA a legal separation of commercial banking and investment banking 
activity has been in force ever since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Universal 
Bank model held sway in Germany and Switzerland. The USA position was based 
on the reportedly mistaken belief that the banks' activities in the securities 
markets caused the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and subsequent economic 
depression. The alternative Universal Bank model combined the major activities 
of intermediation of banking and insurance in both the retail and wholesale sectors 
with the securities market roles of investment management, securities issuance, 
distribution and trading. 
In the UK the traditional segregation between merchant banks and commercial 
banks was still largely prevalent, with each operating in its own markets. This 
segregation was based on established practice rather than diktat. In the 1980s, 
however, this segregation began to break down, with commercial banks growing 
their own merchant banking operations (for example, County Bank, a subsidiary 
of National Westminster Bank). Alongside this gradual blurring of distinctions 
between commercial and merchant banks came the abolition of single capacity 
stockjobbers (a middleman between client and stockbroker) and stockbrokers 
(traders in stocks and shares) in favour of dual capacity firms in the securities 
sector. Restrictions on foreign ownership of UK institutions and securities were 
also relaxed. 
During 1983 to 1985 these changes resulted in thirty commercial banks based in 
London (of which 14 were of foreign origin) purchasing 26 stockjobbers, 9 
stockbrokers, 10 merchant banks and one insurance company (The Economist, 
1985). This was a major drive towards consolidating ownership of financial 
institutions in the hands of commercial banks, thereby forming Universal Bank 
style organizations that encompassed commercial, investment and merchant 
banking activities. 
The broad movement in London's securities sector was towards securities firms 
being acquired by capital rich commercial banks. These commercial banks also 
faced pressures of increased competition that drove up the cost of funds from 
retail depositors and drove down yields in corporate lending and securities 
transactions. In addition, the Bank for International Settlement's Capital 
Zý 
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Adequacy Accords increased both the need for more capital and the cost of 
capital. This led to a further need to increase the yield on the funds employed. 
The retail sector was focussed on as the sector that would allow banks to generate 
the required high returns, because it was characterized by a substantial number of 
transactions of relatively low individual transaction value. 
The high volume retail sector had high associated transaction costs. IT based 
solutions to basic processing needs were effective in increasing the efficiency, 
decreasing cost per transaction and thereby increasing the gross yield per 
transaction. 
During the mid-80s the nature of individual customers was also changing to 
information-rich customers who were more discerning and value-for-money 
conscious and who could, at low cost, switch from one service provider to 
another. Counterbalancing this was the increasing demand per household for a 
number of different financial services needs and the banks attempting to establish 
multi-product relationships with their customers. 
Such relationships were based on a current account with the cross selling of credit 
(overdraft, loans, mortgages), savings (accounts, endowments, annuities), 
securities (purchase and sale of equities, asset management), travel services 
(travelers cheques) etc. Two areas missing in the banks' product range were life 
assurance and general insurance. This type of product required new skills, and the 
banks purchased these skills by entering into strategic alliances with assurance 
and insurance companies (these alliances came to be termed `bankassurance'). 
The alliance usually required the assurance or insurance company to provide 
processing, actuarial and pricing skills while the bank acted as a distributor of 
products to its customers. Providing assurance and insurance products on this 
basis also made limited calls on bank capital, as the liabilities of contracts were 
covered by the amalgamated premiums under management and not the underlying 
institutional capital. The aggregate trend was towards the rapid establishment of a 
number of alliances between banks and assurance and insurance companies with 
the subsequent merger of some alliances if the business case warranted it. Unlike 
the club and consortium banks, decline of Bancassurance arrangements is not 
nearly so rapid, with such arrangements broadly categorized at the maturity stage 
of the lifecycle as displayed in Figure 2.6 below. 
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2.3.4 The 1990s: The Era of the Virtual Bank 
The previous sections have identified two lifecycles of strategic alliances, of Cs 
and CBs and Bankassurance strategies, in the UK. The lifecycles are built on the 
existing high propensity of banks to enter into cooperative arrangements to 
facilitate their business as discussed earlier in Section 2.2. As the business case for 
these alliances grew the number of alliances grew and vice versa. In the case of 
the Cs and CBs lifecycle a decline is identified whilst with the Bankassurance 
lifecycle a maturity phase is posited. 
The nature and lifecycle of Virtual Banks is qualitatively different to both the Cs 
and CBs and Bankassurance configurations and lifecycles. The purpose of the 
remainder of this chapter is to examine this assertion further. 
The traditional view of firms, as exemplified by Coase (1937) is that firms are 
independent organizations with discernible boundaries. They choose to work with 
other firms as the business case warrants it but essentially this collaboration is still 
between two discernible firms, unless they give this up through a merger or 
acquisition or through establishing another firm, a joint venture. In more recent 
strategy literature Porter exemplifies this approach in the Value Chain (Porter, 
1985,1988) and the Value System (Porter, 1985). 
The organization's Value Chain, Figure 2.2, identifies a firm as having within its 
boundaries (often in terms of both corporate control and physical location) all the 
operational functions - inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, 
marketing and sales, service - progressing the raw material from inbound logistics 
through the operations cycle, each of which adds value to the product (for 
example). The achieved sale price minus the cost of operations and activities that 
support the firm's operations of the firm - firm infrastructure, human resource 
management, technology development and procurement - is the achieved margin, 
the operating profit of the firm. This model, at its very basic, has two core 
conditions - that all activities of the firm are carried out within the firm and that 
the production process is typically on one site. Whilst the second condition does 
not always hold, the first generally does. The model is primarily based on a linear 
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manufacturing process and does not take into account the simultaneous production 
and consumption nature of services. 
The Value System Figure 2.3 below, links the organisation's value chain with the 
organisational value chain of three other parties or firms - suppliers, distribution 
channels and the customer. Porter's argument was that competition was no longer 
between individual firms but between the value system of one firm as compared to 
the value system of another firm. Further the quality of one value system is 
dependent firstly on the quality of the member firms and secondly on the quality 
of linkages between them. 
Johnson and Scholes (2002) take this further, asserting that `as organizations 
build e-commerce relationships within the value system there may be shifts in 
`architecture' of the value system towards a value network'. They define a Value 
Network as a `value system where the inter-organizational relationships are more 
fluid'. 
In the case of alliances in the banking sector, as discussed in Section 2.2 above, 
there is a general existing propensity to collaborate. There is also a high specific 
propensity to collaborate at the business level to provide the infrastructure to 
facilitate transactions and to access knowledge, processing power, to gain access 
to products, markets and customers. This specific propensity has been documented 
earlier in this chapter through the analysis of Cs and CBs and Bankassurance 
relationships. 
These alliances are part of a continuum ranging from the early obligational- 
contractural relationships of Goldsmiths, through a general propensity to 
collaborate in correspondent bank and infrastructure links, to the specific 
propensity to collaborate displayed in the two lifecycles already analysed. 
The key difference in the virtual bank lifecycle, as compared with Cs and CBs and 
Bankassurance lifecycles, is the enormous power of the supporting technology, 
now available to all, to underpin and facilitate increasingly complex value 
systems and networks. The computer technology (email, data transfer, low cost 
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telecommunications, virtual groups, seamless integration are a few examples) is 
now invasive and prevalent in most industries. 
This technology allows one to build a virtual value system where the physical co- 
location is not so important. A services firm such as a bank can now locate its 
headquarters in London and its call center in India. It can link to its suppliers via 
electronic procurement systems and to its customers via the internet and email. 
The capabilities of technology have been revolutionary in disaggregating the 
Coase (1937) conception of a firm. In his view the firm is a locus of intent and 
control with clear boundaries between the firm and the rest of the world in which 
the firm operates. Porter's value chain sums up this view and his value system 
shows the linkages between, mostly, independent firms (value chains) to build up 
a process from supplier to the customer. The technology allows the firm to situate 
its value system in many locations, linked electronically, and employ techniques 
such as just-in-time supply, overseas call centers, electronic ordering and third 
party delivery. The revolution is in the possibility of dismembering the firm's own 
value chain. The firm can outsource elements of its previously main activities - 
human resources can be run by Hays, IT by IBM, physical production in China by 
a third party firm and marketing via an agency in New York - with the `firm' 
retaining headquarters, strategy, finance and contracting in London. 
By and large the Coasian firm of clear and closed boundaries no longer exists as 
far as co-location is concerned, though not as far as ultimate control of the firm's 
strategic intent, in the developed world. Instead the firm may be defined as the 
imposition of a strategic intent over a number of activities, many carried out in 
different physical locations and by third party providers. The firm is now 
perceived as a bundle of, largely explicit and some implicit, contracts. The 
facilitator of this approach is information technology. 
This approach allows the bank to decide which activities to carry out, which 
activities to outsource and even which part of the firms value chain to consider as 
its core activity. This latter decision would be based on the individual 
competencies of employees and the aggregate capability of the firm. 
ýý 
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According to Johnson and Scholes (2002), information technology changes the 
nature of competition by changing the nature of the industry. A generic example is 
that barriers to entry can be raised due to the upfront investment, incumbents are 
still tied to previous links and at the same time barriers are lowered due to better 
informed and less loyal customers; the power of suppliers increases because of the 
possibilities for forward integration; buyers become more knowledgeable and 
therefore more discerning and demanding; substitutes increase both through 
different delivery channels, providers and alternative products and hyper- 
competition increases with markets become more commodity-like with rapid 
replication of new ideas. 
In retail banking in the UK, the blurring of distinctions between banks and non- 
banks, in relation to strategic alliances, came to the fore in the 1990s when the 
entry of non-bank providers of financial services into the UK retail sector was 
marked. Organizations with a strong brand name with the retail consumer (Marks 
and Spencers, Sainsburys, Tesco, Virgin) set up, variously, banking operations 
providing retail services such as credit cards, savings, mortgages, personal loans, 
life assurance and general insurance. These services were dependent on strategic 
alliances with bank, life assurance and general insurance companies to provide the 
products and services fronted by and sold through retailers. 
For example, the primary alliances of Tesco Personal Finance Limited are with 
The Royal Bank of Scotland, Scottish Widows and UK Insurance. The Royal 
Bank of Scotland provides banking expertise, including credit scoring, the 
management of assets and liabilities, the collection of regular payments, and the 
issuance of credit cards; Scottish Widows provides life assurance policy 
processing and management skills; UK Insurance provide, for example, motor 
insurance. Products are branded under the Tesco Personal Finance name and 
marketed through Tesco shopping sites, website and direct mail. 
Sainsburys Bank is an equity joint venture between HOBS (Halifax Bank of 
Scotland) and the retailer, Sainsbury plc. The value network encompasses over 90 
strategic or infrastructure alliances that together allow Sainsburys Bank to deliver 
retail financial services in the UK. The Core Value Network is outlined in Figure 
58 
2.4 below. It shows the clear linkages between the primary parties and details how 
each operation in Sainsburys Bank has a link with a corresponding (in terms of 
action rather than title) part of HOBS and Sainsburys plc. It is these many 
linkages that are the strength and enablers of the alliance. 
The foregoing has detailed how the Coaseian conception of the firm has changed, 
yet, by and large, the supply of raw materials and the consumption of the products 
and services is still carried out by different parties. In banking this is not the case. 
Morison (1999) details the assets of financial institutions as: 
i) information ('about customers and markets') 
ii) skill ('in using that information to access, price and monitor risk') 
iii) good reputation (`for probity and professionalism') 
iv) authority ('to undertake deposit-taking and other core business 
activity') 
v) size ('to generate economies of scale and scope... in particular to 
spread risks widely') 
vi) customer base ('and a delivery system for reaching and serving 
those customers') 
Inputs into a bank - money and information - are provided by the same customers 
who consume the services of a bank. Morison posits the Value Loop (Figure 2.5) 
in which `banks add value to the money and information they received from their 
customers by deploying their key attributes of skill, size, reputation and market 
presence' 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the history of cooperation in the banking sector with a 
focus on the relationship between changes in the economic, regulatory, business 
and banking environments and the establishment and evolution of strategic 
alliances. 
As a result of this desk research a number of observations can be made: 
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First - Bankers have a high pre-existing propensity to enter into cooperative 
relationships with other bankers, whether locally or internationally located. The 
II commercial need for a base level of such relationships (e. g: correspondent 
banking links) is deeply embedded in the very nature of banking. 
Second - The choice of whether to enter into higher-level strategic alliances is one 
that is dependent on the strength of the business case. If the potential income 
stream is initially insufficient (either in size or security) to justify full-scale 
investment, the strategic alliance allows the firm to share cost, risk and returns 
while testing the business area prior to this investment. The strategic alliance is a 
discernable event, embedded in changes in mechanisms, in the context, in which 
the strategic alliance partners operate, and involves a deliberate choice to enter 
into an alliance instead of some other route. The strategic alliance will last only as 
long as the business case justifies this rather than an alternative strategy. 
Third - The alliance entry process is one where changes in the context within 
which the bank or banks operate lead to potential new business income streams. 
Bankers then make decisions as to whether to service this potential income stream 
and which strategy to employ. If they decide to follow the income stream using a 
strategic alliances based approach, then pragmatic decisions need to be made on 
the partners, form, scope etc. of the resulting alliance. 
Fourth - Once a strategic alliance is entered into, its longevity depends on its 
success in generating returns for its partners as well as the continuation of the 
business case for such an alliance. The Cs and CBs alliances of the 1960-1970s 
displayed a short lifecycle because the business case for a solo strategy became so 
strong. The bancassurance alliances of the 1980s still generate sufficient returns 
for partners to continue their collaboration. Over time, the nature, scope and form 
of alliances co-evolve with the context in which they operate. 
Fifth - The development of new technology has changed the nature of Coase's 
(1937) conception of a firm of clear and closed boundaries, which by and large, no 
longer exists in the developed world. Instead the firm may be defined as the 
imposition of a strategic intent over a number of activities, many carried out in 
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I- different physical locations and by third party providers. The firm is now 
perceived as a bundle of, largely explicit and some implicit, contracts. The 
facilitator of this approach is information technology. This approach allows the 
bank, or non-bank financial services provider, to decide which activities to carry 
out, which to outsource and even to decide which part of the firm's value chain to 
consider as its core activity. This latter decision would be based on the 
competencies of its individual employees and the aggregate capability of the firm. 
In the specific case of a non-bank financial services provider, the concentration 
would be on marketing and branding with the production side outsourced to other 
specialist providers. 
Sixth - The lifecycle of a strategic alliance can vary both with the steepness of 
growth and decline sections of the curve and the duration of the maturity plateau. 
In Cs and CBs strategic alliances the growth curve was steep, the duration of the 
maturity plateau short, and the decline curve steep. In bancassurance strategic 
alliances the growth curve was steep, the duration of the maturity plateau long and 
the decline, except at the margins, yet to come. In Virtual Bank strategic alliances 
the growth curve is still steep and will continue because information technology 
has changed the nature of the marketplace. This is summarized in Figure 2.6 
below. 
What insight does the foregoing analysis provide into the research question - Do 
strategic alliances add value? 
Clearly at the level of the European banking industry the infrastructure alliance is 
very important to underpin and enable activities and bankers display a high 
propensity to use such alliances. Strategic alliances, on the other hand, were 
traditionally more dependent on a decision that new business streams are most 
appropriately captured by this mechanism. In the case of both the `Clubs & 
Consortium Banks' and `Bankassurance' strategic alliances lifecycles the bankers 
made a specific decision to use a strategic alliance approach, for what turned out 
to be a finite time. 
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So, infrastructure alliances add value. Strategic alliances are more complex. They 
are entered into if it is considered that they would add value and dissolved when 
they have not, or an alternative approach would add more value. The current 
virtual bank lifecycle is not the same as the previous lifecycles. Technology has 
now changed - fundamentally - the -bank's ability to use focused strategic 
alliances to outsource and relocate etc. parts of the firm. Strategic alliances may 
be used whenever and for whatever function and time that they add value, and not 
used if they do not. The period of time between use and non-use is greatly 
shortened. 
The next chapter considers the foundations of strategy, major perspectives used in 
the analysis of strategic alliances and provides a review of key academic papers 
published on the subject. 
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Chapter Three 
Strategic Alliances - The Theory and the Literature 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of foundations of strategy, major perspectives used 
in analysing strategic alliances and a summary of key academic papers. The 
review details a number of theoretical perspectives - economic (market power, 
transaction cost, agency, increasing returns, game), strategic management and 
organization (population ecology, resource-dependency, organization structure 
and management, organizational learning, trust) - and adds to understanding the 
lifecycle of a strategic alliance in the commercial world, from stages of formation 
through management and evolution to dissolution. 
3.2 Strateav 
Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington (2002) refer to primary concerns of the 
strategist as addressing questions about the `purposes, directions, choices, 
changes, governance, organization and performance of institutions in their 
industry, market and social, economic and political contexts'. Concerns of the 
strategy practitioner and strategy researcher are, by necessity, broad, holistic, 
complex and action orientated whilst also focusing on the specific, to inquire in 
depth, to reduce complexity to manageable proportions through frameworks, 
models and matrices, to provide insights for reflection and prescriptions for 
practice. 
These counterpoised trends lead to development of two primary threads in the 
strategy field: first, practitioners who make decisions in, for example, market 
contexts and, second, strategy academics researching in firms but through a lens 
of their own research contexts and traditions. The practitioner uses preferred 
tools, methodologies and perspectives to carry out analysis and make decisions; 
the academic works within research traditions be they qualitative or quantitative, 
positivist or idealist, primary or secondary. Both practitioners and scholars are 
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affected by national and industry context or, in the latter case, by traditions of the 
academic subject or institution. An ongoing dialogue between scholars, between 
practitioners (managers, consultants) and between scholars and practitioners leads 
to evolution of the strategy field. 
Strategy scholars operate in research and discipline traditions that presuppose 
particular preoccupations. The scholar, aside from engaging with the practitioner 
world, engages with other scholarly disciplines, borrowing from and contributing 
to them. Accordingly, it is necessary to review the development of strategy in the 
academic literature prior to considering the literature on strategic alliances. 
Strategy, as a scholarly discipline, is generally considered to have commenced in 
the early 1960s with Chandler's (1962) development of the dictum that structure 
follows strategy and work on rationalism and planning championed by Ansoff 
(1965). Schendal and Hatten (1972) proposed a more economics based, 
analytical, positivistic and quantitative approach to strategy whilst Porter (1980, 
1985) continued this industrial economics based emphasis and language into the 
scholarship and practice of strategy. With this the focus became the structure of 
the industry rather than the nature of the firm. The sub-disciplines of this 
approach include market power, transaction cost economics (commencing with 
Coase, 1937), agency, increasing-return theory and game theory. Whipp (1996) 
argued that the single discipline, industrial economics approach to strategy was 
flawed, that strategy was an important field and required cross-boundary 
fertilization of ideas. 
Hoskisson et al. (1999) reviewed the practice of strategy scholarship and saw a 
concentration on examination of factors that affect performance of the firm. They 
further saw a to-and-fro movement of the `pendulum' from internal (the firm, 
internal context) to external (the industry, external context), principally: 1960s and 
1970s (business policy - internal); 1980s (industrial organization economics - 
external); mid-1980s (organizational economics - internal/external); 1990s 
(resource and knowledge based - internal). Alongside this swing in internal- 
external orientation were also, according to Hitt et al (1998), swings in the level at 
which analysis took place, theoretical orientation and research methods utilized. 
ýý 
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Thus industrial organization economics based work and its derivatives use 
analysis of surveys and databases, while internally based researchers' core interest 
is in obtaining and using tangible and intangible (knowledge) resources and 
requires smaller sample studies via case or survey methods. 
The field of strategic management is still largely dependent on the industrial 
organizational economics view, that is, based on rational external industry 
analysis and positioning the firm in an appropriate place in its market/s, an 
intended strategy approach. Alternative views are expounded by writers such as 
Mintzberg et al (1976) who pondered the nature of the processes internal to the 
firm by which strategic decisions were formulated. Mintzberg characterized this 
process as one of an `emergent strategy' where the `emergent' (bottom up) and 
`intended' (top down) strategies would combine to form a third `realized' strategy 
different, but drawing, from its two constituent parts. 
Managerial and research practice in strategy is subject to preferences. That is, 
emerging management techniques are justified through their perception as a sound 
means of achieving outcomes that are important and an improvement upon 
previous techniques. These `fads and fashions' (Abrahamson, 1996) shape the 
behaviour of managers, leading to positive or negative impacts on firms, 
employees and customers. 
Whipp (1996) writes about his concern for the lack of reflexivity in the relatively 
new strategic management field, perhaps due to the multiple stakeholders 
(scholars, executives and consultants) having differing agendas and working 
according to differing timescales and levels and types of analysis. 
The industrial organization economics approach, made popular by Porter, has a 
strong hold on practice through MBA syllabi and its application directly in firms 
and through consultancies. Bourgeois (1984) was an early commentator on the 
flaws of this deterministic school and drew attention to the: 
-, ý., 
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i) reductionist nature 
ii) lack of examination of causal links between structure of the industry 
and behaviour of the firm 
iii) lack of study of content and process of strategy reciprocally and 
simultaneously 
iv) lack of combination of qualitative and quantitative data use 
v) lack of appreciation of the need to move from industry level context to 
the firm level context 
Future development of strategy has at its core the change towards a greater link 
between the external world within which the firm operates and the internal world 
of the firm. Decades ago, but in a work still influential, Coase in `The Nature of 
the Firm' (1937) defined a firm as an organization that `consists of the system or 
relationships which come into existence when the direction of resources is 
dependent on an entrepreneur'. He asserted that business activity is carried out 
either in `free' markets or within boundaries of a firm and that by organizing and 
co-ordinating resources, capabilities and directing production the `manager- 
entrepreneur' in a firm can gain a significant cost advantage over market based 
transaction costs. 
How then does the manager-entrepreneur access these resources? Mergers and 
acquisitions allow control but do not easily allow integration; organic growth is 
costly and takes time; and co-opting another firm's resources is both less costly 
and allows short-term access. The manager-entrepreneur no longer requires total 
ownership of resources but rather the ability to `rent', and control, resources as 
necessary. Accordingly, the primary concern is to be able to gain access to, 
configure and manage these resources, wherever located, to meet the firm's needs. 
This approach opens up the firm's boundaries, making them permeable to other 
firms (but still within the control of the rent paying firm) to include co-opted 
resources. Collaboration with other firms becomes the norm. As Burton (1995a) 
writes, strategists need to take a `Composite Strategy' approach and: 
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i) choose the combination of competitive and collaborative strategies 
that are appropriate in the various dimensions of the firm's industry 
environment 
ii) blend the two elements together so that they interact in a mutually 
consistent and reinforcing, and not counter-productive, manner; so as 
to 
iii) optimize the firm's overall position, drawing upon the foundation and 
utilization of both collaborative and competitive advantage 
In this scenario the Porter model of competitive advantage is supplemented by the 
Burton model entitled `The Five Sources Framework'. In this framework (as 
displayed in Figure 3.1) determinants of collaborative advantage are analysed and 
(together with determinants of competitive advantage) are appropriately and co- 
reinforcingly mixed to provide a Composite Strategy. A core decision is whom to 
ally with, which webs of firms to collaborate with and what role to play in those 
webs. 
As Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington (2001) state, `A combination of highly 
porous firm boundaries, denser information links, pervasive issues of trust and 
reciprocity and the constant imperative to find, retain and motivate talent make the 
interface between strategizing and organizing a constant challenge'. Strategy is 
no longer one side of a dichotomy of strategy and implementation. Rather it is an 
active and interlinked process of strategizing and organizing for advantage in 
comparison with competing firms and webs, the latter made up of multiple 
strategic alliances of firms. 
Strategic alliances are obligational-contractural relationships that are in-between 
markets and hierarchies. They are not free market competition or internalization 
with one firm rather an agreement to work together, in certain areas, for mutual 
benefit. They require member firms to agree to collaborate, to share resources, to 
allow the `rent' of capabilities, tangible resources and distribution networks for a 
period of time that suits the member firms. The volatility of markets and 
industries that the firms and strategic alliances operate in ensures that such 
alliances only last as long as they confer a collaborative advantage. 
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previously-unrelated industries 
suppliers 1 industry collaborators 2 buyers 
horizontal strategic alliances 
complements and substitutes 
Key: 
1. relational contracting and quasi-integration with suppliers 
2. partnering with channels/buyers 
3. prospecting diversification alliances 
4. related diversification alliances 
Figure 3.1: Analyzing Collaboration: The Five Sources Framework 
Source: Adapted from Burton, (1995a) 
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3.3 The Key Perspectives 
Scholars use and promote a number of perspectives to discuss strategic alliances 
and joint ventures. Each perspective provides insights into the theory and practice 
of strategic alliances but, by itself, is not sufficient to view the full complexity of 
alliance activity. 
The perspectives can be said to fall into broad groups of Economic, Strategy and 
Organization. 
3.3.1 Economic Perspective 
The output minus input relationship is here under scrutiny. An organization may 
wish to increase its dominance of a market and therefore the ability to charge 
extraordinary rents. Alternatively, it may wish to build trust endowed 
relationships with alliance partners to minimize costs and maximize potential 
payoffs. 
3.3.1.1 Market power theory. Market power or monopoly theory, has at its core 
the concept of dominance, of high barriers to entry and therefore reduced potential 
competition. The higher the market share or monopoly/quasi-monopoly enjoyed 
by the firm, the higher the barriers to entry of potential competitors, the greater the 
autonomy in setting high prices and thereby the ability to increase profits. 
Strategic alliances may be used in a negative sense to provide a forum for 
collusion between participants in the same industry or they may be used in a 
legitimate form to, for example, secure and develop know-how. 
In this perspective, offensive coalitions diminish the competitors' market share or 
increase their production and distribution costs while defensive coalitions build 
increased barriers to entry, thereby attempting to secure the position of alliance 
member firms by reducing competition and increasing profits. 
The `value chain' concept, introduced by Porter (1985) can be used to distinguish 
between: 
"vom 
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i) alliances that seek to provide increased economies of scope, reduce 
risk by sharing, including knowledge. Here the intention is to increase 
market share and secure economies of scope, a cost leadership strategy. 
ii) alliances that link different parts of the value chain of the partners to 
the alliance in a complementary way so as to enhance their overall 
competitive advantage, a differentiation strategy 
Market power theory allows for both methods in generating enhanced market 
I 
-I- power and therefore increased returns. In this approach, strategic alliances are an 
alternative choice, alongside competitive or acquisitional strategies for increasing 
this power, and participants make a continual, and opportunistic, choice between 
cooperative or competitive alternatives. 
This theory assumes that industrial, national and international contexts - the 
structure of markets, regulation etc. - will determine and constrain the 
appropriate strategy. It therefore does not give much credence or importance to 
how member firms may use an alliance proactively. 
3.3.1.2 Transaction cost economics theory. Transaction cost economics is 
grounded in the work of Coase (1937), wherein the boundaries of the firm are 
examined. Firms are established because the entrepreneur-manager can manage 
the organization of resources in a more effective and cost optimizing way than the 
marketplace. By reducing costs, the entrepreneur may realize the opportunity to 
reduce prices (and compete on the basis of price) while retaining the same margin, 
or to maintain prices (and compete on a differentiation basis) while increasing the 
margin enjoyed. Firms expand as the manager-entrepreneur takes more 
transactions under his or her control, and firms shrink as their ability to manage 
the higher volume of transactions, in comparison to through the market 
mechanism, decreases. Williamson (1985) noted that `a transaction occurs when a 
good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface'. 
Transaction costs are incurred as a result of negotiation costs, drawing up 
contracts, logistics and monitoring. They reflect costs incurred in `arranging, 
managing and monitoring transactions across markets' (Child and Faulkner, 
1998). 
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The stark choice provided by this perspective seems to be either to carry out 
economic transactions through market-based exchanges or to internalize them 
within a single firm. However, Williamson (1986) argues that multiparty, 
reoccurring transactions will take place when: 
-- 
i) the choice of partners is limited 
ii) market conditions are complex and/or uncertain 
iii) there is information asymmetry 
and that the governance structure to be used should be based on attributes of the 
transaction to be undertaken (asset specificity). That is, one-off, relatively short- 
term duration, non-specific asset based transactions are suited to market based 
mechanisms ('Markets'). Where transactions are recurrent, have uncertain 
outcomes with long lead times and require unique or transaction-specific 
investments, they can be more effectively conducted within firms ('Hierarchies'). 
Williamson proposes that two further possibilities lie between these extremes 
depending on the frequency of transactions. 
i) if occasional frequency: market based contracting supported by 
third party arbitration and litigation is the appropriate form of 
governance 
ii) if of reoccurring frequency: relational contracting (long-term 
investment in building relationships between members) and 
bilateral governance (mutual investment of specific assets that 
generate mutual dependence and act as hostages against 
opportunism) are more appropriate. These latter factors admit the 
possibility of intermediary (between markets and hierarchies) 
forms of organization such as obligational-contractural relations 
including strategic alliances. 
This theory is primarily concerned with a static point efficiency and discloses little 
about development of trust in relationships, a matter which is discussed later in the 
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chapter. A detailed analysis of strategic alliances using the transaction cost 
economics approach is undertaken in Chapter One of this thesis. 
3.3.1.3 Agency heory. Agency theory has, as its primary concern, the ability of 
`principals' to ensure that `agents' are fulfilling their objectives. Eisenhardt 
(1989) pinpoints the contractual agreement between the principal and agent as the 
central unit of analysis and states that embedded in this theory are a number of 
assumptions: 
i) that human behaviour is self interested, is subject to bounded 
rationality and is risk averse 
ii) that organizations contain goal conflict among members, that there 
is asymmetry of information 
iii) that information is a purchasable commodity, and principals can 
secure more detailed information about the conduct of their agents 
Accordingly, agency theory focuses on developing the most efficient contract 
governing the relationship between principal and agent: that is, whether a 
behaviour-orientated contract is more efficient that an outcome-orientated one. 
The former includes working to a set of hours, salary, and managerial hierarchy 
while the latter is based on rewards subject to marketplace (such as stock prices) 
performance. 
The previously outlined Market Power and Transaction Cost Theories largely 
focus on the position of the organization in its markets (and its ability to 
manipulate its market to suit its own ends). Neither provide more than a static, 
one-shot, view of the world and do not develop obligational-contractural 
relationships and co-evolution in alliances. Agency theory provides a place for 
self-interest and incentives in analyzing organizations. It draws attention to the 
implications of contractually framed behaviour under conditions of uncertainty 
and the need to establish systems to provide the principal with information about 
the activities of the agent to assist the former to control the latter. 
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As Child and Faulkner (1998) summarize: `The principal implication of agency 
theory is therefore that, just as a principal is advised to put in place a combination 
of incentives and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that an agent's behavior 
remains consistent with the principal's objectives, so the partners to a cooperative 
venture would be advised to make clear to each other the basis on which each will 
share returns from effective cooperation, and to put into place the systems for 
information to be shared between them. These provisions should reduce suspicion 
between the partners and so provide a basis for mutual trust to develop through 
their working relationship. As and when the partners do trust each other more, so 
the monitoring mechanisms emphasised by agency theory can become less 
prominent. ' 
3.3.1.4 Increasing returns theory. Increasing returns emphasises the relationship 
between factor inputs and returns. Traditional economics presupposes that, past a 
certain point, increased factor (raw materials, labour etc. ) inputs lead to 
diminishing returns. This view provides for an equilibrium point at which factor 
inputs are efficiently allocated. But markets do not in fact move to and stay at an 
equilibrium point but rather the more likely norm is a state of dynamic 
disequilibrium. That is, markets are always changing and organizations 
continually need to form new balance points between factor inputs and returns. 
This tendency is more prevalent in knowledge-based industries where continuing 
returns are seen. Firms in these (for example, technology) industries can build an 
early dominance and lock in customers without decreasing returns. Indeed 
technology-based increasing-returns markets drive firms to form strategic 
alliances to achieve an early critical mass with which to dominate the market. 
This view is confirmed by Bettis and Hitt (1995), who assert: `In industries with a 
high knowledge content, as opposed to natural resource-based industries, it is 
uncommon for diminishing returns to occur; instead positive feedback is present 
where returns continue to increase.. . the optimum scale may 
be the entire market 
and the first mover advantages or an early lead in market share may be quickly 
magnified into market dominance. ' 
3.3.1.5 Game theory. Game theory was originally developed as a mechanism for 
using the language and analytical power of mathematics to analyze and solve 
ýý 
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some types of economic events - especially economic decision making or 
coordination under uncertainty or in the presence of ignorance. According to 
Rapaport (1961), games vary according to a number of parameters: the number of 
players (range from two-person versus n-person games), their interests (conflict, 
coincide, or both), the nature of information access (perfect versus imperfect, 
complete versus incomplete), the number of times the game is played, the degree 
of communication allowed between the players and the ability to make promises, 
commitments or threats. 
The most elementary games are two-person, independent decision, unknown 
outcome games. The type of game attempts to understand the balance between 
conflicting desires to act selfishly and to act for the common good. Some such 
games can be extremely poignant, such as the one described by Casti (1992): `In 
Puccini's opera Tosca, Tosca's lover has been condemned to death, and the police 
chief Scarpia offers Tosca a deal. If Tosca will bestow her sexual favours on him, 
Scarpia will spare her lover's life by instructing the firing squad to load their rifles 
with blanks. Here both Tosca and Scarpia face the choice of either keeping their 
part of the bargain or double-crossing the other. Acting on the basis of what is 
best for them as individuals, both Tosca and Scarpia try a double-cross. Tosca 
stabs Scarpia as he is about to embrace her, while it turns out that Scarpia has not 
given the order to the firing squad to use blanks. The dilemma is that this 
outcome, undesirable for both parties, could have been avoided if they had trusted 
each other and acted not as selfish individuals, but rather in their mutual interest. ' 
In this scenario there are two decision making parties, Tosca (A) and Scarpia (B) 
and both have the choice of cooperating or defecting. The maximum attainable 
value for each is three and the minimum value is one. Drawing on Child and 
Faulkner (1998), the possible outcomes of this two person, zero-sum game, from 
Tosca's perspective, are detailed below in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
The best option for each individual is option 1 for Tosca and option 4 for Scarpia. 
For Tosca to cooperate without knowing Scarpia's likely response is to risk the 
`sucker's pay-off (option 4, score 0, Tosca submits, lover dies), so rationally 
Tosca should defect and gain either the option 1 (Tosca score 3, lover lives, no 
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Table 3.1: Outcomes of Tosca-Scarpia Game 
Tosca (A) Scarpia (B) A score B score Total 
option 1 defects Cooperates 3 0 3 
option 2 cooperates Cooperates. 2 2 4 
option 3 defects Defects 1 1 2 
option 4 cooperates Defects 0 3 3 
Source: Drawn from Child and Faulkner, (1998), Analysis 
Table 3.2: Actions of Tosca-Scarpia Game 
Tosca Scarpia Rifles Lover 
option 1 Stabs 
Scarpia 
loads blanks blanks escapes 
option 2 submits loads blanks blanks escapes 
option 3 Stabs 
Scarpia 
does not load blanks not 
blanks 
Dies 
option 4 submits does not load blanks not 
blanks 
Dies 
Source: Drawn from Child and Faulkner, (1998), Analysis 
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surrender) or lesser option 3 outcome (Tosca score 1, stab Scarpia, lover dies). 
Neither Tosca nor Scarpia have any prior knowledge or insight into how the other 
will act. If they did, they could cooperate (option 2), both score 2 (lover lives) 
I; and raise their total return to 4. The tendency of both Tosca and Scarpia, however, 
will be to not trust each other and to defect, especially if the `game' is played only 
once. 
Axelrod (1984) carried out a series of experiments to test the cooperation 
dimension of game theory over a series of consecutive games. He confirmed that 
the best strategy was to follow two rules known as tit-for-tat - that is, to cooperate 
at the start and thereafter to act in the same way as the other player did in the 
previous round. This approach provides a reward for cooperation, through 
increased payoffs, and a penalty for defection. As the game is played over time, 
increased payoffs to cooperation accumulate to both players with occasional 
corrective penalties for defection. 
In a single-play, zero-sum game, the strategy of defection (competition) is the 
rational one. In a multiple-play, non-zero-sum game, series cooperation is more 
likely to pay higher yields and is the optimal strategy for both players. To defect, 
in the latter type of game, means risking one's reputation and the possibility of 
missing new cooperation opportunities. 
The tit-for-tat strategy has inherent disadvantages when applied to reality. No 
communication in unlikely in multi-play situations such as a strategic alliance. 
Here what is more likely is that the players (partners in the strategic alliance) will 
be able to communicate with each other. This, according to Ridley (1996), `leads 
them to cooperate with cooperators, return to cooperating after mutual defection, 
and punish a sucker by further defection, but it assumes that they continue to 
cooperate after being a sucker in the previous round'. 
Game theory has value in assisting attempts to determine choice between 
competition (defection) and cooperation through a strategic alliance. The theory 
does, however, presume that the actor in each firm is a single decision maker, not 
a number of managers with differing perceptions of the alliance or the interface, 
ýý 
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and assumes that decisions are arrived at through a process of rational analysis 
and clear information on actions and counter-actions. 
3.3.2 Strategic Management Perspective 
This perspective draws attention to the requirement for actual or prospective 
partners to an alliance to determine a fit between their respective strategies. Such 
an inter-organizational fit may be at the macro-level, between strategies and 
national industry environments, or at the micro level, between the organization's 
internal capabilities, systems, ethos. The former generally commences with an 
analysis of the rationale for entering into alliances and the choice of partner, while 
the latter borders on organization theory work. 
Harrigan (1988b) asserts that the choice of partner is essentially a rational and 
analytical process. Contractor and Lorange (1988) in attempting to show this 
rational process identify seven, variously overlapping, objectives for entering into 
cooperative arrangements. They are: 
i) risk reduction 
ii) achievement of economies of scale and/or rationalization 
iii) technology exchanges 
iv) co-opting of blocking competition 
v) overcoming government-mandated trade or investment barriers 
vi) facilitating initial expansion of inexperienced firms 
vii) vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary 
contributions of partners in a `value chain' 
Following on Geringer (1991) distinguishes between two types of partner 
selection criteria: task and partner related. `Task-related' criteria have to do with 
items such as the internal value chain activities - resources (finance, 
competencies, factories, marketing and distribution, institutional environment) 
while `partner related' criteria have to do with association competence (culture - 
corporate or national, past favourable alliance activities, trust between 
management teams, structure and size). Lawrence and ul-Haq (1997) examine the 
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nature of bounded rationality in the short-listing of a selection of potential alliance 
partners, a process that encompasses both task and partner-related factors with the 
latter often being prior and primary. 
To sum up the foregoing, market power and transaction cost theories provide a 
basis for cooperation as mechanisms for, respectively, increasing monopolistic 
tendencies and generating extraordinary returns, and reducing the cost of 
transactions, thereby allowing reduced prices or increased margins. Game theory 
provides a further rational explanation of the cooperation/competition choice. 
Strategic management theory provides for a number of differing reasons for firms 
to enter into alliances and allows for the selection and matching of partners taking 
into account their external contexts and the match or complementarities of internal 
contexts. 
3.3.3 Organization Perspective 
This area of theorizing about strategic alliances is made up of five main sub- 
perspectives: population ecology, resource dependency, organization, 
organizational learning and trust. 
3.3.3.1 Population ecology týheory. Population ecology theory proposes studying 
populations of firms, `homogeneous group of organizations in a certain industry' 
(Aldrich, 1979), and posits that the survival and development of these populations 
is contingent on their successful adaptation to changes in the external context in 
which the organization operates. Such changes lead to a process of selection of 
future members dependent on the ability of current members to adapt to these 
structural changes in the industry. Firms that can adapt do so and may survive a 
natural selection process and prosper, while firms that cannot or will not adapt are 
subject to structural inertia. Strategic alliances or cooperative arrangements are 
responses to uncertainty in the external environment (Aldrich, 1979) and attempts 
to adapt by reconfiguring available resources and access new resources to meet 
new needs. 
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3.3.3.2 Resource-dependency theory. Resource dependency theory has, at its 
core, the view that a firm's resources, rather than the products it produces, are 
defining factors in its competitive position. (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
Resources may be tangible such as manufacturing equipment, factories, 
computers, offices, staff, or intangible such as intellectual property rights (patents, 
copyrights, brands, goodwill), knowledge resources (carried in the minds of staff, 
for example) or other such capabilities embedded in internal processes of the firm. 
It follows that this view puts the acquisition, control and utilization of resources in 
an appropriate manner as primary activities of the firm's management. Resources 
can be acquired by acquisition or merger along, and through the lengthening of, 
the value-chain via backward/forward integration or expanding the width of the 
value-chain through a horizontal merger. Resources can also be grown internally, 
though this would take longer than the mergers and acquisition (M&A) route. 
Both the M&A and organic routes provide a high degree of control over resources. 
In the post-M&A firm the board of directors has direct control over the firm's 
resources but may well have to deal with a number of issues relating to integration 
of resources, people, culture and processes. Similarly in organic growth situations 
the resources are being developed in a mono-culture and set of existing processes 
and procedures and may be blind to new ideas or perspectives. 
With increasing turbulence in the external environment, the organization is 
continually required, by competitive pressures, to provide innovative products or 
services to meet ever-changing needs among individual and corporate consumers. 
This ratcheting-up of the general speed at which innovation needs to take place 
tends to make M&A and organic growth comparatively slow mechanisms for 
acquiring resources. Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) assert that scarcity of appropriate 
resources leads to organizations attempting to exert a degree of influence over 
firms that have the required resources through engaging in inter-organizational 
relationships. Partners anticipate that benefits of acquiring these resources will 
exceed the costs according to Simard (1996). 
The resource-dependency view of strategic alliances emphasizes the importance, 
in effective competition, of the ability to possess a set of core competences 
1 
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(Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) and leads to the view that even when organizations 
recognize deficiencies in their critical competencies they lack the ability either to 
develop these competencies or the ability to develop them sufficiently quickly. 
Entering into an alliance, in order to access the required competencies leads to a 
fluctuating balance of power between participants that is dependent on control 
structures, degree and nature of investment and degree of need to access the other 
partner's resources. 
3.3.3.3 Organization structure and management theory. This approach provides 
a locus for considering practical issues of how to structure, manage and organize 
strategic alliances. However, the variety of forms of alliances makes them difficult 
to analyze, according to Borys and Jemison (1993). 
Child and Faulkner (1998) classify the extant literature into three areas; 
i) the relative importance of structure and process in the management of 
alliances 
ii) their network or quasi-network nature 
iii) issues of the degree and type control, autonomy and learning 
i) Structure and Process 
Doz and Prahalad (1993) argue, in relation to decentralized multinational 
corporations, that `one needs a theory that transcends the structural dimensions 
and focuses on underlying processes... more than the formal structure, the 
informal flow of information matters. So do the processes of influence and 
power, such as how the trade-offs among multiple stakeholders and multiple 
perspectives are made'. As mechanisms for accessing resources in turbulent and 
fast changing environments strategic alliances are subject to re-configuration more 
often than multinationals. While formal structures do exist, informal exchange of 
information needs to be taken into account. Effective bilateral-multilateral 
information flow is a requisite for developing operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, cultural (corporate and national) understanding and cohesion and 
dynamic learning. 
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ii) Network Nature 
Networks are classified by Faulkner (1995) as being `characterized by a high 
sense of mutual interest, active participation by all partners, and open 
communications'. These networks of firms act as a conduit for sharing 
knowledge. Indeed while transaction cost theory surmises that alliances act as a 
mechanism for reducing costs of open market transactions while mitigating 
rigidities of firms, networks generally exist for resource complementary issues - 
that is, a network member provides a function which is synergistic with a different 
contribution from another member of the network (Johanson and Matsson, 1991). 
These networks provide access to increased production capacity, speed of 
response to market changes, competencies and resources not owned by a firm, 
industrial intelligence and information from outside its borders. 
As Child and Faulkner (1998) summarize, `The degree of prominence networks 
have received has significantly increased in recent years. This is due largely to 
the globalisation of markets and technologies, leading to the widespread growth of 
cooperative activity as a necessary strategy, if firms with a limited financial 
strength, focussed competencies, and limited `global reach' are to be able to 
compete in global markets. An attractive characteristic of many networks, then, is 
that they help members to achieve increased global reach at low cost and with a 
minimum time delay .... They enable synergies between members to be captured, 
and provide the conditions for the achievement of scale-and-scope economies 
through specialization. ' 
iii) Control and Autonomy 
Child and Faulkner (1998) address the issue of control in strategic alliances by 
proposing that `the collaboration between partners is balanced against the 
potentially competitive aspects of their relationship, and each partner seeks to 
reconcile the alliance's activities with its own strategy and pattern of operations. 
Insufficient control over an alliance can limit a partner's ability to protect as well 
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as efficiently utilize the resources it provides to the alliance, and to achieve the 
goals it has set for the alliance'. 
3.3.3.4 Organizational learning theory. Organization learning rests on the 
generally accepted assumption that adaptation to external environmental change 
and the enhancement of internal capabilities are essential elements of a successful 
strategy. Both require some form of `learning' by the organization, that is the 
embedding of learning in the procedures, precepts and processes of the firm. 
Some theories emphasise individual learning, others learning `by' the 
organization. In most cases theorists see these as interrelated. De Geus (1988) 
argues that the primary competitive advantage in the future will be the ability of 
individual managers of one firm to learn faster than individual managers of a 
competing firm. Villinger (1996) also stresses learning takes place at an individual 
level and consists of `the process of developing a potential to improve actions 
(behaviours) through better knowledge and understanding (cognition)'. By 
contrast, Argyris and Schon (1978) find that `organizational learning is not merely 
individual learning, yet organizations learn through the experience and actions of 
individuals'. Like Villinger, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) state `knowledge is 
created only by individuals and an organization can only support creative 
individuals or provide suitable contexts for them to create knowledge'. They go 
on to differentiate between individual and organizational knowledge creation: 
`Organization knowledge creation... should be understood as a process that 
`organizationally' amplifies the knowledge created by individuals and crystallizes 
it as part of the knowledge network of the organization. This process takes place 
within the expanding `community of interaction' which crosses intra- and inter- 
organizational boundaries'. Moreover organizations may adopt cooperative 
strategies as mechanisms to acquire new knowledge. Inkpen (1995) asserts that 
learning processes between partners are requisites for successful cooperation. 
This analysis leads to two main issues: 
i) how to convert individual learning into organizational learning 
ii) how to engender (or withhold) the transfer of learning across intra- 
firm borders 
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i) Individual vs. Organizational Learning 
Polanyi (1966) differentiates tacit and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
person specific, often intuitive and embedded in its context. It is difficult to 
verbalize, to formalize, to communicate to others. Explicit knowledge is codified 
and can be transmitted across the organization in formal and systematic ways. 
The conversion of tacit, individual and private knowledge into collective, 
organizational and shareable knowledge requires codification. Argyris and Schon 
(1978) assert that organizational learning takes place at a number of levels: 
`single-loop', `double-loop' and `deutero-learning'. Child and Faulkner (1998) 
classify these as `routine improvements', `reframing of organizational systems and 
perspectives' and `learning how to learn'. Table 3.3 illustrates these classification 
systems. 
ii) Transfer vs. Non-Transfer 
Barriers to conversion from tacit to organizational knowledge include a lack of 
awareness of one's tacit knowledge. Some individuals retain control over their 
knowledge by maintaining it in tacit form and share it with others only through 
personal interaction and in exchange for other knowledge (in project focussed 
teams, for example). 
The internal structures, strong hierarchical reporting lines and `Chinese Walls' 
concept may also dampen transmission of tacit and explicit knowledge across 
intra-firm boundaries. `Chinese Walls' are used to describe, for example, explicit, 
though in practice often permeable, barriers to sharing price-sensitive information 
between trading and corporate finance departments of an investment bank. 
The issue of transfer or non-transfer of tacit or explicit knowledge across inter- 
firm boundaries becomes a core issue in strategic alliances. Child and Faulkner 
(1998) elevate the `ability to learn' (higher level `deutero learning' as detailed in 
Table 3.3) as `probably the most important intangible asset that a company can 
possess. Its enhancement is frequently the main motive for entering into 
collaboration with other companies. Alliances create learning opportunities... '. 
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Table 3.3: Levels of Organizational Learning 
Levels Theoretical a oach Pragmatic approach 
Higher learning-'deutero learning' Strategic learning 
learning how to learn so as to changes in managerial mindsets, especially 
improve the quality of the in understanding the criteria and 
organizational learning process itself conditions 
for organizational success 
Middle reframing - 'double loop' systemic learning 
changes of existing organizational changes in organizational systems, with an 
frameworks-involves questioning emphasis on learning how to achieve 
existing systems-orientated towards better integration of organizational 
survival in changing environmental activities 
conditions 
Lower routine - 'single loop' technical learning 
improvements and adjustments to the acquisition of new specific techniques 
optimize performance within the such as more advanced production 
limits of existing organizational scheduling, or managerial techniques such 
frameworks and systems as more advanced selection tests 
Source: Child and Faul ner, 1998. Includes Argyris and Schon (1978) 
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Geringer (1991) notes that a perception of complementarities by alliance partners 
is a requirement for cooperation to extract benefits of learning from each other so 
as to compete better with other firms. Partners to an alliance can learn from each 
other in an attitude of collaboration or competition. In the former, learning may 
be from each other or with each other (Inkpen, 1995). In the latter, one partner 
would not be interested in collaborative learning but rather intends to learn rapidly 
from the other partner - to cooperate to `access knowledge which they may 
subsequently turn to competitive advantage against their partners' (Child and 
Faulkner, 1998). This dichotomy provides a danger - today's collaborator may be 
tomorrow's competitor - and thus the decision to collaborate and to transfer 
knowledge (equally or differentially) can be construed as a Game Theory type 
decision. 
Asymmetric learning in cross-border strategic alliances was stated by Hamel 
(1991) as being the practical manifestation of this danger - `managers often 
voiced a concern that, when collaborating with a potential competitor, failure to 
`outlearn' one's partner could render a firm first dependent and then redundant 
within a partnership, and competitively vulnerable outside it. The two premises 
from which this concern issues seemed to be that (1) few alliances were perfectly 
and perpetually collusive, and (2) the fact that a firm chose to collaborate with a 
present or potential competitor could not be taken as evidence that the firm no 
longer harboured a competitive intent vis-a-vis its partner'. 
Pucik (1991) observes that `Organizational learning is not a random process, but a 
carefully planned and executed set of policies and practices designed to enlarge 
the knowledge base of the organization. Preventing an asymmetry (or creating an 
asymmetry in one's favour) in organizational learning is a strategic requirement 
for firms engaged in competitive collaboration, when technology is transferred 
between competitors. Win/win outcomes so fashionable in academic literature are 
not likely to occur with one of the partners placed at a bargaining disadvantage. 
Not providing a coherent strategy for the control of invisible assets in a 
partnership is a sure formula for failure. ' 
Accordingly effective learning between two or more firms in an alliance requires: 
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i) intention to learn 
ii) necessary capacity to learn 
iii) ability to convert acquired knowledge into useful resource 
and this is predicated on: 
i) reduction of emotional and cognitive barriers 
ii) reduction in organizational barriers 
iii) openness of inter-organizational communication 
iv) effective circulation of knowledge 
3.3.4 Trust Perspective 
In the trust perspective, mutual - and often differential or asymmetrical - 
dependence on a partner or partners is an essential part of an alliance. Trust, `the 
willingness of one party to relate to another in the belief that the other's actions 
will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the first party, even though this cannot 
be guaranteed' (Child and Faulkner, 1998) is necessary to a successful strategic 
alliance. As partners invest specific tangible assets into an alliance or allow and 
encourage transfer of intangible assets (such as knowledge and patents) into a 
strategic alliance, they put themselves at risk; for example, one might exit from 
the alliance and use the acquired knowledge to compete with former partners. 
According to Creed and Miles (1996), increased trust between strategic alliance 
partners is beneficial, because trust: 
i) reduces bounded rationality (sharing of information leading to 
better informed actions and decisions) 
ii) provides safer investment in specific assets (trust leading to 
increased non-transferable investment) 
iii) reduces opportunism (trust produces good will, which reduces 
temptation to take advantage of other partners) 
All this results in reduced transaction costs for the partners. 
L. 
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The trust perspective may deal with any of three areas; bases of trust, evolution of 
trust and social constitution of trust. 
3.3.4.1 Basis for trust. Lane (1998) differentiates between impacts of 
calculation, understanding and personal identification in such relationships. These 
broadly equate with stages in the length of time that cooperation has been in place 
and/or depth of cooperation. 
The first stage, calculative trust, `involves expectations of each other, based on a 
calculus which weighs the cost and benefits of certain course of actions to either 
the trustor or the trustee'. This view holds that calculative trust is `an on-going 
market-oriented calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes 
resulting from creating and sustaining a relationship relative to the costs of 
maintaining or severing it' (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). This is based on the 
assumption that the cost and penalties for breaking trust are greater than for 
maintaining it at the formation stage. 
The second stage, based on understanding, is the sharing of a common viewpoint 
or ways of thinking leading to a position where parties to an alliance can predict 
the other's behaviour towards fulfilment of shared expectations. Lewicki and 
Bunker (1996) term this type `knowledge based trust' and note that it `is grounded 
in [the] other's predictability - knowing the other sufficiently well so that the 
other's behaviour is anticipatable'. Here complementary behaviours are based on 
believing that partners share the same assumptions with regard to the alliance and 
do not `defect' in their decisions. 
The third stage is based on mutual identification in relation to common purposes. 
This `identification based' trust exists because the parties effectively `understand 
and appreciate the other's wants; this mutual understanding is developed to the 
point that each can effectively act for the other' (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). 
3.3.4.2 Evolution of trust. This provides for the evolution of trust - from 
calculative, through knowledge-based to identification-based - as a process that 
is at the core of a strategic alliance. Deeper trust develops as partners to an 
90 
alliance gain more comfort in their ability to predict behaviour of other partners in 
a given situation; as greater and greater trust develops, the stronger become links 
between the alliance partners. 
3.3.4.3 Social constitution of trust. Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that trust `is 
necessarily realized, and strengthened, by social interaction, cultural affinity 
between people, and the support of institutional norms and sanctions'. According 
to Zucker (1986), this trust is developed first on the basis of past experience, 
second by sharing common characteristics and third through institutional norms 
and guarantees to completion of transactions as promised. 
3.3.5 Summary of Perspectives 
The key groups of perspectives detailed above (Economic, Strategy and 
Organization) provide a set of perspectives, embedded in differing disciplines, that 
assist in analyzing and understanding strategic alliances. To summarize the 
perspectives: 
The economic theory sub-perspectives consider the subject from a market 
orientated view: 
i) relative power of the firm in comparison with its competitors 
(market power theory) 
ii) boundaries between the firm and other firms (transaction cost 
economics theory) 
iii) relationships between principals and agents (agency theory) 
iv) the input-output relationship and dynamic disequilibrium 
(increasing returns theory) 
v) a model for making decisions in repeat decision scenarios, like 
strategic alliances (game theory) 
The strategy perspective is largely concerned with the fit between the external 
market context (global, international, national, industry) and the internal firm 
context (resources, structure, size, culture) and draws on all the other perspectives. 
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The organizational theory sub-perspective focuses on issues of structure, control 
and management: 
i) groupings of firms in specific industries (population ecology 
theory) 
ii) rationale for entering into alliances and the link between 
managerial control and investments (resource dependency theory) 
iii) issues of structure, control, management - that is, how to organize 
the alliance in a practical and strategic context (organization 
structure and management theory) 
iv) adaptation of the firm to changes in the external context and 
changes in the internal context (organizational leaning theory) 
v) mechanisms by which partners in a continued series of `games' - 
that is, a series of decisions to cooperate or defect in the context of 
a strategic alliance - learn to cooperate and deepen the nature of 
cooperation through trusting that the other partner/s in the alliance 
will also cooperate (trust theory) 
No one sub-perspective is, by itself, comprehensive, and the sub-perspectives 
show various degrees of overlap. Used together they may provide a reasonable 
approximation of the complex reality of strategic alliances and allow the scholar 
to gain insights into their establishment, performance, evolution and dissolution. 
3.4 Strategic Alliances - Further Key Academic Publications 
The foregoing review has detailed primary groupings of theories used to analyze 
strategic alliances, a form of business organization that falls in and out of favour 
as external conditions change. As we saw in Chapter Two, use of strategic 
alliances to serve business needs of banks, paralleled more recently by other 
industries, has been subject to lifecycles with the current lifecycle ongoing due to 
the far reaching effects of changes in technology of business organization. 
The latest `interest-lifecycle', as seen in academic literature, began with the 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) volume of papers on cooperative strategies in 
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international business. Twenty-eight papers in that volume summarized the state 
of academic analysis of strategic alliances at that time. This `interest-lifecycle' has 
grown exponentially. Rather than attempt to review all the extant literature this 
section will point to key areas of research. 
In reviewing academic literature it makes sense to select papers on the basis of 
influence. This can be determined in various ways. In this review the special 
editions of three reputable journals, as identified for the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise (Harzing, 2002), have been chosen: 
i) Strategic Management Journal 
ii) Organization Science 
iii) The Academy of Management Journal. 
Core readings have also been selected from three academic conference collections 
on collaboration with the international perspectives (Asia Pacific, North 
American, Europe) edited by Beamish and Killing (1997) and the collection that 
started the current `interest-lifecycle' by Contractor and Lorange (1988). 
Additional papers have been included based on their judged relevance or 
importance. The total of 179 analyzed items are summarized in Appendix Four. 
The review is organized by the topics of conception through to dissolution of a 
strategic alliance, thus: 
i) conceiving cooperation 
ii) forming cooperation 
iii) organizing cooperation 
iv) evolving cooperation 
v) dissolving cooperation 
In each section the literature is placed under relevant subheadings and 
summarized at the end. At the end of the chapter the whole will be summarized, a 
summary carried forward to the start of Chapter Six, the analysis of the interview 
transcripts. 
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3.4.1 Conceiving Cooperation 
Current increase in interest in strategic alliances in the academic realm parallels 
the increasing instability or the degree of dynamic disequilibirum in the context 
within which firms operate. The first stage in the life of a strategic alliance occurs 
when potential partner firms consider cooperation as an appropriate response to 
business needs to, for example, access resources, products and markets. 
Changes in the external context are due to `globalization... driving an increasing 
number of industries and segments into a reconfiguration phase where cooperative 
strategies are essential' (Demers, Hafsi, Jorgensen and Molz [1997]). Korbin 
(1988) asserts that changes in `technology, marketing and global integration' 
explain changes in types of ownership. Horton and Richey (1997) link external 
with internal, finding that firm level incentives to form technology alliances are 
based on environmental factors. All the above observations support the view that 
cooperative strategies allow rapid reconfiguration of the value chain and system at 
relatively low cost and at reduced risk and that such a strategy also provides lower 
exit-barriers than a mergers and acquisitions approach. 
3.4.1.1 Context is clearly the key determiner of the decision to use a form of 
strategic alliance to meet business needs. Stiles (1999), echoing the work of ul- 
Haq, stresses the link between organization and context, defining networks as 
`coalitions between two or more firms, either formal or informal, who share 
compatible goals, acknowledge a level of mutual interdependence, and are formed 
for strategic reasons'. Sydow and Windeler (1998) state that interrelations in the 
broader context are also important: `network practices are viewed as embedded in 
the social context of the interfirm network, the industry, and the society, which in 
turn are produced and reproduced by these practices'. This position is further 
supported by Bell, Barkema and Verbeke (1997), who add to our understanding of 
the choice of mode of foreign entry by identifying strategic, transactional, 
locational and resources-based reasons for the choice. Madhok (1997) expands by 
asserting that both economizing and strategizing perspectives are essential to a 
more thorough understanding. 
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The financial services sector in particular is subject to three trends - deregulation 
and privatization, new technologies and products and new competitors from 
overseas and other industries - the impacts of which will `reduce profits, 
... 
increase market volatility and risk' and lead to an imperative `to create a super 
service culture to maintain and grow the business in more intensely competitive 
markets' (Taylor [1999]). This need will lead to new forms of organization to cut 
costs, share risks and provide suitable types of products and levels of service. 
As the global external context becomes more volatile, so will the industry 
dynamics, increasing the pressure on firms to reconfigure and to gain access to 
new resources, products and markets. Alongside this pressure to link this up is the 
requirement to re-configure rapidly as market and customer preferences change 
again. The strategic context is thus linked with the industry and firm context. In 
the particular case of financial services, the drivers are identified as deregulation, 
privatization, new technologies, new products, new competitors from overseas and 
from other industries (Taylor, 1999). The strategic alliance allows rapid access 
and reconfiguration capability. 
3.4.1.2 When determining whether to enter into an alliance, rather than some 
other form of organization. issues to consider are varied. A primary issue is the 
required accessibility to assets. Stiles (1997) states that firms enter into 
competitive mode if resources are mobile or the cooperative mode if resources are 
immobile or embedded in the firm. This echoes the work of Hennart and Reddy 
(1997), who note that the method used is dependent on the degree of `digestibility' 
of the desired assets; that is, `joint ventures are preferred over acquisitions when 
the desired assets are `indigestible', i. e., when they are commingled with non- 
desired assets'. In their later work Hennart and Reddy (2000) determine that joint 
ventures (a form of strategic alliance) are preferable to acquisitions when assets 
are difficult to extricate, post-acquisition management costs would be high, there 
is difficulty in valuing targets and legal or institutional constraints obtain. 
Major strategic reasons for entering into alliances are detailed by Root (1988), 
who notes that firms enter into alliances when `incremental net benefits exceed 
those of open-market transactions or of intrafirm cooperative arrangements that 
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would accomplish the same mission'. By contrast, Contractor and Lorange (1988) 
determine that firms enter into alliances for reasons of similar or complementary 
contribution, with mutual dependence being necessary for continuation. 
Concerning the process of finding a suitable partner, Osborn and Hagedoorn 
(1997) encourage a multi perspective approach to the analysis of alliances and 
networks. This view is supported by Ramanathan, Seth and Thomas (1997), who 
suggest that the transaction cost perspective needs to be supplemented by other 
perspectives in any analysis of alliances. In some agreement Lawrence and ul-Haq 
(1998) find that the effects of `bounded-rationality' on bankers lead to a pre- 
listing of potential partners based on a presumed similarity of outlook and 
organizational culture. Walker (1988) has suggested a guiding framework for this 
process with strategic, attractive and reciprocity components. 
In summary: Strategic alliances are entered into when benefits gained by this 
method are greater than through another method and in particular where assets 
that are to be utilized are not easily separable from the firm holding the assets. In 
finding a suitable partner a number of analysis methods need to be used, not least 
complementarity of strategy and culture. 
3.4.1.3 A number of factors were identified as pointers towards a successful 
strategic alliance. Although established firms are more likely to enter into formal 
cooperation in networks (presumably because of prior positive experience) than 
less established firms (Häkansson and Johanson, 1988), technology transfer 
opportunities can only be gained through rigorous analysis according to Afriyie 
(1988). Harrigan (1988b) finds that horizontally related partners are more likely 
to be successful (presumably because of a prior positive relationship) in a strategic 
alliance than vertically related (buyer-seller) partners. 
Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen and Bell (1997) note that `experience with 
domestic joint ventures and with wholly owned subsidiaries contributed to the 
longevity of international joint ventures, but prior experience with international 
joint ventures did not'. Sedaitis (1998) supports this, finding that `the relational 
costs of the more concentrated ties increases the cost of search, however it lowers 
\, - 
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the cost of malfeasance'. These views are echoed by Tyler and Steensma (1998), 
who considered the impact of prior experiences and perceptions in the assessment 
I of potential technology based alliances and found that executives with positive 
prior experiences gave more credence to opportunity-based information and lower 
credence to threat-based information. Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) find 
support for the hypothesis that start-up biotechnology firms can enhance their 
initial performance by establishing alliances, forming efficient and diverse 
networks and allying with established rivals. Reuer and Koza (2000) suggest that 
`firms need to contend with both ex ante valuation uncertainties and ex post 
integration challenges when assembling resources' for joint ventures. 
A number of studies have addressed strategic alliances with regard to foreign 
countries. In their study of Japanese global companies Anand, Ainuddin and 
Makino (1997) found that a `host site [was attractive due to the] availability of 
labour and investment incentives'. Luo and Chen (1997) noted the need for a good 
fit between business and investment strategy as a precursor to successful alliances 
in China. Beamish and Delios (1997a) determined that Japanese firms had a 
=. greater propensity to use the joint venture form of strategic alliance than European 
or US firms. Herbert and Beamish (1997) drew the conclusion that where `UVs 
are formed to speed up market entry they generally involve fifty-fifty equity splits, 
and... exhibit relatively high performance rates'. Beamish and Delios (1997b) 
report that dissatisfaction with performances is `rooted in a lack of congruity in 
performance objectives at the time the IN is formed'. Swan and Ettlie (1997) 
state that equity joint ventures are more likely to be used in politically sensitive 
markets if the Japanese partner has knowledge of the product. Saxton (1997) notes 
that partner firms' benefits are positively correlated with reputation, shared 
3 decisions and similarities in strategy. Kogut and Singh (1988) find that strategic 
choices between greenfield and joint ventures as entry methods into the USA are 
predicated on the value of the opportunity costs of delays of the former entry 
method. 
In summary: Established firms are more likely to enter into cooperation in 
networks and horizontally related companies are more likely to be successful than 
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vertically related firms. In Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) situations the equity 
joint venture was the more likely form and these were more successful if they 
ý_ 
,. shared reputation, 
decisions and strategy. 
3.4.1.4 A number of research findings pointed to the continued use of alliances. 
Kalmbach Jr. and Roussel (1999) note that 82% of executives, responding to their 
survey, believe alliances will be the prime vehicle for future growth and that 
alliances are based on enlightened self-interest and diplomacy. Lin, Yu and Seetoo 
(1997) determine the main benefits of entering into international joint ventures as 
the `motivations of partners, and costs, the contributions they make'. 
In summary: Alliances are a force in the mindset of executives and a number of 
benefits accrue from this. 
The next stage is to commence, to action the `how' and `where' of the alliance. 
3.4.2 Forming Cooperation 
To commence cooperation requires a number of choices between partners, a risk- 
reward analysis, a determination of strategic intent and an evaluation of the ability 
to learn and benefit from and contribute to an alliance. 
3.4.2.1 Researchers point to core processes inherent in a strategic alliance. Dyer 
(1998a) provides a complicated model of interfirm cooperation: a demonstrated 
commitment to future action, plus information sharing, plus the use of informed 
safeguards, equals credibility of one's promise, which in turn leads to reduced 
transaction costs and increased investment in relation to specific assets, which 
leads to transaction value through joint performance. This modeling is based on 
expectations. Doz (1998) draws attention to the expectations of partners and how 
they `cover both value creation (the opportunity's potential value and how 
cooperation between partners will be pursued successfully) and value 
appropriation (how the partners will equitably share benefits) presumably in 
proportion to their contributions to the alliance's success'. 
ý; 
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competitors and finds inducements or incentives to collaborate and opportunities 
as the two broad classes of factors. Technical and commercial forms of 
accumulated capital led to attractiveness as an alliance partner. For Anand and 
Khanna (2000), `an alliance can be viewed as an incomplete contract between 
firms, in the sense that detailed interactions between alliance partners can rarely 
be fully pre-specified'. Doz, Olk and Ring (2000) find that strategic networks may 
be formed by two paths - the emergent or the engineered (by the triggering 
entity). Oman (1988) draws attention to the increase in equity joint ventures and 
contractual interfirm cooperation agreements over traditional foreign direct 
investment. 
In summary: Expectations of alliance partners when entering into an alliance 
broadly cover how value will be created and distributed. A number of internal 
agreements - such as information sharing and demonstrated commitment to action 
- develop collaboration into performance. Firms possessing technical or 
commercial capital are attractive partners in what is an incomplete contract where 
the detail is developed as the alliance progresses. 
3.4.2.2 International alliances add the dimension of cultural dissimilarity. A 
number of researchers have focused on the Hong Kong-China dimension. Li and 
Shenkar (1997) found that the forms of international cooperative ventures in 
China were dependent on strategic objectives. Pan and Tse (1997) concluded that 
Hong Kong firms `are valuable [as cooperation partners] because of their 
expertise, knowledge and connections in China'. Yeung (1997) provided further 
insights by drawing attention to the nature of Hong Kong transnational 
corporations use of at least three dimensions in cooperative strategies: interfirm 
internalization based on regional ties, interfirm collaboration based on personal 
friendship, extra firm cooperation based on political patronage. 
In summary: In the Chinese context the alliance form is dependent on its strategic 
objectives and a partner's value is directly related to local knowledge and 
connections. In Hong Kong, personal, regional and political ties were most 
important. 
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3.4.2.3 Within an alliance a variety of decision-making mechanisms can be used. 
In considering decision making, Ring (1997) provide a process-outcomes analysis 
method and Dollinger, Golden and Saxton (1997) find that the processing of 
reputation in decisions about joint venturing is imperfect. Glaister and Buckley 
(1997) found that `the greatest variation in the relative importance of election 
criteria [task or partner related] occurs with the geographical location of the joint 
venture'. 
In summary: The information on which decisions are made is imperfect and 
encompasses a number of process-outcome dichotomies. 
3.4.3 Organizing Cooperation 
Once a decision has been made to enter into an alliance, a vast number of issues 
need to be addressed in order to organize cooperation. Cooperation is an activity 
which carries with it risks as well as anticipated benefits. Each cooperation 
requires the opening-up of normally protective boundaries of the firm to the 
partner or partners. 
3.4.3.1 The organization and configuration of the alliance attemotto reap the 
benefits and mitigate the dangers. Buckley and Casson (1988) expanded the 
concept of mutual dependence by defining cooperation as `coordination effected 
through mutual forbearance' - that is, refraining from cheating. Hladik (1988), 
concerned about the balance of benefits vs. problems in an alliance, draws 
attention to the potential positive impact of partner choice and boundaries and 
goals on this balance. 
When considering operationalizing an alliance, Moxon, Roehl and Truitt (1988) 
draw attention to the need for partners to negotiate on strategic direction and 
degree of input into such decision making. Leverick and Cooper (1998) argue that 
good management practice, in areas of partner selection, communication, 
information sharing and external monitoring, are a substantial part of a successful 
alliance relationship. 
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In an earlier paper, Westney (1988) had called for `empirical, process orientated 
research on how deals [to enter into alliances] are managed once made'. 
Supporting this Mayrhofer (1997) expressed concern at the shortcomings of 
secondary sources of research. Golden (1997) states that retrospective data can be 
inaccurate unless efforts are made to validate such data, after which it `provides 
unique access to past organizational events'. 
In summary: Alliances are based on partner firms' mutual dependence and 
refraining from cheating, combined with the positive impact of boundaries, 
partner choice and goals. Appropriate management practices lead to an increase in 
performance. 
3.4.3.2 Alliances are complex organizational forms. With regard to the internal 
organization of a firm, Combs and Ketchen (1999) propose an integrated view of 
`understanding the antecedents and consequences of organizational actions... a 
central theme in strategic management research'. After surveying 151 firms, 
Simonin (1997) concluded that `experience must be internalised first, and 
collaborative know-how must be developed for this experience to contribute to 
future collaborative benefits'. Benefits are considered to be both tangible 
(strategic, financial) and intangiable (learning or knowledge based). 
Implementation of an alliance gives rise to content and process issues, according 
to Boddy, Macbeth and Wagner (1988). 
The relationships between firms are governed by, as Dyer and Singh (1998) 
suggest, `interfirm resources and routines'. These are relation specific assets, 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary resources and capabilities and 
effective governance which together are sources of competitive advantage. 
Proprietary knowledge-in-action was the real source of differentiation and hard to 
replicate by competitors. Olson and Singsuwan (1997) found that performance 
factors are `affected by strategic alliance success factors (partnership attributes, 
communication techniques, and conflict resolution behaviours) to some degree'. 
In the public goods perspective of Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanagin, Parnassa and 
Rumsey (1998) the two `goods' are called `connectivity' (ability of partners to 
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directly communicate with each other through information and communication 
system) and `communality' (availability of a commonly accessible pool of 
information). Connectivity and communality were found in alliances between a 
number of firms by Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Borgatti (1998). 
They observed that when members of constellations pursue a collectivist strategy, 
they focus on their mutual benefits and employ a relational logic. Given these 
firms' `need for intensifying relations with partners and clients, constellation 
members restrict interactions to certain partners and clients and intensify their 
interactions'. This channelling and distribution of attention of decision makers 
results, according to Ocasio (1997), in changing behaviours. For Leung, Smith, 
Wang and Sun (1997), procedural and performance-based distributive justice was 
related to job satisfaction. Reuer and Koza (2000) argued that, asymmetric 
information and indigestibility, are complementary in explaining the value of joint 
ventures, Merchant and Schendal (2000) found that relatedness and R&D 
orientated activity had a positive impact on the valuation of a joint venture. 
The forms of alliances differ as do the purposes. Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) 
proposed three generic ways to configure value in firms: chain (transforming 
inputs of products in interlinking chains), solving customer problems in refereed 
shops) and network (linking customers in interconnected networks). Firms in 
alliances enter into these collaborations so as to realize a `productive source of 
value creation and realization' according to Madhok and Tallman (1998). The 
firm derives resources, social status and recognition from its portfolio of 
collaborations (Stuart, 2000). The `competitive aspects of alliances are most 
severe when a firm's ratio of private to common benefits is high', say Khanna, 
Gulati and Nohria (1998). 
With regard to international alliances Dussauge and Garrette (1999) analyzed 
alliances by differentiating between features such as multiple decision-making 
centres, constant bargaining and clash of interests. In establishing international 
joint ventures in developing countries the participation of the firm and host 
country institutions is important (Dymsza, 1988) as is the rationale behind it - 
exploit or invest in know-how, mould or grow operations, fight or produce team 
effort, externally develop or internally develop joint venture staff. 
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When considering the value of an alliance, Kaufman, Wood and Theyle (2000) 
found, as they predicted, that high technology and high collaboration firms, 
classified as `problem-solving suppliers', had the largest number of employees 
and the highest percentage of exports, paid the highest wages and had the highest 
gross margins of the sample. 
In organizing strategic alliances it must be borne in mind that the external 
environment has a direct impact on the internal environment (Elg, 1998). Elg 
suggests that the `original relations of a firm [in a network are] expected to affect 
its behaviour as the boundaries surrounding its established net of 
interorganizational relations dissolve' and the impact of external forces increases. 
In summary: The internal organization is full of experience capital, a form of 
intangible capital which links into routines established between one firm and 
another in an alliance. Connectivity (ability of partners to communicate with each 
1 other through information and communication systems) and communality 
(availability of a commonly accessible pool of information) are at the core of 
building relationships between partners. Partner firms gain status and recognition 
from alliances and hope to gain a realized increase in value that can come from 
transforming inputs, resolving customer issues or linking customers. 
3.4.3.3 Alliance partners deliberately built trust between their firms to facilitate a 
successful alliance. Inkpen and Currall (1997) found that trust is dependent on 
prior relationship, risk, forbearance and control. These relational norms, coupled 
with informal monitoring, are important, according to Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay 
(1997), in building trust and achieving performance. As asserted by Holm, 
Eriksson and Johanson (1997), the commitment to that relationship is positively 
correlated to its profitability. Again, according to Ariflo (1997) the `veracity of [a 
firm] is positively associated with its perception of the partner's cooperative 
behaviour'. 
Sarkar, Cavusgil and Evirgen (1997) provide evidence that `interfirm exchanges 
are relationship based, and that competitive advantage lies in the firm's network 
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of associations and exchange ties it shares with its business partners'. These 
exchange ties require `procedural justice' or clear just procedures, (Johnson 
[1997]), to impact on organizational commitment and are based on efficiency in 
exchange and innovation mediated by relational exchanges, according to Florin 
(1997). For Sarkar, Cavusgil and Evirgen (1997), competitive advantage `lies in a 
firm's network of associations and exchange ties it shares with its business 
partners'. Alternative governance structures, such as joint ventures, `impose a 
greater burden of bargaining and political influence costs than is present in a 
hierarchy (Pearce, 1997) and short term contracts which, in high technology 
settings, can lead to long term transfer of learning and firm specific advantages'. 
In summary: Trust is considered to be based on prior relationship, risk, 
forbearance from cheating and control and is built up over time - the greater the 
commitment to the relationship by both partners in the alliance the greater the 
profitability. Each firm's perception of and action on the other firm's degree of 
cooperative behaviour is a core determinate of success. 
3.4.3.4 International collaborations bring increased managerial complexity. 
After analyzing the cooperation by USA or Japanese large firms with USA 
technology entrepreneurs, Hull, Slowinski, Wharton and Azumi (1988) conclude 
that the manufacturing process is the core to advantages being gained. Converting 
these advantages into reality in, for example, US and European JVs in Japan is 
fraught with difficulties because of recruitment and staffing, training and 
development, performance appraisal, compensation and reward system, human 
resources practice and strategy differences according to Pucik (1988). Research 
results by Sohn and Paik (1997), in reviewing Japanese firms in Korea, support 
diversification as an additional control mechanism in international joint ventures. 
Johnson, Cullen, Sakano and Takenouchi (1997) found that cultural sensitivity is 
an important factor in strategic integration in Japanese-US alliances. Olk (1997), 
considering the performance of R and D consortia, concluded that dissimilarity in 
nationality was positively and research location negatively related to performance. 
Lyles and Salk (1997) found that `adaptation mechanisms... were positively 
associated with the degree to which IJVs reported acquiring knowledge from their 
foreign parents'. 
:, ý 
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Different locations led to differing issues in the resulting alliances. Pearce and 
Branyiczki (1997) focus on the `clashes in systems of legitimacy' as a mechanism 
of gaining insights into assumptions brought to Hungarian-Western European 
collaborations. Papanastassiou and Pearce (1997) note a high degree of 
involvement of continental European subsidiaries a parent firms' operations. 
Tallman, Sutcliff and Antonian (1997) noted that Russian firms use organizational 
methods to protect their interests in different ways from those of foreign partners. 
The internal issues in an alliance depended on the focus of the management of the 
alliance. Bell, Barkema and Verbeke (1997) add to our understanding of the 
choice of mode of foreign entry by noting strategic, transactional, locational and 
resources-based reasons for the choice. Beamish and Delios (1997a) reported that 
dissatisfaction with performances is `rooted in a lack of congruity in performance 
objectives at the time the IN is formed'. According to Lu and Lake (1997), host 
country and interparent expectations are usually in conflict and therefore require 
flexibility in management systems to cope, Dyer (1997) found that `Japanese 
automotive transactors minimize transaction costs by minimizing search, 
contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs over the long term'. In their 
research on 112 banks Hopkins and Hopkins (1997) inferred that `intensity with 
which banks engage in the strategic planning process has a direct, positive effect 
on banks' financial performance, and mediates the effects of managerial and 
organizational factors on banks' performance' and Berg and Hoekman (1988) 
found that banking, wholesaling and transportation services in the Netherlands 
benefited from innovation via joint ventures. Pan (1997) discovered substantial 
differences between Japanese and US equity joint ventures in China, probably due 
to `risk orientation, cultural similarities, and impact of political events in China'. 
In considering the internalization of an international joint venture within one of 
the parent firms, Reuer and Miller (1997) concluded that valuation depends on the 
degree of equity held by the parent and debt-cash flow considerations. 
With regard to US-Mexican alliances Robins, Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 
(1998) conclude `the international parent may achieve the greatest success by 
providing strategic guidance and key sources of competitive advantage to an 
alliance, relying upon local partners to take a lead in high cultural content 
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activities such as marketing or labour management'. Makino and Beamish (1999) 
classified Japanese joint ventures according to location of owners and noted that 
the strategy should match the ownership structure. Burton (1995b) counterpoises 
two schools of thought regarding partnering with the Japanese - the Locomotive 
(Western companies will gain from links with dynamic East Asian companies) 
and the Juggernaut (wherein Pacific Rim companies will destroy Western 
companies and ultimately Western economies unless governments step in to arrest 
their progress). Toral (2000) noted the uniqueness of European-Argentine 
partnerships. Schaan and Beamish (1988) define a good joint venture general 
manager in a less developed country as being one who can operate `constantly 
within two or more frames of reference and sets of values, and [be] able to 
successfully manage the idiosyncrasies of their parents'. 
In considering valuations in acquire or divest joint venture decisions, Chi (2000) 
noted that whether `two N partners can gain from the assets without their partner 
depends on the extent to which their independently held assets complement those 
of the venture'. 
In summary: Increased managerial complexity in international alliances is due to a 
number of factors, including differing needs of partners and potentially major 
differences between internal processes, policies and procedures. In building a 
cohesive cross-cultural alliance, sensitivity is important, and in R and D Consortia 
in particular difference of nationality is a positive factor. Differing mechanisms to 
produce collaboration co-exist, and the choice of method for entering into a 
foreign market is based on strategic, transactional, locational, resources-based 
reasons. Poor performance in alliances can be traced to poor performance 
objective setting at the time of formation. The expectations of the host country and 
international parent were often different. Over the long term the Japanese build a 
trust culture to minimize ongoing costs. In the case of banks the strategic planning 
intensity and innovation via joint ventures have direct positive benefits. There is 
often a spilt in responsibility between the international parent providing strategic 
guidance and the local partners taking a lead in high cultural activities such as 
marketing. A successful joint venture manager operates between two or more 
frames of references. 
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Once an alliance has been set in motion, the intents of the partners and the 
capabilities and organization of the alliance evolve over time in response to both 
internal and external developments. 
3.4.4 Evolving Cooperation 
A strategic alliance is a `living entity' that is deeply connected with the 
environment and industry in which it competes. Its development is a function of 
the co-evolution of member firms, their strategic intents and the ability of the 
alliance to continue to deliver benefits as compared with a go-it-alone approach. 
Kogut (1988) observes that the initial rationale for an alliance changes over time 
as the alliance develops and that its stability is conditional on the external context 
- `it would be foolhardy to view a joint venture as anything but an institutional 
cooperation of firms within the larger competitive context'. This view is 
confirmed by Hergert and Morris (1988), who identify the incentive to cheat as 
the alliance reaches the marketing part of the alliance process, thus `collaboration 
becomes more difficult to create and sustain as markets evolve'. 
In summary: The external context is in flux. Global, national, regional and 
product/service markets all change and interact with each other. As this evolution 
takes place, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain collaboration. 
3.4.4.1 To maintain the collaboration the alliance partners need to co-evolve. 
Learning is at the core of co-evolution in alliances. According to Gomes-Casseres 
(1988), `capabilities evolve as firms learn to compete in new industries and 
become familiar with new environments, and as opportunities for global 
integration grow', Lyles (1988) underpinned this by considering learning within 
experienced joint venture firms, and draws attention to the corporate history 
alliance involvement saying that this adds `depth to the organization that 
transcends highly decentralized organization structures'. 
_. ý. 
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In summary: Co-evolution in alliances has at its core the ability to learn and 
develop new competencies to meet new environmental requirements. Co- 
evolution will be considered further in Chapter Six. 
3.4.4.2 As alliances evolve, a number of dimensions come into play, with co- 
learning often referred to as the most important. The external and internal 
environment closely related. Gray and Yan (1997) asserted that stability of a joint 
venture is dependent on institutional environment, relative bargaining power, any 
prior relationship and ongoing effects of changes in the political and economic 
environment. Discussing the internal environment and nature of decision making 
in international joint ventures Lu and Bjorkam (1997) found that both competitive 
strategy and political environment were active roles. 
Knowledge transfer is an important issue. While Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan and 
Inkpen (1997) noted that management of knowledge is predicated on underlying 
conditions, the intra and inter firm structure and processes and the desired 
outcomes, Lorange (1997) posited that protection of core competencies of firms in 
a strategic alliance needed to be well defined as well as `dynamic to allow the 
evolution of knowledge'. Choi and Lee (1997) find that `incentives and 
enforcement mechanisms must be established to ensure effective transfer of 
knowledge between organizations and to facilitate their continuous strategic 
change'. Dickson and Weaver (1997) supported a multifaceted view of `perceived 
uncertainty', Inkpen (1997) determined that effective knowledge transfer is 
dependent on a reduction in performance-induced myopia. 
New ideas and bargaining power are essential factors. Heracleous (1997) defined 
the process of strategic thinking as ' to discover novel, imaginative strategies 
which can re-write the rules of the competitive game: to envision potential futures 
[synthetic, divergent, creative] significantly different from present'. Inkpen and 
Beamish (1997) define instability in international joint ventures as a `major 
change in partner relationship status that is unplanned and premature from one or 
more partner's perspectives'. They note that this instability occurs when shifts in 
relative bargaining power occur and that `shifts in the balance of bargaining power 
I 
108 
occur when partners in an IN acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to eliminate 
partner dependency and make the IN bargain obsolete'. 
Singh and Mitchell (1996) noted that collaboration assists business survival in one 
environment yet inhibits adaptation and industry evolution, Nti and Kumar (1998) 
outlined four factors which determine the ability of a firm to learn from an 
alliance - `motivational orientation, technological competence, the quality of its 
human assets and organizational culture'. Inkpen and Dinur (1998) identified 
`technology, alliance-partner interaction, personnel transfers and strategic 
integration' as processes used in transferring knowledge between firm contexts. In 
contrast, Nti and Kumar (1998) considered differential rates of learning in 
alliances and found that `outcome [economic, learning] and process [interaction 
and psychological satisfaction] discrepancies may emerge as collaboration 
unfolds' and that these differences occur due to differences in `absorptive 
capacity, collaborative strategies... and `how partners assess and react to 
discrepancies shapes the development path of an alliance'. 
The benefits of an alliance vary. Khanna (1998) differentiated between private 
alliance benefits ('accrue to subsets of participants') and public ('accrue 
collectively to all participants'). They concluded that collection of benefits and the 
expectation regarding future benefit streams lead to the intention to learn and 
develop an `alliance capability', defined as the `the firm's ability to identify 
partners, initiate alliances, and engage in the ongoing management and possible 
restructuring and termination of alliances'. 
Considering success or failure of strategic alliances Larson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson and Sparks (1998) found it is crucially dependent on the `collective 
learning process'. They develop a typology of learning strategies based on degrees 
of receptivity and transparency in this process. Koza and Lewin (1998) suggested 
that research on co-evolution of alliances is missing and proposed that they `need 
to be understood and should be researched in the context of the adaptive choices 
of the firm over time... in this view [alliances] are embedded in the firm's history 
and strategy portfolio and co-evolve with the firm's strategy, the institutional, 
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organizational, and competitive environment, and the management's strategic 
intent for the alliance'. 
Drawing attention to the pre-eminence of the learning aspects of alliances Inkpen 
(1998) stated that `bringing together firms with differing skills, knowledge bases, 
and organizational cultures, alliances create unique learning opportunities for the 
partner firms'. Zajac (1998) posited the question of how the relative importance of 
direct experience, vicarious learning, social forces and firm level alliance 
competency impact on managers' willingness to undertake alliances rather than 
merger or acquisition or organic growth routes. Gulati (1998) reported research 
that `suggests that social networks of prior ties not only influenced the creation of 
new ties but also affected their prior design, their evolutionary path, and their 
ultimate success'. Simonin (1999) highlighted the `critical role played by 
knowledge ambiguity' in alliance learning, collaborative ability and duration, 
while Afuah (2000) found that a `firm's post-technological change performance 
decreases with the extent to which the technological change renders co-opetitors' 
capabilities obsolete'. Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2000) infer that firms 
participate in alliances to learn know-how and capabilities from their partner firm 
while at the same time protecting themselves from the opportunistic behaviour of 
the partner in acquiring the subject firm's proprietary assets. Inkpen (2000) 
suggested that firms `openly acknowledge both asymmetric alliance objectives 
and an expectation of learning via private benefits'. 
In summary: A number of factors (including competitive strategy and the political 
environment) contribute to stability of a joint venture The structure of the firm 
determines the management of knowledge and its dynamic evolution. Mechanisms 
of cooperation (incentives and enforcement) assist continuous strategic change. 
Strategic thinking allows the envisioning of new rules of the competitive game. 
Sudden shifts in bargaining power change the dynamics of an alliance and may 
make it obsolete. Collaboration assists in some environments and inhibits in 
others, and flexibility is based on the ability to learn. As firms develop the 
processes of transferring knowledge differential rates of learning occur in outcome 
and process areas. These discrepancies shape the path of alliances development. 
The ability to enter into and develop alliances (alliance capability) is predicated on 
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the process on initiating, managing and terminating alliances. The co-learning 
process, based on receptivity and transparency, is essential to the success of the 
alliance and is embedded in the history and environment of the firm. 
The learning aspects of alliances are crucial. Different firms create different 
degrees of unique learning opportunities and social networks influenced the 
creation of ties, development path and success. Technological changes that reduce 
the appropriateness of the firm's capabilities also reduce its performance. 
Members of alliances try to learn as much as possible from partners while 
protecting the transfer of their proprietary knowledge. 
3.4.4.3 Particular firms and countries display particular concerns. Reviewing the 
knowledge sharing network with Toyota, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) found that 
`learning is facilitated by interorganizational routines that are purposefully 
designed to facilitate knowledge transfers across organizational boundaries' and 
mitigate motivation, free rider and cost issues. Naylor and Lewis (1997) 
concluded that a construction company used the experience gained through an 
alliance to develop a series of joint ventures within the firm. Human and Provan 
(1997) found that membership by small and medium sized firms in manufacturing 
networks can provide `transactional and transformational' outcomes. 
Reviewing alliances in Turkey, Erden (1997) found that widespread use led to 
high stability. Graham (1988) draws attention to culturally based 
misunderstandings that arise between American executives operating in Japan, 
largely due to interpersonal and business relationship differences. When analysing 
Sino-Foreign joint ventures, Child, Yan and Lu (1997) found that the degree of 
foreign influence on management was high, Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997) 
found differences in learning capability more important than Canadian-Japanese 
cultural differences. 
In summary: Learning is underpinned by specific inter-firm actions, and 
experience gained can be used to further alliance activity. Networks with smaller 
firms may lead to new ideas. In overseas alliances cultural differences can lead to 
misunderstandings in interpersonal and business relations. The impact of foreign 
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misunderstandings in interpersonal and business relations. The impact of foreign 
influence is high, and learning capability is more important than cultural 
differences. 
3.4.5 Dissolving Cooperation 
An alliance would only normally exist for the period that it provides appropriate 
benefits to its members or if has achieved the objectives set and the business case 
no longer justifies continuation. At that point the alliance may disband, its 
intangible or tangible assets internalized by one firm. 
Confirming this, Medcof (1997) addressed the question of dissolution in alliances 
and asserted `the long-term alliance strategy of the firm focuses primarily on 
organizational learning of new technical, managerial and partnering skills and on 
improving organizational positioning in the evolving landscape of alliance 
activity'. A 25% annual rate of increase in alliance activity in the USA from 1985 
to 1992 was noted and the dissolving rate is also high. 
Arino and Torre (1998) reviewed partners in a failed strategic alliance and 
developed an evolutionary model wherein they `conclude that positive feedback 
loops are critical in the evolutionary process, that relationship quality is both an 
outcome and a mediating variable, and that procedural issues are critical from the 
start in fostering a climate for positive reinforcement and the building of mutual 
trust and confidence in the relationship'. Indeed a breakdown of trust was 
considered a factor in dissolving alliances, as noted by Nooteboom, Berger and 
Noorderhaven (1997), who state that an `individual trusts someone when he or 
she is willing to forego guarantees based on coercion or self-interest', and by Park 
and Ungson, (1997) who assert that `opportunistic threat and rivalry appear to be a 
stronger indication of the dissolution of joint ventures than organizational 
variables'. 
In summary: Alliances survive through organizational learning and repositioning 
in the environment. Feedback loops and the quality of the relationship are 
1_ 
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important, and the breakdown of trust is a factor in the dissolution of alliances. 
Alliances dissolve if they no longer generating a benefit for the partners. 
3.4.5.1 Alliances dissolve as the rationale for their establishment and evolution 
ceases to exist. Dissolving an alliance may signal the end of its usefulness to its 
partners, after generating benefits, rather than a failure to generate any benefits. 
Tyebjee (1988) concluded that the most instability in Japanese joint ventures in 
the USA occurs when equity ownership is not reflected in board composition; 
different objectives for growth are seen between the parent firms and the rationale 
for setting up the joint venture was not clear. Makino and Delios (1997) 
determined that the `need for a local partner [in alliances in Asia] declined as 
parent experience in the host country grows'. Hennart, Kim and Zeng (1998) 
found that Japanese parent firms displayed a higher tendency to terminate partial 
ownership (often by selling the shares) of joint ventures in the US as against 
wholly owned subsidiaries. Si and Bruton (1999) drew attention to the declining 
performance of international joint ventures in China partly due to unclear 
knowledge acquisition goals. Echoing this, Barnes, Crook, Koybaeva, Taira and 
Stafford (1997) determined that social contract differences between Western and 
Russian business cultures were instrumental in the collapse of Russian alliances. 
Singh (1997) asserted `businesses commercializing high and medium-complexity 
technologies face a higher risk of dissolution than low-complexity businesses'. 
In summary: Instability is a function of equity being incongruent with board 
membership, unclear objectives and rationale at establishment. National 
differences exist regarding the level of equity preferred. Unclear goals regarding 
knowledge to be acquired and social contract differences also contributed to 
dissolution, with high complexity businesses facing a higher risk of dissolution. 
3.4.5.2 Alliances generate different rates of success. Faulkner, Pitkethly and 
Child (1998) considered post-merger or acquisition change processes in different 
national contexts and found that US firms absorb the acquisition, that Japanese 
firms are more concerned with relationships and tacit knowledge transfer, that 
French firms take strategic decisions at head office and that German firms fail to 
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establish clear post acquisition integration methods. Perhaps this research provides 
insights into national characteristics and their impact on alliances success. 
Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell (2000) found that partners are more likely to take 
over link alliances (partners contribute different capabilities) than scale alliances 
(partners contribute similar capabilities), Merchant (1997) considered the issue of 
performance, measured by increases in share prices, of international joint ventures 
and found `results indicate that participation [of non-manufacturing firms] in IJVs 
creates economic value on only 40 percent of firms in sample'. 
In summary: Different national contexts display different integration methods. 
Alliances where partner contribution was of different capabilities were more likely 
to be taken over. Performance of international joint ventures showed a 40% 
increase in share value in the sample. 
3.5 Summary 
Deregulation, increased use of technology, enhanced and fickle customer 
expectations, increased merger and acquisition activity, reduction in 
protectionism, increased formation of trading blocks and global competition all 
have undermined the old certainties within which firms could aim to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage over a long period. The advent of 'hyper- 
competition' (D'Aveni, 1994) provides for short run advantage interspersed by 
frequent interruption with no long run stable end states. Continuous strategic and 
operational innovation-with-reconfiguration has become the norm. The manager- 
entrepreneur of Coase (1937) now needs to continuously access and use new 
tangible and intangible resources to meet the ever-changing needs of consumers 
and never-ending pressure from innovating competitors. Markets no longer tend 
towards an equilibrium position but rather are continuously in a state of dynamic 
disequilibrium. Strategic alliances provide a mechanism for rapid and repeat re- 
configuration to meet the external and internal changes. 
This chapter has provided a review of the development of the strategy field, major 
perspectives used in analysis of strategic alliances and a summary of key 
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academic papers published on the subject. In detailing economic, strategic 
management and organization theory perspectives, the review and adds to our 
understanding of the life-cycle of strategic alliances (from conceiving, forming, 
organizing, evolving to dissolving) in the commercial world. Section 3.4 has 
provided a review of key literature on strategic alliances. A concluding summary 
of this is provided in Table 3.4 below. 
Chapter Four will consider the methodological issues relating to this research. 
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Table 3.4: Key issues in the Literature 
Conceiving Cooperation Context is clearly the key determiner of the decision 
(3.4.1) to use a form of strategic alliance to meet business 
needs (3.4.1.1). 
When determining whether to enter into a strategic 
alliance, rather than some other form of business 
organization, issues to consider are varied (3.4.1.2). 
A number of factors were identified as pointers 
toward a successful strategic alliance (3.4.1.3) 
A number of research findings pointed to the 
continued use of alliances (3.4.1.4) 
Forming Cooperation Researchers point to core processes inherent in a 
(3.4.2) strategic alliance (3.4.2.1). 
International alliances add the dimension of cultural 
dissimilarity (3.4.2.2). 
Within an alliance a variety of decision-making 
mechanisms can be used (3.4.2.3). 
Organizing Cooperation The organization and configuration of the alliance 
(3.4.3) attempts to reap the benefits and mitigate the dangers 
(3.4.3.1). 
Alliances are complex organizational forms (3.4.3.2). 
Alliance partners deliberately build trust between their 
firms to facilitate a successful alliance (3.4.3.3). 
International collaborations bring increased 
managerial complexity (3.4.3.4). 
Evolving Cooperation To maintain the collaboration the alliance partners 
(3.4.4) need to co-evolve (3.4.4.1). 
As alliances evolve a number of dimensions come into 
play with co-learning often referred to as the most 
important (3.4.4.2). 
Particular firms and countries display particular 
concerns (3.4.4.3). 
Dissolving Cooperation Alliances dissolve as the rationale for their (3.4.5) establishment and evolution ceases to exist (3.4.5.1). 
Alliances enerate different rates of success (3.4.5.2). 
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Chapter Four 
Methodological issues 
4.1 Philosophical Underpinnings 
4.1.1 Epistemology 
All research activity has embedded in it a theory of knowledge, an epistemology. 
This theory may be implicit or, as below, explicit; it may be acknowledged or 
tacit. Regardless of its implicit or explicit status, the embedded theory underpins 
the research activity and influences its validity, methods and scope. At this stage 
in the thesis it is appropriate to make explicit the epistemology employed and its 
impact on the research methods used. 
4.1.1.1 The epistemological continuum. This continuum ranges from positivism 
to idealism (or phenomenology), with empiricism, realism and subjectivity in 
between. Each position on the continuum delineates a different view of the nature 
of the object-subject relationship in research activity. The boundaries between 
each position on the continuum are not fixed and are permeable. The researcher's 
position on the continuum determines the understanding of the nature of the 
interactions between cause and effect. Furthermore it delineates the position of 
theory in the research activity - i. e., whether the starting point is the existing 
theory or the subject of the research and whether the end point, accordingly, is 
proof of the theory or the development of new theories. 
,- 
i) Positivism 
The positivist epistemology holds the view that the nature of the relationships 
between the world-at-large and individuals can be observed and explained in the 
manner of the natural sciences. The researcher is considered remote, or detached, 
from the social world being investigated. The prediction and explanation of the 
behaviour of phenomena and the pursuit of objectivity become paramount. A 
direct cause and effect relationship in human behaviour is deemed to exist, and the 
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researcher attempts to identify these covering laws of human behaviour. In 
research terms this perspective leads to the use of methods that emphasise the 
clarity, generalizability and repeatability of outcomes. Specifically such research 
often progresses from theory, through the generation of null hypothesises, to 
questionnaire based surveys resulting in statistically significant, and therefore 
generalizable, findings. 
Such epistemology and its related research methods generally attempt to reduce 
the complex, interrelated world into easily measured, and often simplistic, 
formulations. At its best this view can provide insights into specific aspects of 
complex issues. At its worst it assumes that the controlled environment of the 
laboratory, prevalent in the natural sciences and necessary for replicating and 
therefore generalizing findings, is in principle repeatable in the highly complex 
social world of individuals, firms and markets. 
ii) Idealism or Phenomenology 
This diametrically opposed view holds that social reality is constructed by the 
many varied interactions between social actors and between the social actors and 
their non-human environment. The researcher must extract meaning by 
understanding individual's interpretation of events and actions. Accordingly the 
researcher needs to interact directly with the phenomena (the social world 
microcosm) under investigation. Here the researcher attempts to gather rich, 
contextually specific (and therefore not generalizable) data. From this the 
researcher theorizes and attempts to build an understanding of the social world as 
arising from the `culture', whether national, corporate or group, under study. The 
resulting, generally qualitative, research method often involves a degree of 
immersion in the `culture' under study (ethnographic research for example) on the 
part of the researcher. Bhaskar (1975) refers to this position as ` transcendental 
idealism' and notes that `the objects of scientific knowledge are models' and that 
such objects are artificial constructs and ... they are not 
independent of men or 
human activity in general'. 
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The view of social actors together creating a `reality' has been largely abandoned 
and replaced by an acknowledgement of the impact of external realities - for 
example, national culture, education and `systems' on our actions and 
opportunities. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of this continuum. 
The positivist view of research is dependent on a `closed-systems' approach 
where the aim of the closed system is to control conditions of the experiment so 
that regularities can be identified in the form of `whenever event x then event y" 
(Clark, 2000). The idealist or transcendental idealist approach is based on an open 
system, or emergent, approach where the mechanisms are considered or `imagined 
to produce the phenomena in question', (Bhaskar, 1975). 
Between these two extremes lie Empiricism, Subjectivity and, in the centre, 
Realism. 
iii) Empiricism 
At the heart of the Empiricist perspective is the view that data gathered by the 
researcher about the social world is independent of the interpretation of this data. 
Accurate data collection requires the use of `neutral' measuring instruments. The 
data does not prove or disprove a theory (ä la Positivism) but leads to the 
researcher considering the data as the end result. The data makes its own 
statements and these are the outcomes of the research. Bhaskar terms this 
`classical empiricism' and notes that `science is conceived as a kind of automatic 
or behavioural response to the stimulus of given facts or their conjunctions' 
(Bhaskar, 1975). 
iv) Subjectivity 
In. this ', pcrspeCtive" what matters is the `meanings that people give to their 
environmcr}t, not the environment itself. The social environment which the 
individual inhabits is dependent on the individual's understanding and 
interpretation of it. 
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Table 4.1: The Epistemological Continuum (1) 
and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2) 
Characteristics Characteristics 
" Research is Researcher has direct 
remote from experiential contact with 
the social the phenomena under 
world under investigation 
Cause and Reality is socially 
effect constructed by the myriad 
relationship interactions between 
deemed to exist social actors 
and attempts 
made to 
identify 
Generalizable, Researcher gathers rich, 
repeatable and contextually specific data 
clear outcomes and then theorizes 
attainable 
_- --- ---- _ ------------------------------------------------ i Idealism/Phenomenology__! (1) Positivism 
_ 
Empiricism 
___ 
Realism 
--- 
-' 5ubjectivity 
'ý''ý'ý'ý - ---- -- - - ___ r r --T----- ------- ---- --- ---------------- --- i 
(2j ------------ Classical 'Transcendental ! ---- ----------- _ -! Transcendental Idealism 
Empiricism Realism 
-------------------- ------------------------- ------------------------------- 
Sources: (2) Bhaskar (1975) 
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v) The Realist Perspective 
The Realist perspective is in the centre of his continuum. Rejecting the claims of 
positivism this perspective has at its core the view that `all analytical work in the 
social sciences cannot be undertaken within the closed system model' (Clark, 
2000). It further holds that the mechanisms, or ways of working or acting, are not 
imaginary (unproved), as stated in transcendental idealism, but rather `may be 
real, or come to be established as such' (Bhaskar, 1975). Realism has at its 
foundation the attempt to uncover the structures of social relations in order to 
understand why we have the policies and practices we do. Furthermore, realist 
research requires the investigation of the underlying mechanisms that make those 
[social interactions] possible in the first instance. Thus `reality' is not the 
individuals' perception and interpretation of the `world' they live in, with each 
individual's reality being unique and unrepeatable (and presumably unshareable). 
`Society' is not just a conglomeration of a number of individual perceptions. 
Rather through continued, iterative, empirical testing (using a number of mutually 
inclusive quantitative and qualitative research methods), this real world may also 
come to be known as `real'. This empirical testing leads us to determine the 
`generative mechanisms in models' Bhaskar (1975) the observed events that lead 
to the construction of a model. In Figure 4.1 below this is shown as the movement 
from position (2) where the researcher imagines that the world in constructed in 
the particular way, through empirical testing to a point (3) where the researcher 
has greater confidence in asserting that this is how the world is which allows the 
researcher to build a model (M) of that world. 
vi) Transcendental Realism 
Transcendental realism attempts to link our perception of the world-at-large (the 
imagined world) with reality (the real world) through the empirical testing 
process. Transcendental realism regards the objects of knowledge to be the 
`structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as 
produced in the social activity of science' (Bhaskar, 1975). 
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events; sequences; invariances result/regularity 
(1) classical empiricism 
model-building 
(M)Generative mechanisms 
in models 
(3) (2)transcendental 
real empirical testing idealism 
imagined/imaginary 
--------- transcendental realism 
Figure 4.1: Adapted from Diagram 3.1 The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
Source: Bhaskar, (1975) 
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According to this position, the world is made up of three domains: the `empirical', 
consisting of experience, impression, perception; the `actual', consisting of events 
and state of affairs; and the `deep' consisting of the underlying structures, powers, 
mechanisms and tendencies. 
Lawson (1997) states that these often undetected `deep' domain structures, 
powers, mechanisms and tendencies (as defined in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 below) 
underpin and facilitate real events and that these different domains of reality (1,2 
and 3 in Figure 4.1 above) are out of `[time] phase' with each other. 
Thus the transcendental realist epistemology leads to the nature of scientific 
inquiry being aimed `at identifying and illuminating the structures and 
mechanisms, powers and tendencies that govern and facilitate the course of 
events' (Lawson, 1997) through a process of retroduction. Retroduction `consists 
in the movement... from the conception of some phenomenon of interest to a 
conception of some totally different type of thing, mechanism, structure or 
condition that, at least in part, is responsible for the given phenomenon' (Lawson, 
1997). The process of retroduction thereby moves the inquirer from the 
`empirical' and `actual' domains into the `deep' domain. 
4.1.1.2 From transcendental realism to research. The forgoing has introduced the 
concepts of Realism (Bhaskar, 1975) and Transcendental Realism (Lawson, 
1997). This section considers the application of the latter to the research 
conducted and reported in this thesis. 
One example of the application of this approach to the broad area of this thesis is 
to consider the issue of capital in banking. The observed `actual' domain `state of 
affairs' is that the banking industry is said to have the greatest volume of capital 
allocated to any industry worldwide. The retroductive approach would be to try to 
identify the `deep' domain reasons why this observed phenomenon obtains. Thus 
one brief possible analysis might be in terms of the following structures, powers, 
mechanisms and tendencies. 
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Table 4.2: Transcendental Realism versus Empirical Realism 
Objects 
Domain transcendental realism empirical realism 
structures 
cp dc powers 
meýant9rtts 
'actual' cents FIN cnts 
state of affair-, state of affairs 
'empincal' experience Experience 
tmp csvon impression 
perception perception 
Source Adapted from Lawson (1997) 
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Table 4.3: Definitions of Transcendental Realism Deep Domain Categories 
Cat o Definition 
Structures Systems and complexly structured situations 
Powers Potentials, capacities, abilities to act in certain ways; facilitate 
various activities and developments 
Mechanisms A way of acting or working of a structured thing; a causal 
wer of things 
Tendencies Continuing activity; potentialities which may be exercised or 
in play without being directly realized or manifest in any 
particular outcome; a power that is being exercised whatever 
events ensue 
Source: After Lawson, (1997) 
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Structures - that Government policy generally restricts to authorized institutions 
the provision of loans to households and firms; the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) demands that banks hold a minimum level of capital; many 
intra-country financial systems are connected to the non-bank international capital 
markets. 
Powers - that financial institutions have the power to redistribute funds by acting 
as intermediaries, for example, from individuals to firms, from depositors to 
borrowers and to lengthen the period of loans over the period of deposits. 
Mechanisms - that banks facilitate entrepreneurship and commercial activity by 
increasing the flow of credit. 
Tendencies - that bankers are less risk averse than governments. 
A more generic approach is suggested by Sayer (1992) wherein he focuses on the 
movement from concrete observed events to abstract underlying mechanisms and 
tendencies. 
This general approach of attempting to determine the `deep' domain causes of 
observed events is used to analyze the industry and firm level trends of European 
banking sector strategic alliances. The following section details the research 
methodologies used. 
4.2 Research Design 
This research consists of three empirical elements: desk research, a questionnaire 
based postal survey and thematic semi-structured interviews. The approach leads 
to multifaceted findings based on published annual reviews of trends (Chapter 
Two), directed and closed questionnaire responses (Chapter Five) and an open- 
ended discussion process (Chapter Six). The research design encapsulates these 
three elements so as to add greater depth and validity to the findings compared to 
what would be possible using only one empirical method. Furthermore the source 
data is broad based enough to attempt to tease out the structures, powers, 
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mechanisms and tendencies underpinning the use of strategic alliances in the 
European banking sector. 
The desk research was carried out to determine the historical propensity of banks 
to cooperate, to identify the 23 year trend towards increased liberalization in 
financial markets and to determine the lifecycles of strategic alliances in the 
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. This was reported in Chapter Two. An extensive 
review of the strategy field and the literature on strategic alliances was reported in 
Chapter 3. This was used to identify the nature of the subject under investigation, 
the strategic alliance. The questionnaire research was carried out and is reported 
in Chapter Five. The analysis of the interview transcripts based on the themes 
identified in Chapter One and Three was then conducted and written up. 
This thesis reports a number of research activities carried out in one industry over 
a period of time. It provides a high level review of the major trends supported by a 
range of research findings. 
4.2.1 Desk Research 
The desk research was carried out to set the context of this thesis in relation to 
`actual' events occurring in the research area. The primary purpose was to 
identify the pre-existing (in general) and current (in Europe) propensity of banks 
to enter into a number of types of alliances. Three public sources of trends in the 
banking sector were obtained and analyzed: The Financial Times World Banking 
special section (published annually), The Economist Survey of International 
Banking (published annually) and The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin section 
on Developments in International Banking and Capital Markets. These were 
obtained for the 23-year period ending in December 1993. This period was chosen 
to stretch far enough into the past so as to allow in-depth analysis of the Clubs and 
Consortium Banks lifecycle, and the underlying changes in the economic, political 
and business environment, strategy and a limited analysis of the Bankassurance 
and Virtual-Bank lifecycles. 
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The analysis was carried out by identifying the concrete events mentioned in the 
data sources, as detailed in Chapter Two, and attempting to identify the 
mechanisms and structures that underpinned those events. The data sources used 
were public analyses of the major occurrences in the banking sector. An event 
mentioned here could be deemed to be of major importance on the basis that a 
quarterly or annual review in such reputable publications, would only report the 
major and important events. 
In undertaking research the generally preferred method is to undertake primary 
research through a variety of data gathering methods. In this part of the research, 
however, secondary sources have been exclusively used. The data ranges over a 
vast 23-year period, and it was therefore impossible to access primary sources for 
analysis within the time and resource constraints of this thesis. This section 
constitutes one third of the empirical part of the research - the remaining 
questionnaire and interviews are primary data The data sources used are 
considered to be reputable chroniclers of primary events. The first two would 
have reported the primary events in real time (daily and weekly respectively) and 
would have used these reports as the basis for identifying the core events in 
preparing the annual review. The third source reported events on a quarterly 
basis. It is, therefore, possible to assert that these provide a valid reflection of the 
real events that occurred and their relatively high importance. 
4.2.2 Questionnaire Based Postal Survey 
The questionnaire based postal survey was conducted over 20 countries in the 
continent of Europe. The purpose was to provide an empirical foundation, based 
on primary research, for understanding the prevalent practices and motivations 
(entering, forming, managing and evolving strategic alliances) in the major banks 
in this region. Furthermore the survey tested the definition of a strategic alliance 
proposed, and elicited agreement to and served as a foundation for a follow up 
interview. 
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The sample selection and survey process was split into two by the geographical 
location of the centre of strategic decision-making (normally the location of the 
head office and board of directors). 
With regard to the United Kingdom, the initial sample list included all banks 
registered in the UK and considered by the Bank of England to be of `British' 
origin. These banks were also considered to be managed in a strategic sense in the 
UK. The list consisted of 63 banks. 
One bank was later excluded from this list, at their request, as all strategic 
decisions were made by the parent bank located overseas. A UK merchant bank 
owned by an overseas bank retained its place in the list, as the strategic decisions 
for the UK firm were taken in the UK. Three banks were reclassified as overseas 
continental European and therefore part of the continental European sample. This 
reduced the UK sample to 59. 
A personally addressed letter was sent detailing the research agenda and enclosing 
a questionnaire (see Appendix One) and a Loughborough University Banking 
Centre (LUBC) pen. The wording of the personally addressed initial letter is 
given in Table 4.4. 
In drafting the initial letter, four considerations were of particular importance: to 
assure confidentiality, to gain an agreement in principle to a follow-up interview, 
to enhance the response rates and to test the strategic alliance definition used. The 
confidentiality and interview issues were mentioned both in the text of the 
questionnaire and in the covering letter. 
Attempts were made to enhance the response rate by printing the letter on the 
Loughborough University Banking Centre letterhead, thus linking the survey with 
an established, industry specific, research centre. The letter was signed by a 
professor and the author to try to ensure equivalence in seniority between the first 
signatory on the letter and the named recipient. An LUBC pen was enclosed as a 
free gift to facilitate the completion of the questionnaire and to raise the response 
Stratedc AUfancei In Banking Survev 
Loughborough University Banking Centre has recently received funding for a study of the role 
of strategic alliances within the banking sector. As part of this study, we are anxious to survey 
the views of banks themselves towards this particular form of commercial development. 
We are writing to request your assistance in this research and would be most grateful if you, or 
an appropriate senior colleague, could complete the attached short questionnaire and return it to 
us in the reply-paid envelope. 
There is no precise or agreed definition of a strategic alliance. For the purposes of this exercise 
our preferred definition is 'A durable relationship established between two or more independent 
firms involving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a mechanism (corporate or 
otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or activities of strategic importance to one or more 
partners for their mutual economic advantage'. 
We would therefore ask you, in responding to our questionnaire, to consider any relationship you 
have formed which appears to meet these criteria: 
" The relationship should be seen as a lasting, not temporary, one. 
" The partrrrs involved should be independent of one another (i. e., one should not be a 
subsidiary of the other, though minority shareholdings are acceptable). 
Purely operational relationships (e. g., Correspondent banking links) should be 
excluded. the relationship must be seen to be of strategic importance to at least one of 
the partners. 
The alliance need not involve the creation of a fully-owned subsidiary, but there must 
be some sharing or pooling of resources to qualify - if only resources of proprietary 
knowledge or customer information. 
This normal buyer-supplier relationships would be excluded, but long-term vertical 
links, involving (say) the outsourcing of a key activity would be included. 
A space is provided in the questionnaire for your additional thoughts regarding the nature of 
strategic alliances in banking. 
Any information that you ppooide will be treated with complete confidentiality. No analysis in 
our resulting research output will mention you or your organization. 
We will be happy to provide you with a copy of the report if you indicate your interest on the 
questionnaire and would appreciate the opportunity to conduct a short follow-up interview at 
your convenience. 
The primary objective of the Loughborough University Banking Centre is the enhancement of 
applied and academic rescarch in money, banking and finance and its dissemination to the 
academic and financial services communities throughout the world. Your assistance in this can 
help us to achieve this objective. 
If you require any feather information, please do not hesitate to contact us. 
is the enhancement of 
Source: Definition from Hamilton Morison and ul-Haq, (1996) 
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rate and as a `thank you' to the respondent. A pre-paid response envelope was 
also provided to reduce barriers to returning the questionnaire. 
The alliance definition used in this thesis, based on the work detailed in Chapter 
Two, was enclosed in the letter. The author noted that a substantial variety of 
definitions are used in the academic literature and by practitioners. Including a 
definition in the questionnaire would go some way towards putting respondents on 
the same footing. A half a page was made available for respondents to disagree 
with the given definition or propose an alternative. 
With regard to Continental Europe, The Banker magazine, a trade journal, 
publishes an annual list of banks ranked by total asset size. The `Top 500 
Europeans' listing was reviewed, and all banks which had a total asset size of over 
US$10,000 million were included in the list. This asset size was chosen to include 
the major continental European banks (which should include at least one bank in 
each of 19 continental European countries as detailed in Table 4.4 below) and 
exclude those of the approximately 3,000 banks in continental Europe whose 
operations are, in comparison, mainly regional and small scale. 
As with the United Kingdom sample, contact details were obtained from the 
Bankers Almanac. In the majority of cases the name of the managing director was 
given. In cases of uncertainty, a telephone call was made to the personal assistant 
of the managing director to obtain the correct contact details. A covering letter, 
questionnaire and LUBC Pen were sent to each bank and a follow up reminder 
letter sent to 117 banks. 
A total of 17 completed questionnaires were returned by the UK sample. A 
follow up telephone call was made to 15 banks to arrange an interview and seven 
interviews were held. A total of 51 completed questionnaires were returned by the 
Continental European sample. A follow up telephone call was made to 20 banks 
to arrange an interview and 17 interviews were held. The sample and responses 
breakdown is given in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Analysis of Study Sample, Valid Questionnaire Responses and Interviews Held 
area/country Total 
sample 
valid 
res nses 
number 
Valid 
responses as 
% of sample 
interviews 
number 
interviews 
as % of 
rtVpnses 
total: UK 59 17 29% 7 41% 
total: C-Europe 158 51 32% 17 33% 
total: UK+CE 217 68 31% 24 35% 
CE Countries 
Austria 7 1 14% 
Belgium 8 4 50% 2 50% 
Bulgaria I 
_ Chez. Republic l 
Denmark 5 1 20% 
Finland 4 
France 17 3 18% 2 67% 
Germany 43 16 37% 5 31% 
Greece 2 1 50% 
Ireland 3 3 100 
Italy 24 4 17% 
Luxembourg 4 1 25% 
Holland 6 5 83% 1 20% 
Norway 3 2 67% 2 100% 
Portugal 5 1 20% 
Spain 10 2 20% 1 50% 
Sweden 5 3 60% 1 33% 
Switzerland 9 4 44% 2 50% 
Turkey 1 
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The returned questionnaires were first graded into three groups: 
9 valid responses where the respondent had attempted to complete the 
questionnaire; 
" specific non-questionnaire responses, where the respondent did not 
complete the questionnaire but volunteered information in some other 
form; 
" no valid response items, where the recipient wrote to decline the 
completing of the questionnaire. 
Valid responses totalled 68 completed questionnaires. These were coded and 
input into the SPSS for Windows v 9.0 statistical software and a set of frequencies 
computed for the 44 questions asked in the survey. These responses are analyzed 
and reported in Chapter Five of this thesis. The raw statistics are contained in 
Appendix Two. 
The survey attempts to provide a broad view of the practice of large banking firms 
with regard to their strategic alliances. It encompasses 20 countries across Europe 
(UK, Western and some Eastern Europe) while surveying the largest 217 banks in 
this geographical area. 
This broad approach is appropriate in the context of a thesis that is focussed on 
large firms and cross-border alliances. However, this limits the nature and degree 
of statistical analysis that can be carried out. With a valid response size of 68 and 
numbers of valid responses per country ranging from nil to 16 with an average of 
4.5, it is not possible to carry out a statistically significant analysis even when 
using the Nonparametric Test version of the Chi-Square Test (as provided in 
Appendix Three). 
The appropriate method is to use the frequencies output as mentioned above and 
provided in Appendix Two. 
The survey therefore provides a broad view of practice. While outside the gambit 
of this thesis, there is scope for a survey of all banks located in the geographical 
area, unrestricted as to size, thereby generating a sample of over 3,000 possible 
respondents. This approach would lend itself to more detailed statistical analysis. 
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4.2.3 Thematic, Semi-structured Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with 24 senior managers across 9 European countries 
and were designed to provide insights into the manager's perceptions of the issues 
facing their firms in the alliance process. 
The initial questionnaire (see Appendix One) sent out in the postal survey, as 
detailed above, included a space at the end for administrative questions. Question 
12 asked if the respondent `Would be willing, in principle, to participate in a 
follow-up interview? ' with a yes/no possible answer. Question 13 asked for the 
contact details of the respondent. Respondents who ticked the `yes' box in 
question 12 were contacted with a view to re-confirm their willingness to be 
interviewed, and interviews were arranged as appropriate. A letter detailing the 
research agenda, the format and broad questions to be raised in the interview and 
confirming the logistical details was sent to the interviewee. Thus the sample was 
semi-self-selecting and well briefed prior to the interview being conducted. 
A total of 24 interviews in 9 European countries were conducted. The interview 
travel, accommodation and transcription costs were funded by, variously, the 
Banking Centre and the International Research Group - both at Loughborough 
University Business School, the Birmingham Business School at the University of 
Birmingham, and the British Council offices in Basel, Madrid and Paris. 
Interviews were conducted in English at the head office of the subject bank. In 
the main they were tape-recorded always with the explicit knowledge and consent 
of the interviewee and lasted on average 45 minutes to 1 hour, though some took 
as long as 1 '/2 hours. In some cases another academic accompanied the author. 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature, asking these questions: 
i) What are the key environmental or competitive issues that your bank 
faces? 
ii) What alliances has the bank entered into and why? 
iii) How does the bank go about forming an alliance? 
iv) How do you manage an alliance relationship? 
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v) How do you allow and encourage an alliance to evolve? 
The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed the interviewer to interact 
with the interviewee and to gain access to the interviewee's `accounts and 
articulations' and to allow them to `be recounted' (Mason, 1996). 
A `grounded theory' approach was taken in the interview process. Thus the 
purpose was, from an initial set of broad research questions, to generate, collect 
and analyze data from which theory could be built (Punch, 1998). 
The locus of strategic decision-making in large organizations is generally 
considered to be at head office level, though some debate between the emergent 
and traditional schools of thought does exist. Even if the decision process is an 
emergent one the final responsibility to articulate the strategic goals, vision, of the 
bank lies at or near the Board. Interviewees in this sample were mainly main 
board members (14 out of 24) or a head office executive (9 out of 24). The 
interviewees were drawn from the strategic decision-makers and they ranged from 
members of German and Swiss banks' supervisory boards, chief executives and 
executive directors to corporate planning managers and similar head office 
officials. The sample was broadly representative of a wide geographical scope, 
with the subject banks being classified into four categories: regional (e. g., German 
Landesbanken), national, international (mainstream national banks with a 
significant international presence) and global (banks with a substantial presence in 
most continents). The head offices of the banks at which interviews were 
conducted were located in the nine European countries visited. In ownership 
terms a distinction was drawn between joint stock and cooperative banks. The 
former are those owned by shareholders, whether public or private sector, while 
the latter include cooperative and mutual banks (i. e., those `owned' by their 
members or customers). This analysis is summarized in the matrices in Tables 4.6 
and Table 4.7. 
The responses to the interviews were first disaggregated into the process of the 
alliance - from formation to dissolution - and an analysis written (provided in 
Chapter 6) that sought to identify and distil the major concerns of the managers 
interviewed. 
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Table 4.6: Analysis of Country of Interview and The Responsibility Level of Interviewee 
country/ 
responsibility 
level 
Supervisory 
board 
chairman main 
board 
head 
office 
executive 
subsidiary 
board 
Total 
Belgium 2 2 
France 2 2 
Germany 2 3 5 
Holland 1 1 2 
Norway 2 2 
Spain 1 1 
Sweden I I 
Switzerland 2 2 
United 
Kingdom 
4 3 7 
Total 2 2 11 9 24 
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Table 4.7: Analysis of Country of Interview and Geographical Operational Scope of Joint Stock 
and Cooperative Banks 
country/ 
geographic 
a] scope 
Mainly 
regional 
Mainly 
national 
International global total () total[] grand total 
Belgium (1) 1 1 1 2 
France (1) (1) 2 2 
German 1 (1) 121 1) 2 3 5 
Holland [21 2 2 
Norway (1) (1) 2 2 
Spain (1) 1 1 
Sweden (1) 1 1 
Switzerland (1) (1) 2 2 
United 
Kingdom 
(1) (2) [11 (1) (2) 6 1 7 
total () 2 8 3 4 17 
total 1 4 2 7 
grand total 3 12 3 6 24 
Key: () = Joint Stock Banks. []= Cooperative Banks. 
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At the start of each interview the interviewee was assured that all comments and 
observations made would be treated in the strictest confidence and was asked 
whether the interview could be taped. Only those who consented were tape 
recorded. 
It did not appear that the interviewees were being more guarded when the tape- 
recorder was being used. The responses seemed to be genuine and 
comprehensive. After each interview, recorded or otherwise, a file note was made 
of the main issues discussed. Each taped interview was transcribed verbatim. 
These accounts, along with any file notes and interview notes, were used as the 
source documents in the analysis. Thus the data gathered was rich and 
contextually specific and consisted of the `knowledge, views, understandings, 
interpretations, experiences' (Mason, 1996) of the interviewees coupled with the 
author's analysis. 
Only nine of the interviews were held in the UK. In the UK interviews one was 
conducted with a German national working for a British bank. The remaining 
interviews were conducted with nationals, as far as one could tell, of the country 
of origin of the bank. In the case of interviews held in continental Europe, 
although the English language was ostensibly a second language, this was not 
considered problematic as the international language of business and banking is 
English and because all interviewees displayed fluent English language skills. 
The primary issue in any interview process, especially one that is not strongly 
structured, is to develop a meaningful dialogue between interviewer and 
interviewee (a subjective relationship) while eliciting the more objective insights 
of the interviewee. Many methodologists have commented on the need for this 
continuous balancing act. 
To achieve the successful completion of interviews there are three necessary 
conditions that need to be met: accessibility, cognition and motivation. 
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The term `accessibility' relates to a decision about whether the interviewee has the 
knowledge that the interviewer seeks. In these interviews the interviewees were 
semi-self-selecting in response to a questionnaire about strategic alliances. 
Furthermore all the interviewees were located at the top end of their firm's 
hierarchy, a place generally considered to be the locus of strategic decision- 
making. 
The term `cognition' relates to the interviewees understanding their role and what 
is expected of them in the interview. Prior to each interview the basic parameters 
were made explicit in a letter confirming the interview and then again verbally at 
the start of the interview. These parameters were: type (semi-structured), context 
(rich contextual addition to questionnaires), topic (strategic alliances) and time 
constraints (amount of interviewee's time requested). 
The term `motivation' refers to the need for interviewees to be aware that their 
thoughts and ideas on the interview subject were of value to the interviewer and 
the research. This value was displayed through respondents being asked in the 
questionnaire if they would be willing to be interviewed thereby indicating that 
the interviews were an integral part of the study. Their semi-self-selection also 
shows that interviewees considered that they had some further insights that would 
add value to the research. Finally, through the encouraging nature of the probing 
or follow up questions and the obvious interest in the interviewee's observations 
shown by the interviewer, value was shown to the respondents. 
All three criteria of accessibility, cognition and motivation were met in the 
establishment and conduct of the interviews. The interviews can therefore be 
broadly termed successful in gathering valuable data. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The thesis has been designed to examine the research question `Do Strategic 
Alliances Add Value? ' at industry and firm level in Europe. Through analysis of 
the foundation theory (Coase, 1937), a historical review, a questionnaire survey 
and in-depth interviews the thesis attempts to provide a multi-dimensional 
examination of the research question. 
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Chapter Five 
Postal Survey Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports, summarizes and discusses the outcome of the 44 questions 
contained in the questionnaire. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix One. A comprehensive review of the sample and the analysis method is 
provided in Chapter Four. The observations below are based on the Descriptive 
Statistics - Frequencies analysis, carried out using SPSS for Windows vs 9.0, as 
provided in Appendix Two of this thesis. 
5.2 Strategic Alliances -A Definition 
In Chapter One an ex ante definition was proposed for a strategic alliance 
(Hamilton, Morison and ul-Haq, 1996), that is, A durable relationship established 
between two or more independent firms, involving the sharing and pooling of 
resources to create a mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a 
business activity or activities of strategic importance to one or more of the 
partners for their mutual economic advantage. It was noted that the alliances 
defined in these forms would constitute the subject of this study. 
The definition was provided to the recipients of the postal questionnaire in the 
covering letter and a set of questions asked to identify the respondent's views as to 
the validity of the definition. 
The respondents were asked: 
`In respect of strategic alliances you have entered how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? ' 
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The scale used here and throughout such questions was `extremely important', 
`very important', `somewhat important', `not very important' or `not at all 
important'. 
5.2.1 Durability 
Of 59 responses received, a substantial 81.4% considered durability to be a `very' 
(57.6%), `extremely' (23.7%) or `somewhat' (16.9%) important characteristic of a 
strategic alliance. Only 1.7% disagreed and responded that durability was `not at 
all important'. There is, therefore, substantial support from the respondents for 
the contention that durability, ex ante, is an integral characteristic of a strategic 
alliance. 
However, the issue of duration is a complex one. Embedded, and often made 
explicit, in the decision to establish a strategic alliance between two firms, for 
example, is the understanding that their strategic intents are served, at least 
initially, by entering into the alliance. Both firms expect to gain some advantage 
through the alliance whether the advantage is offensive or defensive. At time zero 
the strategic intents of the partners are co-aligned. As the alliance moves from 
time zero onward, the alliance partners' strategic intents co-evolve. 
Durability (ex post) is not absolute but rather conditional, predicated on the firms 
entering into a strategic alliance receiving the anticipated gains that the alliance is 
presumed to be able to generate for them, a collaborative advantage when 
competing with other firms in their competitive space. Further, they hope that this 
newly formed alliance will repay the effort in establishing it by generating these 
advantages over a period of time. This will only be realized if the alliance is also 
sensitive to changes in strategic intent of the member firms and co-evolves to 
meet these needs. 
There is a difference between `anticipated' and `realized' durability. It is possible 
for a strategic alliance to have an anticipated durability (ex ante), which may also 
be for a finite period or limited life-span, on inception but for either or all partners 
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to exit from the strategic alliance at a later stage if a change (ex post) in, for 
example, the conditions of competition or own firm strategic intent occurs. 
The very high importance attributed by respondents to the issue of durability 
probably reflects a wish that the strategic alliance will continue to co-evolve and 
deliver a collaborative advantage to the member firms, repaying the effort and 
resources invested in it. 
5.2.2 Sharing or Pooling of Resources 
A high number of the 59 responses, 96.6%, considered that the sharing or pooling 
of resources was `very' (64.4%), `somewhat' (25.4%) or `extremely' (6.8%) 
important. A very small 3.4% viewed this as `not very important'. There is 
substantial support for the contention that the sharing and pooling of resources is 
an integral characteristic of a strategic alliance. 
Firms that enter into strategic alliances do so because they believe that their 
strategic intents will be better served together than separately. This often requires 
some form of sharing and pooling of resources. It may be through the endowment 
of a new joint venture company with tangible or intangible assets or alternatively 
through allowing `claims to usage' by the alliance partners on the member firms' 
assets and capabilities, including embedded and explicit knowledge. 
5.2.3 Creation of a Separate Company 
While 59.3% of the 59 respondents to this question viewed creation of a separate 
company `somewhat' (40.7%), `very' (15.3%) or `extremely (3.4%) important', a 
substantial remainder considered it as `not very' (30.5%) or `not at all (10.2%) 
important'. There is clear support for the contention that a cooperation 
mechanism needs to be established but that it does not necessarily have to be in 
the form of a separate company. 
This broadly balanced split reflects the variety of inter-organizational structures 
available to be utilized by strategic alliances. In the BNP/Dresdner strategic 
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alliance (discussed in Chapter Six), for example, a number of forms were used in 
co-existence: a global agreement to cooperate, the linking of technology, cross- 
border marketing and introductions, and the setting up of joint venture companies 
in Eastern Europe. These various inter-organizational structures were a result of 
the strategic intentions of the alliance. Each type is considered appropriate to deal 
with a particular set of objectives. They portray a number of risk versus reward 
balances and a number of types may co-exist and may change over time. 
Indeed the first order decision is that the alliance firms' strategic intents are served 
by a cooperative relationship and the second order decision is what form - joint 
venture or non joint venture - the cooperation should take. 
5.2.4 Strategic Importance to Partners 
A substantial 87.9% of the 58 responses to this question held that this 
characteristic was `very' (50.0%), `extremely' (22.4%), or `somewhat (15.5%) 
important'. Only a small number responded that it was `not very' (10.3%) or `not 
at all (1.7%) important'. There is clear support for the contention that strategic 
importance to partners is an integral factor in a strategic alliance as one would 
anticipate. 
This reflects the fact that the nature of a strategic alliance entered into is to 
provide a strategic advantage to the members as compared to non-members. 
5.2.5 Mutual Economic Gain 
Of 57 responses to this question a substantial 98.2% viewed mutual economic 
gain as a `very' (52.6%), `extremely' (28.1%), or `somewhat (17.5%) important' 
characteristic. Only 1.8% considered this criteria `not very important'. There is 
clear support for the contention that mutual economic gain is important in 
strategic alliances. 
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5.2.6 Own Firm Economic Gain 
Out of 57 responses received for this question, a substantial 98.2% of respondents 
view own firm economic gain as `very' (59.6%), `extremely' (31.6%), or 
`somewhat (7%) important' characteristic. Only a small minority considered it 
`not very important' (1.8%). 
The previous two characteristics display the same overall view. That is, a 
strategic alliance has to generate economic gain for all the members to be of 
value. This value may not be equally distributed; and it must be noted that 
respondents, as one would expect, rank their own firm's economic gain higher 
than that of their partner or partners. 
This question and response has embedded in it the nature of the firms under 
investigation in this thesis - European banks - that is, common actors which carry 
out their activities in economic space and see the world in terms of economic gain. 
If the same question was posited to the National Health Service, the response 
could well be different, with the strategic intent being to maintain health, alleviate 
suffering and enhance the quality of life, say, rather than to generate a financial 
return. 
5.2.7 Other 
A total of 6 (8.8 % of total) responses were received. This category encouraged 
the respondent to suggest additional characteristics of a strategic alliance that they 
considered important. 
These reported characteristics can be broadly placed under four headings: 
relationships, resources, loyalty and markets. 
5.2.7.1 Relationships. 
i) the creation of a strong bond for the (finite) length of the alliance 
(extremely important) 
ii) the long-term commitment to the market and the strategic alliance. 
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These responses reflect the diversity of the notion of durability in strategic 
alliances. The first response points to the development of a strong relationship, or 
bond, between the firms for the duration of the strategic alliance, whatever that 
period may be. The second takes the opposing view that a strategic alliance is, by 
its very nature, a long-term commitment to both a partner and a market (one that 
may be product or service or geographical). This dichotomy will reflect the 
particular characteristics, and motivations, of the strategic alliances entered into 
by the respondents. 
5.2.7.2 Resources 
i) the creation of, and access, to increased and specialized resources (very 
important). 
The firms in a strategic alliance may create, through collaboration, a new form of 
resource that each individual firm may not have in its existing resource portfolio. 
For example, the sharing of knowledge may lead to innovation and the creation of 
a new product, service or process. In addition each firm may have specialized 
capabilities, and cooperation allows an exchange of, or affords access to, these 
capabilities. 
5.2.7.3 Lo alt 
i) the need for exclusivity among partners (very important) 
ii) the need for limited competition on each member's home market 
(somewhat important). 
The former and latter are linked by the concept of mutual commitment. The 
former may suggest a focussed strategic alliance in which, for example, a retail 
bank and an insurance company ally, and life assurance products are sold through 
the bank's retail distribution channels (branch, direct mail, telephone, internet et 
al). Such an agreement would be exclusive (perhaps due to regulatory controls in 
this product sector, for example) but might allow scope for a further parallel 
strategic alliance with a general insurance company to expand the offered product 
range. 
An example of the latter might be a cross-European strategic alliance, such as the 
conception of Scandinavian Banking Partners, where the membership is 
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configured so there is a limited overlap between the geographical areas of 
competition and the mutual use of partners' networks to deliver cross-border 
services to their customers. 
5.2.7.4 Markets. 
i) the targeting of third countries only (very important) 
ii) the provision of an all embracing product range (very important) 
iii) market, or regulatory, restrictions. 
The first item relates back to 5.2.7.3 above, in that collaboration is restricted to 
new entry to third countries, with competition continuing in first countries. An 
example would be two European banks setting up joint ventures in Eastern Europe 
as a method of entering a new geographical market while continuing to compete 
in the rest of the world. 
The second item refers to the concept of a bank increasing the revenue per 
customer by encouraging the customer to source all their financial service needs 
from the main relationship bank. Thus the bank has to be able to offer a full range 
of services, some of which may be sourced via strategic alliance partners. 
The third item connects to the regulatory restrictions imposed on banks entering 
into new geographical, product or service markets. These may include, in the 
former case, a requirement that to enter into joint venture in a particular country a 
minimum level of local ownership is necessary or in the latter case being subject 
to industry or legal requirements to train salespeople to certain standards. One 
respondent mentioned the SE Asia region and noted that entry was possible only, 
in some instances, by means of a joint venture or a strategic alliance with a local 
partner. In addition, managerial issues included the gaining of access to 
distribution channels, access and availability of banking licences, minority vs. 
majority shareholding, long-term commitment to the market and the desirability of 
a local partner. 
In addition to the 68 completed questionnaires, a total of ten bank representatives 
responded that the questionnaire was not applicable to them and therefore did not 
146 
complete it. The reasons given for non-completion, some of which overlap, are 
contained in Table 5.1. 
Of the ten non-completes half specifically noted that they had no strategic 
alliances as defined in the survey's covering letter and three noted that they had no 
strategic alliances. In the questionnaire there was space provided for respondents 
to note their comments, but all declined to propose an alternative definition or 
characterization of a strategic alliance. 
One French bank's London office noted that they do not expect to enter into 
durable relationships with other lenders but instead `... expect to join with others, 
including competitors, from time to time, for particular tranches of business, but 
would not see it as a continuing relationship except on an ad hoc and opportunistic 
basis'. A German bank official noted that they `expand... business activities 
basically by takeovers or taking majority stakes in partners. Strategic alliances 
play no significant part in expanding the business activities... '. 
In the view of a number of strategic managers, homogeneity was unlikely rather 
than varied nature of cooperative activity between commercial organizations and 
diversity in the form, nature, purpose and importance of such strategic alliances 
was prevalent. 
There are vast differences among firms, depending upon a number of factors. 
These include the range of options available to generate competitive advantage, 
the degree of expertise in establishing and managing alliances ('alliance-ability'), 
the willingness to use cooperative strategies such as strategic alliances and the 
degree of control that firms wish to exercise over their activities. Nevertheless, 
the major constituent parts of the definition of a strategic alliance (Hamilton, 
Morison and ul-Haq, 1996) mooted at the start of this thesis and embedded in the 
research have been found to have a high degree of support from the respondents of 
the questionnaire (classified as over 70% of respondents stating that the 
characteristic was `extremely', `very' or `somewhat important'). These 
characteristics are durability, sharing or pooling of resources, creation of a 
mechanism, strategic importance and mutual economic advantage. 
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Table 5.1: Reasons of Non-Completion of Questionnaire 
reason given number of banks 
do not have strategic alliances 9 
do not plan strategic alliances 3 
do not have or plan `durable' relationships 1 
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5.3 The Rationale for Conceiving Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are entered into for a wide range of reasons. This section of the 
questionnaire asked respondents to state how important they considered five 
reasons for entering into strategic alliances in the banking sector: the reduction in 
the cost of capital, the sharing of risks, entry into a new product market, entry into 
a new geographical market and accessing of new distribution channels. 
Respondents were asked: `How important are the following reasons for entering 
into a strategic alliance? ' 
5.3.1 `Capital cost reduction' 
Of 63 responses, a total of 63.5% considered capital cost reduction to be 
`somewhat' (30.2%), `very' (23.8%) or `extremely (9.5%) important'. The 
remainder viewed this motivator as `not very' (25.4%) or `not at all (11.1%) 
important'. On balance the reduction in the cost of capital through entering into 
strategic alliances was a factor in choosing the alliance route but not an 
overwhelming one. 
There is a general presumption in banking firms that reducing the cost of capital is 
a desirable goal, as testified to by the 63.5% of respondents. However, the 
responses were skewed in favour of the `somewhat important' classification with 
a high `not very important' classification. 
It should be noted that the pressure on capital in the banking sector is lower than 
in other industries and is reduced by three factors: 
i) 'the nature of the subject firms, that is large European banks, with, in 
the main, easy access to the global bond and equity markets at fine 
rates; 
ii) a sector, banking, that has the highest allocation and utilization of 
global capital; 
iii) a high profit generation among the major banks coupled with a lack of 
profitable expansion opportunities leading to a surplus of under- 
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utilized retained earnings and resultant share buy-backs (e. g., Barclays 
and Nat West). 
On balance, reduction in capital usage is not a major issue for these respondents. 
5.3.2 `Sharing risks' 
Of 64 responses, a clear majority of 79.7% considered the sharing of risks as a 
`very' (37.5%), `somewhat' (31.3%) or `extremely' (10.9%) important reason for 
entering into strategic alliances. Only 20.3% held the opposing view that this 
criteria was `not very' (15.6%) or `not at all' (4.7%) important. The sharing of 
risks is therefore a significant characteristic of strategic alliances. 
Risks to be shared may be tangible, such as the loss of capital inserted into a new 
venture; or they may be intangible, such as the loss of reputation if the venture 
fails. An alliance with an expert partner may reduce the likelihood of failure. In 
European Union countries changes in legislation have enabled European banks to 
market their products and services in other member countries. The local bank, for 
example in the UK, has an extensive knowledge base about legislation, 
distribution systems, consumer preferences and segments, pricing and competition 
in the UK. When entering into another European country, the UK banks face a 
new set of risks generated through information asymmetry and mitigate these risks 
through allying with a local firm. This alliance may act as a lower risk - learning, 
risk identification and market potential gauging - experience prior to a full entry. 
5.3.3 'Entering a new product market' 
Of 62 responses received on this topic a high 79% viewed this reason for entering 
into a strategic alliances as `very' (46.8%), `extremely' (19.4%) or somewhat 
(12.9%) important'. Only 21% considered it an unimportant reason. Therefore 
entering a new product market is a significant driving factor for entering into a 
strategic alliance. 
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The partners may, for example, bring specific product manufacturing, processing 
and distribution knowledge to the alliance. Many alliances allow the front, 
customer facing, firm to market a new product which is manufactured and 
processed by another, non-customer facing, firm, thereby combining the customer 
relationship with processing knowledge and capability. 
5.3.4 `Entering a new geographical market' 
Of 64 responses received, 75% consider this reason `very' (40.6%), `extremely' 
(20.3%) or `somewhat (14.1%) important'. The remainder viewed this reason as 
`not very' (18.8%) or `not at all' (6.3%) important. Entering into a new 
geographical market is thus a significant reason for entering into a strategic 
alliance. 
The local partner may bring knowledge, access, contacts, and locally based 
resources and may smooth regulatory hurdles. 
5.3.5 `Accessing distribution channels' 
Of 63 responses, 88.9% considered this reason `very' (46%), `somewhat' (23.8%) 
or `extremely' (19%) important. The small remainder held the view that this 
reason was `not very' (7.9%) or `not at all (3.2%) important'. 
On the face of the above aggregate results, accessing distribution channels may be 
said to be a significant factor in entering into strategic alliances; but is not 
substantiated due to a typographical error in the questionnaire. In the initial 
mailing to UK banks, resulting in 17 responses, the question read `Assessing 
Distribution Channels'. This error was corrected to read `Accessing Distribution 
Channels' in the subsequent mailing to continental European banks, resulting in 
51 responses. 
The primary reasons, in the European banks surveyed in this thesis, for entering 
into strategic alliances are sharing risks and entering into a new product or 
geographical market. 
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5.4 The Rationale for Forming Strategic Alliances 
The decision to form a strategic alliance has a number of dimensions. Three 
questions regarding the formation of alliances were asked in the questionnaire and 
related to the degree of activity, the propensity to enter into alliances with 
competitors and the control vs. influence issues. 
5.4.1 `How many strategic alliances does your company have? ' 
Of 58 responses, a majority of 67.2% stated they had between 1 to 4 alliances. Of 
the remainder, 22.4% had between 5 to 9,5.2% between 10 to 15 and 5.2% 
enjoyed more than 15. The question elicited a general response that displays a 
tendency towards a smaller number of strategic alliances. 
The question does not differentiate between `serial-alliancers' who maintain a 
limited number of relatively short-term alliances and `parallel-alliancers' or 
`compulsive-alliancers' who, as a matter of preference, effectively outsource 
production, operations or distribution through the strategic alliance route. It also 
does not differentiate between large global alliances or smaller intra-country 
alliances. 
5.4.2 `We do or are willing to enter into strategic alliances with our 
competitors' 
Of 60 responses, 58.3% either `agree' (51.7%) or `strongly agree' (6.7%) with this 
statement. A figure of 23.3% `neither agree or disagree' and the remainder 
`strongly disagree' (10%) or `disagree' (8.3%). The majority are willing to enter 
into strategic alliances with their competitors. 
In the sector (banking) and segment (large European) under analysis, the majority 
of participants will be competitors in one area or another - product, service, 
customer segment, geographical location etc. The impetus on collaboration is to 
find areas of mutual benefit while continuing to compete in other areas -a hybrid 
or Composite Strategy (Burton, 1995a). 
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5.4.3 `We consider that there is a direct positive relationship between 
ownership, in equity terms, and management control and influence in 
strategic alliances. ' 
A total of 68 responses were received. Of these a high 76.5% `agree' (55.9%) or 
`strongly agree' (20.6%) with this statement. A small number (17.6%) of 
respondents `neither agree nor disagree' and an even smaller number (5.9%) 
`disagree'. There is a clear view that this relationship between ownership and 
control holds. 
Indeed it is a factor of the nature of publicly quoted companies that the degree of 
equity ownership determines the number of votes under one's control or influence 
which is available, but not necessarily used, at a firm's Annual General Meeting. 
In many alliances, however, no equity relationship exists and the control and the 
degree of influence over resources and direction is negotiated between parties to 
the alliance. This negotiation is either through contractual agreements or on a 
continuous basis and depends on the degree of congruence between the strategic 
intents of member firms and the alliance. 
5.5 The Rationale for Organizing Strategic Alliances 
An alliance has to be actively managed to be effective. The locus and nature of 
strategic alliance management may differ from that of the internal hierarchies of 
the partner firms and will need to address the probable differences in the work and 
priority cultures of these member firms. 
A number of questions regarding the management of alliances were asked in the 
questionnaire. 
5.5.1 `We consider our strategic alliances have met or are meeting our 
strategic objectives' 
Of 65 responses received, a high 80% either `agree' (61.7%) or `strongly agree' 
(18.3%) with this statement. A minority of 16.6% `neither agree nor disagree' and 
1.7% `disagree' and 1.7% `strongly disagree'. The majority of respondents 
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clearly thought that their strategic alliances have or are meeting their strategic 
objectives. 
These responses may reflect a lifecycle view of the alliances. Successful alliances 
may be at the start of the lifecycle, with initial objectives being met, or may be 
well established, with the ongoing and final objectives being met. Alliances 
regarding which 16.7% of respondents stated `neither agree nor disagree' to the 
above question may be in the start and middle phases of the lifecycle (that is, it is 
too early to make a judgement) while the `failed' alliances (those which have not 
been successful (or have been fully successful) in meeting the strategic objectives 
of the partners) may well have been disbanded. 
The skew is for successful strategic alliances and may be reflective of the wider 
experience of alliance partners of successful outcomes or may be due to the skew 
in respondents. That is, those banks that chose to respond to the questionnaire, by 
completing and returning it, were those that had a generally positive experience of 
alliances. Those with a generally negative experience may have declined to return 
the questionnaire. 
5.5.2 `The objectives of our alliances are specific. ' 
Of 61 responses received, a large majority of 96.7% `agree' (52.5%) or `strongly 
agree' (44.3%) with this statement. Only 3.3% `neither agree nor disagree'. 
Indeed the decision to enter into a strategic alliance is a generally a positive 
decision to gain access (or deny other competitors access) to resources, markets, 
knowledge etc. through alliances. Prior to this decision the firm must have pre- 
identified (broadly or narrowly) this need. The strategic alliance is usually a 
conscious choice, an outcome of this process, and thus reflects these pre-existing, 
and generally specific, objectives. 
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5.5.3 `Our strategic alliances identify and undertake specific tasks in 
support of these objectives' 
Of 61 responses, 96.7% `agree' (60.7%) or `strongly agree' (36.1%) with this 
statement. A tiny 1.6% `neither agree nor disagree'. A clear majority of 
respondents overwhelmingly agree that their strategic alliances identify and 
undertake specific tasks in support of these objectives. 
The level of response reflects the responses in the previous question and is an 
outgrowth of the `management by objectives' view embedded in the respondent's 
strategic alliances. 
5.5.4 `We encourage our strategic alliances to take calculated initiatives' 
Of 61 responses a majority of 65.6% `agree' (49.2%) or `strongly agree' (16.4%) 
while the remainder `neither agree nor disagree' (27.9%) or `disagree' (6.6%) 
with this statement. 
A much lower percentage broadly agreed with the view that strategic alliances are 
encouraged to take calculated initiatives (65.6%) than those (in the two previous 
questions) who agreed with the statements about specific objectives (96.7%) and 
specific tasks (96.7%). 
This finding may imply that firms managing alliances simultaneously ask for 
specific objectives and tasks while allowing a varied degree of calculated 
initiative in pursuit of these. 
This may be reflective of the nature of the relationship between the firm's internal 
dynamics and its decision to enter into a strategic alliance. A firm may host a 
range of concurrent behaviours - management by objectives, engendering 
continuous innovation, taking calculated risks, underlying or occasional lethargy, 
developing emergent strategies, imposing strategic intents, suffering external 
discontinuous shocks. The strategic alliance, on the other hand, is generally set up 
to fulfil a specific need of the partner firms - perhaps to fill a resource or access 
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deficiency. During the lifetime of the alliance it may be subject to many of the 
behaviours of the partner firm(s) but the balance may be different. Managers of 
the alliance will also be empowered to act with a varied degree of independence, 
from the member firms, in achieving the overall outcomes desired by the member 
firms. 
5.5.5 `We are strongly committed to our strategic alliance partners. ' 
A total of 61 responses were received. Of these 65.6% `agree' (47.5%) or 
`strongly agree' (18%) with this statement. The remainder `neither agree nor 
disagree' (26.2%) or `disagree' (8.2%) with this statement. 
While the majority agree with this statement, we saw, however, earlier in this 
chapter that mutual economic gain and own firm economic gain are `very', 
`extremely' or `somewhat (98.2%) important' factors in a strategic alliance. If the 
strategic alliance meets these overarching economic gain objectives, then the 
commitment obtains. If not, the degree of commitment would probably be 
reduced. This latter view of conditional commitment is reflected in the 26.2% 
who `neither agree nor disagree' with the statement and further supported by the 
8.2% of respondents who `disagree'. The last group are even more likely to 
change alliances if the external economic rational changes. 
5.5.6 `When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial time to 
establishing methods for making decisions. ' 
Of 61 responses a high majority of 83.6% `agree' (65.6%) or `strongly agree' 
(18%) with this statement. The remainder `neither agree nor disagree' (13.1 %) or 
`disagree' (3.3%) with this statement. 
Strategic alliances may, for example, have a concrete tangible form through a joint 
venture or a more diffuse form through a cooperating mechanism. The joint 
venture will have its own board of directors and the balance of power would 
generally reflect the shareholding in the joint venture by the strategic alliance 
partners. A non joint venture cooperating mechanism would require a contractual 
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agreement or ad hoc arrangements. Contractual agreements may delineate the 
level of claim to mutual resources, profit sharing, decision-making processes etc. 
all of which will have to be discussed, negotiated and codified. Ad hoc 
arrangements will require an agreement about the process of decision-making and 
intensive negotiation prior to a decision being made. All require an investment in 
the processes of making decisions. 
Agreement on the decision making process is particularly relevant and important 
where there are significant differences in culture between the partners. Such 
differences may be due to size (large international and small regional), product 
expertise (retail bank and an insurance company), ethos (investment bank and 
commercial bank), regulatory structures (life assurance and funds management), 
linguistic expertise and embedded presumptions (French and German), national 
culture and ethos (Brazil and the UK). 
5.6 The Rationale for Evolution in Strategic Alliances 
The concept of co-evolution can describe the evolution of `national contexts' and 
the `zones of manoeuvre' available in these national contexts, Clark (2000). At 
the next level down, this concept may be used to analyze geographically 
determined regional or industry contexts and further, at the increasingly micro 
level, the individual firm. In this chapter co-evolution is used in this latter firm 
level context. 
At the start of an alliance the strategic intents of the member firms can be said to 
be co-aligned - that is, facing in a similar direction with a similar intent. As an 
alliance moves through time, the external environment, internal drivers for all 
partner firms, and the drivers for individuals and the projected outcomes 
involved in the alliance (especially if in the form of an independent joint venture) 
co-evolve and may converge or diverge in varied combinations as discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
Questions about this evolution process were asked in the questionnaire 
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5.6.1 `When entering into strategic alliances we devote substantial time to 
establishing methods for monitoring the implementation of decisions' 
Of 61 responses a majority of 70.5% `agree' (52.5%) or `strongly agree' (18%) 
with this statement. The remainder `neither agree nor disagree' (26.2%) or 
`disagree' (3.3%) with this statement. 
It follows from the above discussion about managing, that in the complex 
environment of a strategic alliance it is important for partners to monitor the 
implementation of decisions. This is especially important because implementation 
may take place within one firm, a joint venture for example, while the broad 
decision was made by more than one firm. There may not be direct control of the 
activities of the alliance by member firms, rather a monitoring and influencing of 
activity may be the appropriate form of management. 
5.6.2 `When entering into strategic alliances we devote substantial time to 
establishing a method for resolving conflicts' 
Of 61 responses 70.5% `agree' (55.7%) or `strongly agree' (14.8%). The 
remainder `neither agree nor disagree' (27.9%) or `disagree' (1.6%) with this 
statement. 
A significant majority agreed with this statement. Conflicts that arise in a joint 
venture can be resolved in a board meeting. In a more diffuse non joint venture 
however, a mechanism for resolving conflicts needs to be established. This may 
be through a coordinating committee, for example. Such a mechanism is essential 
to the process of allowing the strategic alliance to co-evolve with the strategic 
intents of member firms. 
5.6.3 `When entering into strategic alliances we devote substantial time to 
establishing... a number of other issues' 
Out of 61 responses, a small number, 8, made additional comments under this 
section. These observations related to three headings: commercial benefits, 
marketing and dissolution. 
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5.6.3.1 Commercial benefits. Some respondents referred to the optimizing of 
commercial action, sharing profits/benefits, and the legal and tax framework. As 
strategic alliances have at their centre the need to obtain a competitive advantage 
(or mitigate a competitive disadvantage), all three factors above are clearly 
important. The third factor is particularly important in the case of cross-border 
alliances or third country operations. 
5.6.3.2 Marketing. Some respondents referred to methods for promoting the 
alliance to customers and to methods for enhancing the relationship with the 
partner. The former is important in engendering cross-selling of products and 
services to each other's customer base, and the latter is both an immediate and 
ongoing need. 
5.6.3.3 Dissolution. A respondent referred to methods for breaking the alliance. 
Strategic alliances, as was seen earlier in the managing section, are set up to meet 
specific objectives. When the alliance no longer meets those objectives or cannot 
evolve to meet new, revised objectives, it may need to be dissolved. An orderly 
dissolution and withdrawal is preferable to its opposite and may need to be carried 
out according to pre-determined and perhaps pre-documented procedures. The 
procedures may delineate details such as providing the first refusal of the partner's 
shareholding to the other partner(s), the split and distribution of resources and 
profits, and non-competition agreements. 
The dissolution of a strategic alliance may well be a positive step. Take the 
example of a UK firm entering a new geographical market via a strategic alliance 
with a local partner in Spain. Over time the UK firm would gain knowledge about 
local business conditions and would also build up its contacts and relationships 
with distributors (wholesale and retail), while the Spanish firm gains access to 
knowledge of new products and services. The UK firm may decide to go it alone 
in the Spanish market by buying out its local partner. The strategic alliance, 
though dissolved, would have to have met the UK firm's objective of entering the 
Spanish market and may also have met the Spanish firm's objective of gaining a 
knowledge transfer. 
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5.7 Current Status of Strategic Alliances 
This section of the questionnaire asked respondents to provide information about 
the current geographical distribution of strategic alliance partners. 
A total response of 68 completed questionnaires was possible. The responses are 
tabulated and discussed below. The `percentage', in column three, below is as a 
percentage of the total possible (e. g., 68 responses equals 100%), while the `valid 
percentage', in column four, is the number of responses received as a percentage 
of the total number of responses to that particular question (e. g., 18 equals 100%). 
5.7.1 `How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-UK? ' 
Table 5.2 provides details of the responses. The preference is to have one 
strategic alliance with a partner in the UK. This may reflect the highly 
concentrated nature of the UK banking sector in the hands of HSBC, NatWest, 
Barclays and Lloyds TSB. Where there is more than one UK alliance, this may 
relate to UK-to-UK alliances. The rationale for these alliances may be due to the 
trend, initiated in the 1980s, towards universal banking and the resultant need to 
rapidly build multi-purpose banks providing commercial, investment and 
assurance services through a mix of acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances. 
It must be noted that by 1998 the concept of the universal bank in the UK was 
under question. The de-merger of BZW from Barclays Bank, of NatWest Markets 
from NatWest Bank and the increasing focus on specific products and markets by, 
for example, non-banking financial services providers such as Marks and Spencer, 
Tesco, Sainsbury's, Virgin and Internet banks such as Egg and Smile reflected this 
trend. 
5.7.2 `How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-Western Europe? ' 
A high (39) number of strategic alliances between UK and non-UK Western 
European banks and between Western European banks was noted as detailed in 
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Table 5.2: Numbers of Partners in UK 
number frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
1 6 8.8 33.3 
2 2 2.9 11.1 
3 2 2.9 11.1 
4 3 4.4 16.7 
5 2 2.9 11.1 
6 1 1.5 5.6 
10 2 2.9 11.1 
Total 18 26.3 100 
Table 5.3: Number of Partners in Western Europe 
number frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
1 12 17.6 30.7 
2 5 7.4 12.8 
3 6 8.8 15.4 
4 5 7.4 12.8 
5 7 10.3 17.9 
6 1 1.5 2.6 
7 1.5 2.6 
11 1.5 2.6 
19 1.5 2.6 
Total 39 57.5 100 
Table 5.4: Number of Partners in Eastern Europe 
number frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
1 4 5.9 57.1 
2 1 1.5 14.3 
3 1 1.5 14.3 
4 1 1.5 14.3 
Total 7 10.4 100 
Table 5.5: Number of Partners in North America 
number frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
1 11 16.2 73.3 
2 2 2.9 13.3 
3 1 1.5 6.7 
4 1 1.5 6.7 
Total 15 22.1 100 
Table 5.6: Number of Partners in Asia 
number frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
1 4 5.9 44.5 
2 2 2.9 22.2 
3 2 2.9 22.2 
5 1 1.5 11.1 
Total 9 13.2 100 
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Table 5.3. The spread accorded with observations in Chapter Two whereby 
Western European banks tended to ally with a number of other Western European 
country banks to establish a cross-European network. This view is further 
supported by the range of one to five alliances seen with a valid percentage of 
over 12%. 
5.7.3 `How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-Eastern Europe? ' 
The number of alliances in Eastern Europe, as detailed in Table 5.4, was much 
lower (7) than in Western Europe. In addition, the tendency to have more than 
one alliance was also markedly lower. This may reflect a number of issues, such 
as a possible perceived low relative importance of Eastern Europe (vs. Western 
Europe) as a new market, the more recent nature of access and the economic re- 
adjustment problems of the region, the concentration of needs in the investment 
banking (privatisation, consolidation, securities) areas rather than retail and a 
tendency to retain control, for example, through own branches rather than through 
alliances. 
5.7.4 `How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-North America? ' 
The 73.3% concentration on one North American alliance, see Table 5.5, accorded 
with the trends observed in Chapter Two where a typical cross-border alliance 
consisted of a number of Western European banks and one US bank. This linking 
with US banks may be due to the status of New York as a major world financial 
centre. 
5.7.5 'How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-Asia? ' 
The growth in the Asian Tiger economies over the 1980s and most of 1990s 
period probably underlies the popularity of alliances with banks in this region as 
detailed in Table 5.6. 
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5.7.6 `How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the 
following regions-Indian Sub-Continent, South and Central America, 
Africa, Middle East? ' 
Western European banks show only a limited tendency to enter into strategic 
alliances with partners in the regions of the Indian Sub-Continent, South and 
Central America, Africa and the Middle East. This may reflect the greater 
tendency to assert control in these regions through acquisitions (for example, 
Spanish banks acquiring Latin American banks) or having established branch 
networks dating from colonial days (for example, UK's Standard Chartered 
Bank). 
Underpinning a strategic alliance is the understanding that member firms have 
access to accurate information about the financial condition of the members 
(reliable and audited annual reports), that there is a degree of symmetry in 
management style and that in the case of mishap, there is rapid, and unbiased, 
recourse to the courts to resolve disputes. In the case of non-Europe/US 
geographical areas, these underpinning conditions may be considered to be 
(variably) lacking by potential firms considering alliances. Therefore the 
tendency may be to enter through one's own operations, such as representative 
offices and branches, where the firm can exert direct control over decisions and 
processes, rather than through arm's length strategic alliances. 
5.8 Future Plans for Strategic Alliances 
This section of the questionnaire asked respondents to provide information about 
future planned or possible geographical distribution of strategic alliance partners. 
A number of banks refused to complete this section, presumably because of 
competitive issues, in spite of assurances as to the maintenance of confidentially. 
A total of 68 responses were possible. They were asked to respond to: 
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5.8.1 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-UK? ' 
A high valid percentage of 55.2% said they are using alliances and 26.3% would 
consider further use of alliances with UK banks as reported in Table 5.7. This 
latter group may have been laggards in entering into alliances who are now 
expanding their range of alliances or they may be experienced firms that have 
found alliances beneficial and intend to expand their range. The 34.2% of those 
who responded `no and no future plans' may be banks that restrict their operations 
to a particular geographical area (the German Landesbanken are an example) or 
they may have existing non-alliance operations in the UK. The final category, 
('no and possible future plans' (10.5%)) may refer to those who prefer a high 
degree of control rather than the looser control of a strategic alliance. 
Alternatively they may prefer to have the concept of alliances `proved' prior to 
using it. 
In addition, many Western European banks will also have representative office, 
branch or subsidiary operations in the City of London due to its position as a 
global financial centre. The resulting need to establish alliances will be less in 
terms of cross-border types, because of the ability to use own branch; but intra- 
country, product or service specific alliances may be more prevalent. 
5.8.2 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-Western Europe' 
The high positive response, `yes and possible future plans' (57.1%), may be due to 
changes in mechanisms underpinning the countries of the European Union and the 
resulting opportunities that have arisen. The responses are contained in Table 5.8. 
These changes include, for example, the harmonisation of bank regulation 
allowing a bank licensed in one EU country to operate in another EU country 
without obtaining a further licence. 
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Table 5.7: Expansion Intentions in UK 
response frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
Yes but no further plans 11 16.2 28.9 
Yes and possible future plans 10 14.7 26.3 
No and no future plans 13 19.1 34.2 
No and possible future plans 4 5.9 10.5 
Total 38 55.9 100 
Table 5.8: Expansion Intentions in Western Europe 
response frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
Yes but no further plans 9 13.2 16.1 
Yes and possible future plans 32 47.1 57.1 
No and no future plans 6 8.8 10.7 
No and possible future plans 9 13.2 16.1 
Total 56 82.3 100 
Table 5.9: Expansion Intentions in Eastern Europe 
response frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
Yes but no further plans 1 1.5 2.9 
Yes and possible future plans 9 13.2 26.5 
No and no future plans 14 20.6 41.2 
No and possible future plans 10 14.7 29.4 
Total 34 50 100 
Table 5.10: Expansion Intentions in North America 
response frequency percentage valid 
percentage 
Yes but no further plans 7 10.3 20.6 
Yes and possible future plans 5 7.4 14.7 
No and no future plans 15 22.1 44.1 
No and possible future lans 7 10.3 20.6 
Total 34 50.1 100 
Table 5.11: Expansion Intentions in Asia 
response frequency percentage valid 
ercenta e 
Yes but no further plans 4 5.9 11.8 
Yes and possible future plans 6 8.8 17.6 
No and no future plans 15 22.1 44.1 
No and possible future plans 9 13.2 26.5 
Total 34 50 100 
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5.8.3 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-Eastern Europe' 
The high negative response `no and no future plans' (141.2%) probably indicates 
the high uncertainty of Eastern Europe in terms of ownership of property, the 
ability to action and realize assets via the courts and the transition status of the 
economic system. Table 5.9 details the responses. All of these tend to push 
foreign banks towards the retention of control over their operations via branches 
or representative offices rather than through strategic alliances. In cases where 
banks (BNP/Dresdner, for example) have entered into alliances with local 
partners, these have been of the more tangible joint venture variety. The response 
`no and possible future plans' (29.4%) probably points towards the realization that 
countries of Eastern Europe are in transition and that opportunities are arising. 
Banks that responded thus are probably cautious but may be waiting for the right 
opportunity to present itself. 
5.8.4 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-North America' 
As noted earlier, North America, and particularly New York, is a prime world 
financial centre where most banks will already have substantive direct, alliance or 
at least correspondent bank relationships. The minority may wish to upgrade the 
latter. Table 5.10 details these responses. 
5.8.5 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-Asia' 
Asia, as noted earlier, continues to be an area where Western European bankers 
wish to establish alliances. Table 5.11 details these responses. 
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5.8.6 `We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our 
capability in-Indian Sub-Continent, South and Central America, 
Africa, Middle East' 
The very high negative responses to the possibility of future expansion via the 
strategic alliance route in the Indian Sub-Continent, South and Central America, 
Africa and Middle East regions may be due to: 
i) the issue of control by the parent firm of operations in areas where the 
`rule of law' is not strong or where the markets are not information 
transparent. 
ii) the focus of the respondents, large Western European banks, on the 
opportunities generated by the EU in Western Europe and by the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in Eastern Europe. 
5.9 Additional Observations 
At the end of the questionnaire respondents were asked for any observations that 
they considered important. These responses ranged from short sentences to a 
comprehensive two-page response. 
A British bank stated that it `has entered into several other strategic alliances in 
the past, but the relationship has been terminated when the benefit has been 
achieved and no further value was to be gained'. This accords with the view that 
the strategic intent of the firm drives its actions, the firm identifies certain needs 
(defensive or offensive, access to tangible or intangible resources, access to 
products or markets) and makes the decision to fulfil these needs via a strategic 
alliance. The continuation of the strategic alliance is predicated on the 
continuation of benefits to its members. 
A second British bank noted that `strategic alliances are becoming increasingly 
critical - particularly due to IT and Communications - all enablers of reduced 
geographical constraints'. Opportunities to expand the geographical spread of 
countries in which the bank can offer its products and services lead to the need to 
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access specialized knowledge of the foreign market through a cross-border `link', 
often enabled via a strategic alliance. 
A British cooperative bank stated `It is difficult to be accurate in filling in this 
survey. Within a group like... there are many relationships and no one person is 
familiar with all of them, how they work, what the objectives are etc. I have tried 
to give a sense of how we look at things... '. This response provides an insight 
into the link between an individual intra-firm strategic intents and the resulting 
alliance. Any particular firm may have a number of diverse strategic intents, 
located at different places in the firm, that are realized through a diverse set of 
inter-firm strategic alliances. 
A German commercial bank noted that it has two types of alliances. The first type 
relates to three alliances with insurance companies to provide brokerage on a 
domestic scale in three different geographic areas. This is a product specific, 
geographically bounded strategic alliance. The second is a broad-based, global 
alliance `together with an outstanding foreign banking group, concerning all third 
countries' activities'. A firm can enter into alliances to simultaneously serve a 
number of objectives, domestic and international. 
A Luxembourg based bank drew attention to two alliances: one a product and 
knowledge capital based fund management operation and the other a co-location 
of its bank offices. The bank could use alliances as a mechanism to facilitate its 
operations in any area it saw fit. The configuration and purpose of the alliances 
can vary substantially. 
A Norwegian Bank proposed three categories of the strategic alliances that it had 
entered into: structural, product, and infrastructure. 
Structural -A number of Scandinavian banks entered into a strategic alliance with 
the explicit intent that, over a pre-envisioned time, members would ultimately 
merge to form a regional champion. Here it was intended that convergent co- 
evolution, leading to a merger, would take place. Due to a change in the external 
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context (a regional banking crisis), differential divergent co-evolution took place 
and the alliance was disbanded. 
Product - The initial strategic intent, between the bank and an insurer, was 
convergent co-evolution leading towards merger. The reality was differential 
parallel co-evolution leading to the disbanding of the alliance and finally the 
acquisition of the insurer by the bank. 
Infrastructure -A number of Norwegian banks have cooperated in establishing 
infrastructure alliances that serve the interests of all banks. However, the cost of 
these alliances has been borne by the larger banks that may now seek to establish 
their own restricted membership alliances. 
The foregoing display the broad range of strategic intents that are served by 
various forms of strategic alliances and show that intents may change over time. 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter reports the responses to 44 questions contained in the questionnaire. 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to broadly survey the proclivities of senior 
managers in large European banks with regard to strategic alliances. 
In the academic context the strategic alliance, cooperation agreement, 
collaborative arrangements, joint venture etc., have a variety of meanings and 
integral assumptions. At the start of this research a definition of strategic alliance 
was developed from first principles, and this definition was embedded in the 
research. In the first section of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to 
comment on the validity of the consistent parts of the definition. The majority 
agreed that durability, the sharing or pooling of resources, a mechanism, strategic 
importance to partners, mutual and own firm economic gain were all elements of a 
strategic alliance. 
Respondents were asked how important they considered a number of reasons for 
entering into a strategic alliance. There was support for the sharing of risks, 
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entering a new product or geographical market reasons for entering into alliances. 
Reduction in the cost of capital is generally considered to be an important reason 
for entering into strategic alliances in most industries - but this was not so in this 
survey with regard to the European banking sector. 
A number of questions regarding the 'formation of alliances were asked. The 
majority had a small, rather than large, number of alliances, were willing to enter 
into alliances with their competitors and held that there was a direct relationship 
between ownership and control. 
With regard to managing these relationships, the majority reported that their 
alliances have met or are meeting strategic objectives, that these objectives are 
specific and underpinned by specific tasks. A degree of calculated initiative in 
pursuit of these objectives and tasks was allowed. The degree of commitment was 
high, and time was spent in agreeing methods of making decisions. 
As the strategic intents of the members of the alliance change, so the alliance 
needs to evolve, as discussed at the start of this chapter and detailed in Chapter 
Six. Respondents stated that substantial time was taken at the start of an alliance 
to establish methods for monitoring the implementation of decisions and resolving 
conflicts. The main focus of alliance activity among the respondents was clearly 
on Western Europe, and this pattern was repeated with regard to future alliance 
activity. 
Questionnaire based surveys generally have, at their core, an attempt to gain a 
view of the consensus with regard to the particular issue or issues being addressed. 
The purpose of the questionnaire and its place in this thesis is to broadly identify 
the proclivities of strategic managers in large European banks with regard to 
strategic alliances. 
In addition the responses have engendered a debate in the previous pages about 
the complexity of the issues addressed and provided a partial answer to the 
question - Do strategic alliances add value? 
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Clearly they do but the tendency is to use alliances in a particular geographical 
and legal context - Europe, North America - rather than continents - Africa, Latin 
America - where property rights are not so clearly defined and defendable. 
Alliance were entered into where useful and disbanded as their use declined. 
Chapter Six provides further insights regarding the use of alliances through 
reporting the analysis of the semi-structured interviews. 
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Chapter Six 
The Substance of Alliances 
6.1 Introduction 
Key substantive issues can only be explored by dialogue with senior 
organisational members who are or have been prime movers in the strategic 
alliance and can therefore provide insights, from the inside, on the causes, effects 
and major processes relevant to the establishment, development and dissolution of 
the alliances. 
This chapter is based on the interviews conducted with twenty-four senior 
managers, main board members or head office executives, in nine European 
countries. The interviews were conducted using a number of semi-structured 
thematic questions, as detailed in Chapter Four. The insights gleaned are reported 
below under the broad themes of background, conceiving cooperation, forming 
cooperation, organizing cooperation, evolving cooperation and dissolving 
cooperation which we identified as key issues in the review of the academic 
literature in Chapter Three. 
6.2 Background 
The external context typically establishes the conditions necessary for strategic 
alliances to be considered as an appropriate form of business organisation. Many 
examples of this relationship can be seen. Let me give two particular examples - 
OPEC in the 1970s and the EU in the 1980 and early 1990s: 
When OPEC (the Organisation of Oil Producing Countries) substantially 
increased the price of crude oil in the 1970s the flow of surplus funds, deposited in 
London by the oil producing countries and lent on to the oil consuming countries, 
led (in conjunction with other factors detailed in Chapter Two) to the 
establishment of the Euromoney markets centred in London. To access these 
markets a number of strategic alliances - clubs and consortium banks - were 
172 
established with, largely, USA, UK and European participation. The C& CBs 
(also analysed in Chapter Two of this thesis) lasted only as long as the underlying 
business rationale lasted. As this rationale ended alternative forms - foreign banks' 
own branches being established in London to access the Euromoney markets 
directly - became the norm. 
An outcome of the establishment of the European Union (and the free trade in 
goods, services and labour) was to allow European banks to provide their products 
and services in a foreign European country. This process started through cross- 
European strategic alliances that allowed one bank's products and services to be 
distributed through the network and to the customers of another bank. As the 
business flow increased, own branch operations became more prevalent and more 
complex relationships developed. 
In both of the above cases the strategic alliance was used as an organisation form 
and method, which allowed the members to test out a potential business stream - 
enabled through largely market (in the former) and largely regulatory (in the 
latter) changes in the context - to establish its continuity. This was carried out 
while sharing the cost and risk through a low commitment of tangible and 
intangible resources. 
A bank's strategic alliances strategy is externally driven by a combination of 
political and economic developments (the move towards monetary union and 
greater economic integration) and client needs (greater cross-border activity by 
both industrial/commercial and financial clienteles). 
The context is confirmed as an important issue in the interviews conducted. 
6.2.1 Regulatory Changes 
In a number of instances a change in regulation at an international, national, 
industry or product level led to new business opportunities which then allowed the 
choice to use strategic alliances if thought appropriate. 
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The UK went through a process of deregulation and liberalisation (starting during 
the 1980s) which reduced the barriers to foreign banks entering into London; 
allowed the establishment of Universal Banks; allowed mutual financial 
organisations to provide consumer loans and also allowed non-financial service 
organisations to provide consumer financial services. Alongside this was a greater 
re-regulation of the quality of information about products and a transparency of 
charges provided to the consumer as a foundation on which to exercise their free 
choice. 
As British banks decided to provide new products for the domestic consumer they 
established clearly defined strategic alliances (with an inbuilt implicit or explicit 
finite life) with the agenda to provide these products (in the short term) and to 
internalise know-how about how to produce, package, market and manage such 
products themselves in the future. Examples include: 
9 Alliances between banks and general insurance and life assurance 
companies to provide and all the banks to internalise know-how gained 
from the insurance companies with a later go-it-alone strategy being 
employed by some of the banks. 
" Mutual organisations authorised to provide consumer loans established 
alliances with loan companies and gained access to the latter's credit- 
scoring systems. 
The above general examples are supplemented by a host of specific intra-country 
alliances established to provide product and services in a more efficient way by 
using specialised providers who worked in a complementary way. In one example 
a major Bureau de Change operation took over the running of this service in the 
branches of a bank, thereby allowing the bank to outsource foreign currency and 
travellers cheques handling but retaining its own branding and location; in another 
the demand for national coverage in a sparsely populated large country led to an 
alliance with the Post Office accessing the extensive office network; in another 
case the EFTA/EU agreement allowed liberalisation but government maintained a 
`golden share' in the national banks to stop takeovers which in turn lead to an 
increased use of alliances; in another case national (home country) restrictions on 
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the bank's ability to operate overseas branches may lead to a greater use of 
alliances. 
6.2.2 Market Changes 
As the Euromoney markets have developed into a global financial system with 
global linkages the propensity to seek business opportunities on a global scale has 
increased. The principles of complementarity, as seen in intra-county alliances is 
also at the core in international alliances and is used to capture a perceived 
business stream. Some alliances are set up in a strategic way (for example to 
access Eastern Europe), others in a more opportunistic and experimental way (to 
access a specific business opportunity). 
In the international arena strategic alliances are used to 
" Access the foreign partners' distribution network (branches) and market 
products prevalent in one country to consumers in the other country where 
the product would be considered new. 
To produce a new activity, for example, British private-equity know-how 
into Australia; British and New-Zealand fund management of Indian 
HNWI funds; British investment into private companies in Japan; Global 
investment expertise for variously located retail funds. 
Alliances allow the ability to enter into new product or geographical markets 
quickly as opportunities arise and to re-configure as these opportunities change. 
6.2.3 Technology Changes 
The Coase (1937) conception of the firm (as analysed in Chapter One) was of 
closed boundaries within which the manager-entrepreneur undertook a number of 
activities that collectively added up to the business being conducted. The firm 
internalised - typically - inbound logistics, production, outbound logistics, 
marketing, servicing and support activities (human resources, finance etc. ) - and 
went into the market place to gather resources or to access customers. The parts 
of the firm were located in one place or in a number of places (with access 
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through physical transport links to each other) that - critically - were all under the 
control of the manger-entrepreneur in terms of direction, activity, employees and 
the security and control of information, physical products and other parties access. 
Technology - the personal computer and the internet - enables parts of the `firm' 
to be located far from each other and yet still communicate without time lags. The 
nature of the Coasian firm is the same as the 1937 conception in that the manager- 
entrepreneur remains in control of direction and resources but it has changed in 
that the resources may be located a long way away or may belong to another firm 
but be `rented' through contracts by the firm under analysis. 
A non-financial services sector virtual bank can now own the marketing 
relationship, deliver the products electronically (alongside retail, post and agency 
sales networks) and outsource much of its activities - for example IT to IBM, HR 
to Hayes, Finance and Credit Control to a bank. The boundaries of the virtual 
bank (firm) now extend to the parts of the partner organisation, wherever located, 
that are allocated by contract to this virtual bank. The security and control of data 
becomes paramount and the boundaries of the firm become increasingly 
contractual and virtual or electronic. Examples of this process include 
infrastructure alliances such as DELTA and ATMs and virtual banks such as 
Sainsburys Bank, Egg, Intelligent Finance et al. 
The developments in technology provide new opportunities for banks. Some make 
the high investment to gain the advantage of being first, others wait until the 
service is proven before providing the same. Technology reduces the boundaries 
between products, increases the need for scale (to off set the costs of technology), 
changes the boundaries and leads to a more focused industry and an exchange of 
skills through contracts. 
6.3 Conceiving Cooperation 
Changes in the regulatory, market or technological contexts provide new 
opportunities for bankers to develop new streams of business and profit. The 
decision to enter into a particular product or geographical area is taken alongside 
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the decision on the most suitable method of entry. So why are strategic alliances 
chosen? 
6.3.1 Context 
Context is clearly the key determiner of the decision to use a form of strategic 
alliance to meet business needs. This context can be at a number of levels from 
international to organizational. 
On the international level this can be because of the globalisation of financial 
services predicated on a desire to cross-borders in the pursuit of new products, 
markets and customers. In the interviews a number of examples pointed to the 
importance of the context: 
" History and Geography -A Spanish bank wanted to internationalise but 
saw its core strength as building a bridge between Europe and Spanish 
speaking Latin America. The longstanding historical and linguistic link 
underpinned the ability to service trade and investment flows and to 
provide this ability to others. Later this strategy would lead to acquisitions 
by Spanish banks of local banks in Latin America. 
" Regional Champions - At an IMF/World Bank meeting in 1984 four major 
Nordic banks, who knew each other from a consortium bank co- 
involvement in the 1970s, decided to consider the development of a 
strategic alliance as a precursor to merger. The reason for its foundation 
was the perceived need to establish a Scandinavian Champion to operate in 
the increasingly globally competitive environment. It was backed by 
strong top-level commitment and maintained through annual Salmon 
fishing expeditions between the top teams and their families. 
" Primary Interests -A German bank whose major concern was financing, 
and gaining branch and customer networks in the newly open East 
Germany, decided to place its international expansion in the hands of a 
strategic alliance, the most successful part of which was equity joint 
ventures in Eastern Europe. 
" Focus -A Californian bank disposed of its international operations and 
focused on the provision of credit in the home market, thereby increasing 
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credit quality. An alliance with a British global bank precluded poaching 
by other local banks with an international network by providing for the 
former's customers and a Californian presence for the latter. 
" Various Factors -A host of other contexts and contextual changes drive 
alliance activity. Internal policies and procedures preclude alliances; 
distinctive strengths - for example fisheries financing - determine the 
degree of geographical growth; Government policy precludes foreign 
ownership of local banks to maintain national integrity or precludes the 
opening of some types of foreign branches; differences in personal tax 
regimes predispose people to live in one European country and work in 
another and therefore provide an opportunity for the offer of new products. 
The contexts are as varied as the number of countries, banks and customer needs. 
In some cases the context -a prohibition on the establishment of certain types of 
branches by Swiss Banks outside Switzerland - determines that strategic alliances 
must be used. In other cases - the decision to establish eventually a Scandinavian 
Regional Champion - led to a choice in favour of a strategic alliance between 
national banks, which over time would build relationship, technology and process 
links leading to convergence and merger. 
6.3.2 Issues 
When determining whether to enter into a strategic alliance, rather than some 
other form of business organization, issues to consider are varied. As mentioned 
above some decisions may be predetermined by national legislation, but in most 
cases the potential entrants into the alliance may chose between organic growth, 
strategic alliances and mergers and acquisition routes to achieve expanding 
capability. What then are the key issues to consider in deciding (where the choice 
is available) on the alliance as the preferred form? 
The interviews pointed to a broad range of reasons: 
" Opportunistic - As opportunities arose to gain `economic benefit', a 
realisation that may well be at business group level that the strategic 
alliance allows a quick reaction to capture these opportunities without an 
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excessive commitment of resources or contracts. An additional benefit is 
that the alliance is also relatively easy to terminate. Alliances may 
provide joint opportunities, a synergy of fit, opportunity to enter a new 
market, or opportunity for a partner to learn about a new sector of their 
domestic market. 
" Legal restrictions - Some countries stop the acquisition of local banks 
either through formal barriers or through informal barriers. Others allow 
internal alliances - such as between a bank and the national post office 
branches - rather than an acquisition so as to maintain diverse provision. 
" Sharing expertise - The alliance form allows firms that are not in the same 
industry to share their expertise to achieve a common goal. An example 
is of a `Fastbox' outlet located in Switzerland which was built through an 
alliance between a kiosk retailer of cigarettes/newspapers/chocolate, an IT 
firm, a bank and, a provider of tickets for entertainment. Individually 
none of the partners would consider acquiring the other and entering into 
their industry. Collectively, via a strategic alliance, they can configure the 
service and all gain additional customers and revenue. 
" Infrastructure needs - Banking requires a set of infrastructure alliances 
(See Chapter Seven for a discussion) that underpin and enable banking 
activity. Infrastructure alliances include clearing systems (BACS); 
electronic point of sale systems (SWITCH, DELTA); retail payment 
systems (VISA); automated teller machines (ATMs) and funds transfer 
systems (IBOS, SWIFT). The majority of banks need these services and 
membership is very broad thereby spreading the cost. 
" Country conditions - Even where there are no formal barriers to entering 
a country through a strategic alliance, the nature of local conditions may 
preclude this choice. Clear and determinable property rights, backed up 
by a legal system based on proof rather than personal preference, is 
necessary to allow the firms in an alliance to establish and terminate 
contracts. Without this the only mechanism for control would be through 
direct ownership of the overseas firm and direction of its employees. 
Banks showed a tendency to enter into countries through strategic 
alliances where clear (tangible and intangible) property rights are possible 
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and show a great reluctance to enter into countries through strategic 
alliances where property rights are not clear. 
9 Organizational conditions - In some internal contexts an assignment to a 
strategic alliance may be considered a move out of the mainstream career 
path and may not attract candidates or have due importance in the partner 
firm's psyches. Particular banks have certain internal ethos - Co-operative 
Bank for example - that predispose them to enter into alliances only with 
those banks that have a similar internal ethos. 
The decision on whether to enter into a strategic alliance, as opposed to some 
other form, is dependent on the objectives, special considerations (as analysed 
above) and the likelihood, as judged by the prospective partners, of the alliance 
being successful. 
6.3.3 Success 
A number of factors are identified as pointers toward a successful strategic 
alliance. A Swiss bank was clear in its review of these factors: 
"a similar customer base in the retail or medium sized business area 
" the bank's existing regional structure was used. Regional managers 
initiated and were the focus of co-operation in the region 
" strategic decisions on co-operation were taken at the Head Office 
" implementation of the operations was considered most important 
" customer lines were managed though the Key Accounts System 
" the relationship manager must be able to see a direct benefit of an alliance 
in servicing their customers' needs. 
This clear menu was supported by a British bank which found partners which 
displayed a `similar strategy, or similar perception of the external circumstances, a 
similar uncertainty about how to respond to it, similar difficulties I suppose in 
terms of resources... and a focus on SMEs... and a similar culture'. 
A heavy focus on implementation was seen as a determinant of success. In IT 
outsourcing the long term planning horizon (3-5 years), the heavy unionisation of 
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the industry and the serious implications for the business if projects were not 
properly completed made accurate and timely implementation critical. In another 
case the build up, over a long time (over 70 years in one example), of 
relationships (which delivered good products and cleanly resolved difficulties) 
between a retail bank and professional workers' affinity groups, led to a great 
degree of customer loyalty and to the identification of the bank with the affinity 
groups and the customer sector. 
6.3.4 Continued Use 
A number of research findings pointed to the continued use of alliances. A British 
bank's core activity is to provide retail financial services to members of 
professional workers' affinity group. At establishment it provided insurance 
services to an affinity group. Now this bank provides a range of services to a 
number of such groups. Its customer acquisition and distribution method are the 
same, the affinity group, with both parties gaining from the relationship. So, in 
this case, the alliance strategy is a core part of the business model and will 
continue to be used. 
While the reasons for entering into alliances are known, it was noted that the 
decision to enter into an alliance with a particular firm in a particular market could 
lead to other non-alliance member banks not dealing with the alliance partners as 
a self-protective measure. 
6.4 Forming Cooperation 
Once the decision to use a strategic alliance as the mechanism for meeting 
identified business needs is made, the next issue is how to form this collaboration. 
The literature identifies three main issues for consideration. 
6.4.1 Core Processes 
Researchers point to the core processes inherent in a strategic alliance. These 
processes include those to do with finance, control, learning and strategy. 
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With regard to finance a German bank in the sample was clear that an increase in 
shareholder capital to fund international expansion would be negatively correlated 
with the value of the shares to shareholders. So this bank tended to use methods 
of expansion that limited the use of expensive bank capital - equity joint ventures, 
contractual alliances - all of which include sharing the financial costs. 
The control issues were often noted. Alliances allow a `risk sharing' that can 
include the reduction of risk by co-opting local know-how thereby reducing the 
`likelihood of problems'. It is clear, however, that this also leads to more tenuous 
control - as control is dispersed over a wider range of people in two or more 
firms. How do banks deal with these issues? 
Again a German bank used the equity joint venture form of alliance, establishing a 
separate company with its own independent Board and management structure, so 
that there is `respect for local necessities' with minimal interference from the head 
quarters of the parent companies. Developing this idea, a number of British banks 
started from the premise that `relationships' were most important - that alliances 
were formed and based on goodwill, trust, mutual understanding and later 
underpinned by contracts, joint ventures, policies, rules, regulations. Serving and 
delivering the mutual interest was the core activity of the alliance. In one case a 
clear preference was for independent action, with a cultural bias against sharing, 
and a strong desire to maintain control. 
In many cases, particularly German and British banks, managers noted the 
importance of learning. Alliances may be initiated by a `regulatory impulse', an 
identified specific opportunity, and the parallel identification of the lack of 
knowledge in an area required to deliver the benefits of the opportunity. Banks 
sought alliances with partners who could bring `greater experience and greater 
strength' in the required area. Alliances developed from a `smaller nucleus' then 
grew as the rationale grew. 
The parallel or convergent nature of the strategies of the firms considering 
entering into an alliance was very important. A Dutch bank was clear that the 
strategy of cross-border alliances to access the other partner's home country 
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branch networks, and to increase the distribution network, was flawed. Rather 
they chose to specialise in developing an expertise, emerging markets, which they 
subsequently provided to all. 
6.4.2 Cultural Dissimilarity 
International alliances add the dimension of cultural dissimilarity. A British bank 
reflected on its three small local alliances in Spain, France and Italy that were 
designed to gain local expertise and to try out a new market. The alliances failed 
to deliver and were disbanded. What were the reasons? 
9 `it's very difficult for financial services organisations to cross national 
boundaries' 
9 `you have to get it right between imposing your culture and your product 
offering into that market' 
The cultural dimension manifests itself in a number of areas such as national 
characteristics (however defined), business ethos, nature of agreements, even 
language used. On the more practical front, international systems such as VISA, 
MasterCard and SWIFT allow a degree of operational homogeneity between 
banks which in many respects are dissimilar. The local currency cheque clearing 
systems, by and large, designed for local needs, and time consuming collection 
systems often end up being used for foreign cheques. IT systems may not be 
compatible and may require major investment to underpin the alliance. 
A number of those interviewed pointed to some form of pre-existing relationship 
with an overseas bank or foreign country. This relationship, and resultant mutual 
understanding, was the underpinning of successful alliances. A Spanish bank 
mentioned, on the one hand, its linguistic and trade links with some parts of Latin 
America, and on the other the trade and political links with the rest of Europe. 
This put it in a unique position to act as a `financial services bridge' between 
Europe and Latin America. 
Cultural fit is used as a term to describe a `meeting of minds', the latter a phrase 
that encompasses a number of issues including: 
183 
"a view of the world that is in harmony - eg: co-operative banks sharing an 
ideology 
9a parallel or convergent understanding of the key opportunities in Europe, 
or in a product market 
"a mutual understanding and respect on a very human level 
As one British banker said, "if you get along with people you are more likely to 
achieve things faster and again you have to be able to, I hesitate to say the ..., 
share a vision..., but I think it means really sharing perhaps a cultural fit, sharing 
a view of the market where it's going, and seeing how that can go". 
It could be said that a successful cross-border strategic alliance is one where 
cultural fit is high. However it may be that the best arrangement is when cultural 
fit in managerial processes and world-view is high (so the partners can work 
together), but cultural dissimilarity in product or geographical knowledge for 
example is also high so that there is the possibility to learn from the partner. 
Thus: 
Cultural Fit (managerial processes + world-view) + Cultural Dissimilarity 
(product or geographical knowledge) = mutually beneficial and valuable 
knowledge transfer = successful strategic alliance. 
6.4.3 Decision-Making 
Within an alliance a variety of decision-making mechanisms can be identified. 
These mechanisms are driven both by the nature of the business and the 
managerial ethos. 
In the case of an investment fund alliance between British and Japanese partners 
the process started with a feasibility study which led to a structure that is standard 
in the industry -- a partnership agreement with a pre-determined life to invest, gain 
return and dissolve. The relationship between the two parent companies is 
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encapsulated in a management company that runs the various investment fund 
companies. 
This industry determined arrangement is very different from a British bank that set 
its own clear agenda when managing alliances. The decisions to enter into 
alliances between two or more banks are based on strategic thinking at Group 
level. Once the decision had been made the management of the functional 
alliance (or the functional parts of a broader alliance) were considered: 
`very specific to subsidiaries, or operational areas and therefore the 
authority to manage them was delegated down to either the functional 
manager in the case of a technology alliance, or the chief executive of a 
subsidiary who is managing those alliances as a main part of his business'. 
Once the decision has been made to enter into an alliance the possible internal and 
cross-partner structures are many fold. 
A German bank, upon agreeing to collaborate with a partner, set up a joint venture 
vehicle and a business plan approved by the head quarters of the parent banks. 
The preferred method was to appoint joint venture managing directors, one from 
each parent, who ran a largely self-contained and self-directed joint venture. 
Various ongoing processes were used to facilitate the operations of the alliance 
and to engender closer cooperation. These ranged from a 10 year planning 
horizon (British bank); specialist 2-3 person committee to prepare the `grand 
vision' (Norwegian bank); a reciprocal board membership and a small cross- 
shareholding (a French bank); person exchange programmes (a French and a 
German bank); a coming together for specific activities but also maintaining a 
clear separate identity (a German bank). 
In designing products `review meetings' were held (reported a British bank) 
where decisions were made on `what kind of products are being offered. ' It was 
clearly important in this case to match the alliance insurance partners' product 
design, business culture, and delivery to the needs of the banks customers. 
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A British bank stated that the levels of responsibility for lending, expenditure, 
contracts etc. are very clearly defined. However no one place is identified as 
responsible for joint ventures. In general the head of a department wishing to 
enter into an operations based alliance would ask the `Executive Committee 
member responsible for a particular area... [to take the time to]... take a view as to 
whether he felt it was something that he needed to bring to the table... [at the 
Executive Committee]... to get the approval of his colleagues. ' Any approved 
alliances may be based on a number of legal contracts which if required will be 
arranged by the legal department. 
These alliances would be supported by time spent in building up a personal as 
well as a professional relationship. Accordingly `so we sponsor their rally cars, 
we play cricket against them each year, we go to their golf tournaments but more 
than that we report our numbers to them every month, actual numbers, profit and 
loss and number of customers. ' 
The decision making mechanisms are in two main areas: 
" deciding whether to enter into an alliance, with whom to enter into it, for 
what purpose and under what terms. 
" once the decision has been made, how to structure and manage the 
collaboration. 
" how to develop bonding and mutual respect between the partners managers 
and staff. 
6.5 Organizing Cooperation 
6.5.1 Benefits and Dangers 
The organization and configuration of the alliance attempt to reap the benefits and 
mitigate the dangers. The benefits are identified by managers as being important, 
and therefore it is important to mitigate the danger of an alternative provider 
taking on this business. These dangers are often of a specific nature - 
geographically, organisationally or customer based. 
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A particularly clear example of this is the Swedish bank that built an alliance with 
the Swedish Post Office. The benefits (and mitigations) of this alliance were of 
three tiers: 
" Geographically specific - the need to meet the regulatory requirement to 
service customers all over the largely rural and widely dispersed 
population. Entering into this alliance secured the network and excluded 
competitors. 
" Organisational specific - The Swedish Post Office provided lower 
transaction costs as their customers carry out limited transactions. 
" Customer specific - The network allows the servicing of customers 
throughout the country, allowing the gathering of low cost deposits and the 
selling of new products. 
The definition of a customer varies - Swedish salaried employees often have their 
accounts opened for them by the employer. Thus banks target and build alliances 
with employer firms and once the current account and salary credits are captured 
savings and loan products follow to develop a profitable relationship. Another 
example is the acquisition of a branch in Copenhagen by a German bank that was 
predicated on the Germans bank's desire to build a competence centre starting 
from servicing the Baltic Sea business through to providing shipping finance. 
Alternatively, process decisions such as to reduce costs or increase effectiveness 
may be underpinning the decision to enter into a specific alliance. 
6.5.2 Form Complexity 
Alliances are complex organisational forms. They range from high degrees of 
formality to high degrees of informality. A sample is provided below. 
Formal forms include a Board based management team for a Joint Venture; a 
swap of board directors and an alternative or alternating chairman; Board 
decisions communicated to operational departments (and a dormant Steering 
Group); formalities due to legal structures and agreements with seamless 
management; `objectives are specific, identify specific tasks, take calculated 
initiatives'; `consider there is a direct positive relationship between equity and 
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managerial control'; dialogue at senior board level and permanent dialogue 
between operating departments; preferred equity joint ventures; 10% ownership 
swap; full recognition of clear and focused business objectives; formal Board 
meetings; alliances must not get too independent; international alliance is `more 
planned, much more structured and more thought about and perhaps more 
importantly much more committed from the point of view of both parties'; mutual 
representation on Board of Governors dealing with strategic issues, steering group 
established at start disbanded and operational units for coordination substituted. 
Informal forms include interchange of people; working with banks of a similar 
size (and similarities in decision making systems, time scales etc. ); agreements 
that allow (but do not force) participation in each other's loans; `committees are 
forbidden; `who has the best knowledge about it, who do we talk to... who works 
on the tasks that they have over there'; a personnel swap between two partners of 
the alliance; absence of share stakes or a legal entity is not seen as an inhibiting 
factor in any way; periodic brainstorming, ad hoc task force activities designed to 
identify market opportunities, personal accountability of senior international 
officers in making alliances work; meetings between functional staff from 
partners. 
There are as many forms of alliances (an unlimited combination of formal and 
informal forms) as there are alliances themselves. 
6.5.3 Trust Building 
Alliance partners deliberately build trust between their firms to facilitate a 
successful alliance. The trust building themes are twofold - sufficient structure to 
allow discussion and sufficient flexibility to allow open dialogue. As one British 
bank said: 
No token shareholding and the Minutes of a meeting start with `this is 
what we want to do together, it was very vague, deliberately and there's 
been no piece of paper since. It's just informal contacts. ' 
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Relationships at all levels were built on patience and interaction in developing 
products and providing services. Whilst there was general understanding between 
Boards of Directors and specific contracts with separate organisations, informal 
relationships were engendered by the emphasis on sending young specialists from 
the French and German partners to the other for socialisation thereby learning 
each others systems and cultures and then sending them into a third country. 
Trust between the bank and its customer is very important. A British bank has 
built long-term relationships, some as long as 70 years, with affinity groups. 
Members of these groups trust the group and in turn the group trusts the bank. 
The relationship between the bank, affinity group and the individual customer is 
one of experience, trust, integrity and reliability. 
To summarise `the most important thing is actually that we have partners in daily 
business on which we can rely' and `as the relationship builds over time, the 
deeper trust and personal relationships, so you can work together better and 
better. ' 
6.5.4 International Complexity 
International collaborations bring increased managerial complexity. To enter into 
a new country (as in the case of the Franco/German collaboration) the view 
emerged that it was easier to develop a new operation (singly or jointly). This 
would mitigate the complexity and difficulty of building a common culture as well 
as electronic computer systems from two existing groups. Rather the new 
operation, though jointly owned, would build its own systems and a distinct, 
individual culture. 
In establishing an East European joint venture the French and German banks 
brought with them their corporate clients. Local knowledge was important: 
`you should know the third country, the local country [in East Europe], 
you should have knowledge of banking and of the business reasonings and 
behaviour etc. ' 
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The international dimension has repercussions in staffing. In a Franco/German 
alliance a French minority group `who have limited economic opportunities in 
mainstream France' lived just near the border and were put to work in the German 
partner bank where they could `work like a German worker'. 
The decision to go overseas is driven by a number of factors: 
A geographical expansion of a British bank to follow business opportunities 
through purchasing a 100 branch Portuguese bank and through following 
large corporate clients who are attempting to capture new business streams. 
International operations may be enabled and delivered by branches, by 
international electronic payments systems, or by agreement with overseas, 
otherwise independent, branches. 
6.6 Evolving Cooperation 
6.6.1 Sustaining Collaboration 
As an alliance is established there is alignment between the parent firms' 
objectives and the objectives of the alliance. Alliances require the commitment of 
a dynamic individual or group of individuals whose personal input leads to the 
alliance performing. All three levels, parent firms, alliance members and 
individuals, have to co-evolve. Co-evolution leads to a longer-term alliance if it is 
still in accord with the underlying business rationale and thereby greater security 
of revenue. Co-evolution is required at all levels from strategy to delivei'y and 
clear, but changing, objectives lead to the delivery of a clear and appropriate 
result. 
6.6.2 Co-learning 
As alliances evolve a number of dimensions come into play with co-learning, 
often referred to as the most important. 
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The primary requirements of co-learning in an alliance are `recognition of an 
identity of interest' which continues over time, and an ability to exchange 
information, ideas and insights. However, information cannot flow freely in 
alliances `because it's sensitive information. Those things [free information flow] 
will become more difficult to manage as banks, building societies or insurance 
companies broaden their structures, their markets and the intermingling will 
become more confused. ' Sometimes the strategic alliance will bring specific 
knowledge and the partner bank will internalise it. 
Despite the above proviso many of those interviewed gave importance to the 
human processes that led to successful alliances through co-learning. For 
example: 
9 `Enormous value from having someone that you trust and can talk about 
strategy', as one CEO remarked (it is lonely at the top). 
" That alliances relied on trust, cultural fit, interpersonal support, equal 
partnership, mutual respect, core desire to maintain the relationship at a 
professional and personal level, open and honest dialogue, mutual 
understanding. 
In their daily work the alliance partners used networks and relationships to 
persuade and develop consensus. This consensus changed as the strategic 
objectives changed and developed and the positive and negative experiences of 
alliances determined the nature, management and development of the next 
alliance. 
Products were co-designed to meet specific needs, in response to specific events 
and client needs, this was carried out at an operational level. As one banker said 
`a lot of time was put into the question to find out which way we can make more 
business together'. 
Another bank enabled the product development process by holding meetings 
every 4-6 weeks to identify areas of mutual concern and interest based around 
encouragement and coaching rather than structures. These alliance partners try to 
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be proactive in considering all areas of business through allowing ideas to spark 
and then try to develop them together. 
6.6.3 International Issues 
Particular firms and countries display particular concerns. The main concern, 
with regard to the international context, was accessing the learning curve effects 
of the overseas location. Entering into alliances with overseas banks to access the 
overseas market allowed the internalisation of the local business culture and 
mitigated against the perceived differences. A German co-operative bank 
attempted to further mitigate the national business culture `issues' in Spain and 
Eastern Europe by building alliances solely with other co-operative banks, who 
had a similar `co-operative ethos' overlaying their national business culture. 
6.7 Dissolving Cooperation 
6.7.1 Ceasing Rationales 
A strategic alliance is usually established to satisfy a business need - to enter a 
new geographical or product market, to access new knowledge - and co-evolve as 
the strategic needs of their parent companies evolve. 
Alliances are dissolved when they no longer serve the needs of all the partners. 
The method of dissolution may range from a total disbanding to an internalisation 
by one partner of the activity-competence of the former alliance. In both cases the 
alliance has not in some way `failed' but rather delivered what it could or was 
required to deliver and is no longer an appropriate way for the former partners to 
meet their business needs. 
Again the reasons for dissolution may be as varied as the alliances dissolved. A 
sample of the observations made by interviewees on the subject of dissolving 
alliances is provided below ordered by the nationality of the bank(s) that made 
observations regarding the dissolution of the alliance: 
In the case of British banks: 
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" `going back to one of the philosophies we have is shareholder return and 
by that it's not just mouthing the philosophy we actually try to make a 
decision based on it... so you've got to be constantly planning and 
analysing what is it you're getting out of this... what else can we do... if 
it's a more balanced contract, then the other side should be thinking the 
same thing as well' 
" dissolving an alliance is a considered decision as it has a direct impact on 
one's and one's partners business 
" agreements govern the access to underpinning technology so that if the 
alliance is dissolved then access to the technology will still continue 
" one British-Indian JV is being terminated `because of the particular 
circumstances of the alliance and it has a natural life and that's really all 
[there is] to be said'. Documents regarding termination are `substantially 
irrelevant in a sense that it's the fact that is important, and if there's 
nothing for the venture to do then the venture's life is limited and 
terminated' 
" the reasons for termination depend entirely on the venture - it may be at 
the end of its natural life, a failed venture or have successfully carried out 
what it needs to do 
" they considered themselves ruthless about the tangibility of the alliance 
and equally ruthless about the non-viability of an alliance. Dissolving 
includes the issues of contracts, exit periods etc. The viability of the 
alliance was checked via the financial planning process 
In the case of a Dutch Bank: 
" it presumed a good fit between Dutch-Uruguay partners from a business 
point of view but suffered from a clash of cultures. The Dutch bank 
injected capital and management expertise but the local bank resisted the 
business plan developed so it pulled out. With hindsight it is important to 
`talk fundamentals from the outset' to establish whether there is a meeting 
of minds between the prospective partners 
In the case of a German bank: 
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" the formal termination provision may be addressed in different ways. The 
statutes of the alliance include termination clauses. In Germany they use 
2-6 pages to address all the issues rather than the Anglo-Saxon 60 plus 
pages 
In the case of a Norwegian bank: 
" the alliance collapsed with worse relations than before except at the 
founding fathers/old chairman level. The gains of the 1980s - payments 
systems, multinational corporation subsidiary accounts - were lost. 
Because staving off the bankruptcy of the firm was more important than 
the alliance it became secondary, but could have been reactivated. The 
new managing directors and chairmen wanted to put blue-water between 
previous policies and current policies. The underlying Scandinavian 
consortium bank collapsed as well when the vision collapsed and practical 
operational initiatives started to fall to pieces. A financial crisis in the 
early 1990s led to a non-functioning alliance by 1992 and by 1995 all 
areas of the co-operation between the four banks terminated and the 
underlying vehicle dissolved. Now the former partners only have normal 
correspondent banking relationships 
" it set up an alliance with a Swedish bank in London but closed because the 
`war aims' of the two partners diverged after the strategic alliance was 
formed. They had a specialised ship financing company, together with 
some other rich banks. The specialist company was taken over by one of 
the members and the joint venture with a Swedish bank closed down 
because branches wanted to become too independent 
In the case of a Spanish Bank: 
"a former alliance with a bank in France, regarding mergers and 
acquisitions work, was cancelled after one and a half years due to 
problems with the business flow (from France into Spain rather than vice 
versa) and problems with letters of credit etc. An agreement with the 
Italian bank in the leasing area was the local initiative of an Italian bank 
manager in Spain and dissolved when the manager moved on to other 
responsibilities 
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In the case of a Swiss Bank: 
"a failed alliance in Italy was credited to an inability to enter into cross 
shareholdings 
In the above we have deliberately cited a wide range of factors and causes 
concerning dissolution, often supported by quotations from the discussions, 
because that does represent the spread of testimonies offered by the respondents. 
There are, however, some themes present through these testimonies. First the 
alliance is measured against some criteria - profitability, tangibility, shareholder 
value, and found wanting. Second, cultural incompatibility is recognised post 
factum. Third, the alliance has run its course, served its purpose, or is no longer 
appropriate in changed circumstances. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The senior managers' core interests, as noted by the degree of discussion in each 
area, were the global, national and market context and the two areas of the 
conceiving and forming cooperation. The organising and co-evolution areas 
received less attention in the discussions. This may be because, based on this 
review, these elements were dealt with in real time by non-Board levels of 
management and operational people and were not directly the responsibility of 
senior management, other then in setting policy. The dissolving cooperation 
question resulted in detailed responses with, in many cases, an expression of the 
lessons learnt. 
The research material reported in Chapter Five generated valuable pan-European 
data enabling developments and trends in strategic alliance formation to be 
identified. The present chapter is complementary in that it explores the internal 
dynamics of strategic alliances in European banking. Substantive insights about 
the lifecycle of alliances, as seen from the inside by practicing senior managers, 
are reported and analysed. We found here how the alliances commenced, what 
the participants thought - what the ensuing experience was. 
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The next chapter provides a final response to the question posed at the start of this 
thesis - `Do Strategic Alliances Add Value? ', revisits our understanding of 
strategic alliances and proposes two areas of further research. 
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Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Further Research 
7.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter we seek to provide a response to the question `Do Strategic 
Alliances Add Value? ' as posed at the start, and a leitmotiv of the thesis. The 
definition of a strategic alliance as posited in Chapter One is revisited and revised. 
A summary of the contribution of this thesis to academic knowledge and the 
practice of alliances is provided. A number of reflections on the methodologies 
employed follow and, as a result of findings in this thesis, further research into the 
infrastructure alliance and into the co-evolution model is proposed together with 
some suggestions for a future research agenda. 
7.2 Conclusion 
7.2.1 Do Strategic Alliances Add Value? 
The observed phenomena of an exponential increase in the use of strategic 
alliances was examined in this thesis using the epistemology of Transcendental 
Realism (Lawson, 1997) wherein scientific enquiry is aimed `at identifying the 
underlying structures and mechanisms... ', a movement from the observed to the 
underlying. To investigate this movement from observed to underlying a number 
of scientific research tools were utilised. 
We examined the research question through five types of analysis and at two 
levels of engagement - through an analysis of the strategic alliance from first 
principles (at firm level) based on the foundation work, `The Theory of the Firm' 
by Coase (1937); through a 23 year historical review of secondary data (at 
industry level); through a review of over 400 papers in the academic literature (at 
firm and industry level); through a questionnaire survey of European banks (at 
firm level again) and through in-depth interviews of senior managers (also at firm 
level). This research examined the European banking industry. 
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As argued in Chapter One, Coase (1937) set out to explain the rationale of the 
firm that is, at the simplest, the existence of transaction costs and uncertainty 
("bounded rationality") may make it less costly, less risky or both to internalize 
inherently separate economic activities within the boundaries of the firm. The 
strategic alliance was detailed in terms of its form, nature, purpose and importance 
and identified as taking an intermediate position on the continuum between 
market based, arm's length transactions on the one hand and relationships and 
hierarchic, or intra-firm transactions and relationships on the other. Glaister and 
Buckley (1994) identified a dichotomy between the purposes of market-based 
transactions and intra-firm transactions as reported in Figure 1.3. The strategic 
alliance allows one to balance the two extremes and therefore allow the firm to 
make more flexible choices, as available in the market, while at the same time 
securing the benefits of intra-firm operations. 
The analysis of historical secondary data ranging over 23 years, as reported in 
Chapter Two, determined that the use of alliances went through three distinct 
lifecycles each of which, in different ways, added value to the alliance and 
member firms. The Clubs and Consortium Banks lifecycle (during the 1970s) 
enabled bankers located throughout Europe and the USA to internationalise 
(through, for example, a low commitment of capital, reduced risk, shared return 
and an easy potential exit) and to follow commercial opportunities whilst 
accessing the new established Euromarkets in London. Bankassurance (during the 
1980s) allowed banks in the UK to take advantage of new opportunities afforded 
through the liberalization of the financial sector to provide various insurance 
services to bank customers, products and expertise being sourced through 
alliances with insurance companies. The Virtual Bank (starting during the 1990s 
and continuing) allowed the firms in Coase (1937) terms to disaggregate the firm 
through technology to disparate geographical locations and outsource to various 
providers whilst retaining control of the firm's operation and knowledge capital 
boundaries through contract based alliances. Virtual banks still exist as a viable 
method of organising banking services. In all these cases - clubs and consortium 
banks, bankassurance and virtual banks - types of alliances add value in different 
ways as appropriate to the different context which they operate in. 
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The literature review in Chapter Three, shows quiet clearly that strategic alliances 
add value of different degrees, of different types and of different duration in a 
wide range of geographical, industry and firm contexts. 
Our questionnaire survey of major European banks, as analysed in Chapter Five, 
found that the reduction in the cost of capital, the sharing of risks, help in 
accessing product and geographical markets or distribution channels were all 
advantages gained through strategic alliances. 
The analysis, reported in Chapter Six, of in-depth interviews with 24 senior 
managers across 9 European countries has provided further insights into the 
alliance process and confirmed that alliances provide a number of benefits to the 
partners. 
To summarise: 
" Strategic alliances allow the ability to balance `markets' and `intra-firm 
transaction' extremes and enjoy flexible choices in increasingly dynamic 
markets. 
" Clubs & Consortium Banks and Bankassurance lifecycles display the 
value of alliances in allowing an early entry into a business area with later 
commitment. Virtual banks allow disaggregration of the firm while 
retaining strategic intent of its (owned or contracted) resources. 
" Strategic alliances add value of different degrees and of different duration 
in a wide range of geographical, industry and firm contexts. 
" Strategic alliances allowed, variously, a reduction in the cost of capital, the 
sharing of risks, accessing knowledge capital and resources, help in 
accessing product or geographical markets and distribution channels. 
" Senior Directors confirmed that strategic alliances provided a number of 
benefits to partners. These benefits were at differential rates, of varying 
duration, in different ways and of varied impact. 
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Based on the wide-ranging analysis in this thesis it is possible to assert with a high 
degree of confidence that strategic alliances do add value and increase the rage of 
strategic options available to Senior Directors. 
7.2.2 Revised understanding of a strategic alliance 
In Chapter One an extensive analysis of the form, nature, purpose and importance, 
of strategic alliances, based on the ground breaking work of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1982,1986), was carried out and the strategic alliance defined as: 
A durable relationship established between two or more independent 
firms, imolving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a mechanism 
(corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or activities of 
strategic importance to one or more of the partners for their mutual 
economic advantage. 
Hamilton, Morison and ul-Haq (1996) 
In the research reported in this thesis it emerged that strategic alliances only lasted 
as long as the strategic rationale lasted. As long as the alliance continued to 
deliver sufficient value to the partners to continue, the alliance did continue. 
However if the converse was true the alliance would be disbanded, for example, 
through gradual withdrawal, through sudden and terminal disbanding or through 
internalisation by one ore other partner of some key element in the alliance based 
cooperation. In some cases the strategic alliance had a defined period of life - 
either measured in time or in outcomes - before disbanding occurred. 
Our research suggests that firms entering into alliances hold the explicit or 
implicit view that the alliance will only last as long as the strategic advantages are 
forthcoming. In some form the alliance partners `anticipate' that the alliance will 
be dissolved at some future date. Accordingly the definition offered at the start of 
this thesis should be amended to: 
A relationship of antic! Pyted durability established between two or more 
independent firms, involving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a 
mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or 
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activities of strategic importance to one or more of the partners for their mutual 
economic adtiantage. 
Underlining the often limited lifespan of alliances, however, does not detract from 
the range of alliance-based value explored in these pages. 
7.2.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has provided a contribution to our knowledge of alliances in a number 
areas: dynamic-disequilibrium, the distinction between Strategic vs. Infrastructure 
Alliances, the (Changing) Nature of the Firm, Directors Areas of Interest, 
Geographical Scope and Property Rights, and implications for Other Industries. 
7.2.3.1 Dynamic-disequilibrium. This thesis provides a detailed summary of the 
major academic work in line with the lifecycle of an alliance: conceiving, 
forming, organizing, evolving, dissolving cooperation. This summary will be 
valuable to academics researching in this area and to practitioners initiating and 
running alliances as it brings together the core findings in one accessible 
document. 
The springboard we find is that deregulation, increased use of technology, 
enhanced and fickle customer expectations, increased merger and acquisition 
activity, reduction in protectionism, increased formation of trading blocks and 
global competition have undermined the old certainties within which firms could 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage over a long period. Markets no 
longer tend towards an equilibrium position but are continuously in a state of 
`dynamic-disequilibrium'. Strategic alliances provide an essential mechanism and 
as we have shown a flexible one for rapid and repeat re-configuration to meet the 
external and internal challenges. 
7.2.3.2 Strategic verses infrastructure alliances. The original definition of 
strategic alliances as `obligational-contractual relations' which are `.. [A] durable 
relationship[s] established between two or more independent firms, involving the 
sharing or pooling of resources to create a mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for 
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undertaking a business activity or activities of strategic importance to one or more 
of the partners for their mutual economic advantage'. Research led to modifying 
this definition to `A relationship of anticipated durability... '. Strategic alliances 
are found to be set up to add value to members. 
As a development of the foregoing we identified the `infrastructure alliance', as a 
former strategic alliance that has broadened its membership so that it no longer 
provides a competitive advantage to its members but rather becomes an `industry 
wide base-line provision'. Non-membership of an infrastructure alliance garners a 
competitive disadvantage for non-members. Infrastructure alliances add value to 
the industry. Infrastructure alliances are multilateral, provide a commodity 
service, provide strategic disadvantage by exclusion, are more embedded in the 
industry, have greater self-sufficiency. 
For academics this new distinction between the `strategic' and the `infrastructure' 
forms of alliances opens up a new field of research as suggested in Section 7.3.1 
below. Practitioners may use this classification to determine value chain 
modifying activities (through the strategic form) and industry dynamic modifying 
activities (through the infrastructure form). Some may focus on providing the 
industry underpinnings by deliberately forming and developing infrastructure 
alliances, leading to extraordinary profits for the founding shareholders as 
membership broadens and transaction volume increases. 
7.2.3.3 The Nature of the Firm. We found evidence of `obligational-contractual 
relations' underpinning all banking activity and considered them to be integral and 
essential and therefore posited a high industry specific `propensity to cooperate'. 
We discovered that Bankers follow income streams generated by customers. New 
income streams lead to bankers using alliances (1970s, 1980s) to service clients 
cautiously until the security of the income stream warrants direct investment. 
Furthermore we assert that the Coase (1937) conception of a firm as an 
independent organization with discernable boundaries has been changed by 
technology. The `virtual firm' with the imposition of strategic intent over a 
number of activities, many carried out in different physical locations and by third 
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party providers, is possible and underpinned by a bundle of, largely explicit and 
some implicit, contacts. This development has also been facilitated by a variety of 
factors including deregulation, freer movement of people and capital, by 
internationalisation generally, as well as by enhanced competition between 
companies leading to a desire to outsource non-core activities. 
Again both academic and practitioner interest in the implications for large 
dominant firms in particular established industries subject to competition from a 
fast moving, disaggregated collection of individual knowledge entrepreneurs and 
professional advisors is likely to be high. The academic will wish to develop 
understanding while the practitioner interest is more likely to be about using the 
understanding offered here to protect their dominant position (in the case of large 
firms) or to create new markets (in the case of newer faster moving firms). 
7.2.3.4 Directors areas of interest. We carried out an analysis of the 
perspectives of Directors in the major banks in Europe according to the 
conceiving, forming, organizing, evolving, dissolving cooperation lifecycle. 
The senior directors' core interests, as noted by the degree of discussion in each 
area, were the global, national and market context and the two areas of conceiving 
and forming cooperation. The organizing and co-evolution areas received less 
attention in the discussions. This may be because, based on this analysis, these 
elements were dealt with in real-time by non-Board levels of management and by 
operational staff and were not directly the day-to-day responsibility of senior 
management, other than in setting policy. The dissolving cooperation question 
resulted in some detailed responses with, in many cases, an expression of the 
lessons learnt. This first finding leads us to confirm earlier writing asserting the 
upward, outward and forward orientation of senior management. 
Academic and practitioner interest is likely to be aligned with great interest in 
how Senior Directors (making global, national, market context, conceiving and 
forming stages judgements and decisions) can ensure delivery through operational 
(including front end) staff, whilst subject to the co-evolution of the partners' 
strategic intent and the partners and alliances delivery capability. 
203 
7.2.3.5 Geographical scope and property rights. We found that strategic alliance 
activity was clearly restricted to Europe and the same pattern was repeated for 
future alliance activity. A clear disinclination to enter into alliances in certain 
continents or sub-continents (Africa, Latin America) where property rights are not 
so clearly defined or defendable was observable in the interviews whilst capital 
cost reduction was not considered to be of major importance in choosing the 
alliance route. It should be said that the willingness of Spanish banks to engage in 
Latin America, no doubt predicated on long standing linguistic and trade links, is 
a possible exception to this generalisation. 
Academics may be interested in investigating the optimal level of discernible and 
determinable property rights and access to capital required to make alliances a 
possible choice whilst practitioners may wish to define the levels of risk 
acceptable in undertaking alliances. 
7.2.3.6 Contribution to other industries. It would be fair to suggest that there are 
three key findings that have application to other industries. The first is our notion 
of the possibly changed nature of the firm, where dispersed capabilities are backed 
by strategic intent. A non-banking example of disaggregation is the 
pharmaceutical industry with its strategic alliances and/or cooperation with 
biotechnology companies, together with outsourced activities, some cross-border. 
The second, though more tenuous, would be the strategic alliances vs. 
infrastructure alliance distinction. This is clearly found in the world of I. T, where 
for example, all web-sites have bought into Google, where Google has become a 
core requirement for the internet to work. The third is the strategic alliance co- 
evolution model explored in a later section. 
7.2.4 Reflections on Methodology 
The methodologies employed in this thesis are detailed in Chapter Four. To 
reflect on their appropriateness and on the way it all worked out in practice may 
be helpful. 
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7.2.4.1 Questionnaire. The original research agenda was to consider substantial 
cross-border alliances and accordingly the sample of banks in 20 countries, on the 
continent of Europe, broadly defined, was subject to a qualifying hurdle, namely 
an asset size of over US$10,000 Billion. The resulting small response did not 
generate findings that may have been of general importance, rather provided 
insights for further investigation. Not using the asset size hurdle would have led 
to a potential sample size of approximately 3,000 banks and allowed more 
statistical validation of findings and captured data on a wider range of in-country 
alliances. 
The questions were formed using a five point Likert scale ranging from `strongly 
agree' to `strongly disagree' and a broad bipolarity established in reporting the 
findings in Chapter Five. On reflection, if a ranking and rating system had been 
used in the design of the questionnaire then a finer degree of discrimination in the 
views of respondents could have been identified and reported. 
7.2.4.2 Literature. The very substantial, and international, underpinning 
literature regarding alliances was filtered through the medium of the editors of 
major international journals and collections. This process resulted in 400 papers 
being analysed. An alternative, and equally acceptable, method would have been 
to use the Citation Index to gauge the influence of a particular academic paper on 
thought in the alliances field and to build an analysis from these papers. 
7.2.4.3 Controls oup. Our study raises the question of the existential status of 
the control group. The questionnaire was completed by banks who were both 
willing and relatively qualified in the sense of having experience of strategic 
alliances. The control group is all those banks who excluded themselves on the 
grounds that they had no relevant activity on which they could report. And the 
interview sample was determined by the questionnaire sample, where 
questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate whether they were willing to be 
interviewed as well, on the grounds of having `something to say'. In short this 
research operation casts some doubt on the standard view that the researcher either 
has a control group or has not, by opening up the possibility of the self-selection 
of research groups and the implicit control group. 
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7.2.4.4 Triangulation. Our research did not use this technique of triangulation as 
formally defined. On the other hand it did use a variety of methodological thrusts 
- desk research, literature analysis, interviews and a survey - and we would like to 
suggest that this multiple methodology has enriched the findings. In particular it 
has enabled our leverage of the definition of the strategic alliance and has 
facilitated our reconstruction of the theory of the firm. 
7.3 Further Research 
In these last pages we would like anticipate, as it were, a question often asked of 
candidates in the Viva Voce, namely does your research prompt suggestions for 
further research? We leave two lines of inquiry to offer food for thought. 
7.3.1 Infrastructure Alliances 
Whilst substantial research exists regarding the strategic alliance, some of which 
is reported in Chapter Three, much less research has been carried out on the 
infrastructure alliance detailed in Chapter One. 
Infrastructure alliances are a `base line provision' that are fundamentally 
important to the provision of banking services and banks have a high pre-existing 
propensity to enter into infrastructure alliance. Given the importance of such 
alliances this may well be an area warranting further research. 
Research could examine areas such as: 
" the forces driving a strategic alliance to become an infrastructure alliance 
" the degree of potential `oscillation' between infrastructure and strategic 
forms 
" the diverse forces acting on the `oscillation' process 
" the lifecycle of an infrastructure alliance 
" the value chain of an infrastructure alliance 
" the co-evolution of infrastructure alliances and the member firms (see 
below for `The Co-Evolution Model') 
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" the divergence between the provision of financial products and the 
provision of cross-industry infrastructure to support these products 
" regional and global convergence in infrastructure alliances 
9 obtaining and sustaining a competitive advantage in infrastructure 
alliances 
" capturing and retaining profitability in infrastructure alliances. 
7.3.2 The Co-Evolution Model 
In the forgoing analysis the co-evolution of the alliance partner strategic intent, in 
a similar direction, was a prerequisite to the continuation of the alliance. 
This co-evolution may be said to take three major forms - parallel co-evolution, 
convergent co-evolution, divergent co-evolution. 
Parallel Co-evolution - This is where the strategic intents of the two firms are 
evolving along paths that allow the continuation of the strategic alliance in the 
broad nature as at establishment. The initial matching of intents continues and 
evolves over time at the same rate, in a similar direction. Any sli h changes in 
the speed of evolution of the individual intents of the member firms or in the 
degree of parallel evolution are compensated for by the 'springiness' or flexibility 
of the strategic alliance. If the degree of convergence or divergence in intents is 
too great and cannot be compensated for, then the following classifications apply. 
Convergent Co-evolution - This is where the strategic intents of the two firms 
converge over time and the rationale behind the strategic alliance is strengthened. 
This strengthening may ultimately lead to the merger of the two firms and the 
'dissolution' of the alliance. 
Divergent Co-evolution - This is where the strategic intents of the two firms 
diverge over time and the rationale behind the strategic alliance is weakening. 
This weakening may ultimately lead to the dissolution of the alliance. 
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With regard to the form of the alliance, the parallel type of co-evolution will tend 
to maintain the form or forms used at establishment, the convergent type will tend 
to move the alliance towards the 'hierarchical' nature whilst the divergent type will 
tend to move the alliance towards a'markets' nature. 
An example of this process is the development of the BNP and Dresdner strategic 
alliance from initiation to dissolution, a process that took place over a 10 year 
period. It commenced as a response to the commercial opportunities made 
available by the opening up of Europe to cross-border financial services provision. 
The alliances' most successful achievements were focused joint venture 
operations in the emerging Eastern Europe. As competitors entered those 
countries with full operations, BNP and Dresdner decided to go it alone and 
accordingly disbanded the alliance. 
The BNP and Dresdner alliance may be characterised, from time zero to time 10 
years, as: 
" parallel co-evolution - At commencement both banks strategic intents were 
aligned 
" divergent co-evolution - As country specific concerns, such as the 
reintegration of East Germany into Germany, impacted on the concerns of 
top management intents became divergent 
" convergent co-evolution - Simultaneously the position immediately above, 
the Eastern European joint ventures were a tangible manifestation of 
convergent intents in relation to those operations 
" divergent co-evolution - As the rationale for the joint ventures, the 
`binding agents' of the global alliance declined so the whole alliance 
diverged to the point of dissolution. 
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Parallel Co-Evolution 
SA 
Time Time 
0 0+ 
Convergent Co-Evolution 
SA 
Time 
0 
Divergent Co-Evolution 
Time 
0+ 
Key: 
SI = Strategic Intent 
SA = Strategic Alliance 
A= Alliance Member A 
B= Alliance Member B 
Time 0= Time at Start of Alliance = Co-Alignment 
Time 0+ = Time in the Future 
Figure 7.1: Schema for Classifying Co-Evolution of Firm Level Strategic 
Intents in Strategic Alliances 
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A full exposition of the lifecycle of this alliance is contained in Itschert and ul- 
Haq (2003). 
The three generic cases above are modified by the concept of differential co- 
evolution. This concept notes that each firm's strategic intent will co-evolve at 
different rates and that this will have an impact on the nature, purpose, 
importance, form and validity of the strategic alliance. 
The addition of this concept allows three modified categories - differential 
parallel co-evolution, differential convergent co-evolution, differential divergent 
co-evolution. 
Differential Parallel Co-evolution - This is where the evolution of the strategic 
intents of the two firms are at different rates but in a broadly similar direction. 
Whilst this allows the continuation of the alliance, the faster evolving firm, for 
example, may pull the slower evolving firm and the strategic alliance in a new 
joint direction. 
Differential Convergent Co-evolution - This is where the strategic intents of the 
two firms evolve at different rates but in a convergent direction. Whilst this 
allows the continuation of the alliance it may only do so until such time as the 
faster evolving firm, for example, decides to internalise the alliance and the slower 
evolving firm, inside its boundaries. 
Differential Divergent Co-evolution - This is where the evolution of the strategic 
intents of the two firms is at different rates but in a divergent direction. The faster 
evolving firm, for example, if it finds benefits from the strategic alliance may 
internalise it or on the other hand it may evolve beyond the alliance. 
The three generic, and three sub-generic, concepts above point to the complexity 
of the concept of anticipated durability. The complexity of the real situation is 
many layered with: 
" the speed of evolution of each firm's strategic intent changing over time 
with spurts of innovation interspersed with moments of complacency 
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" changes in the nature of co-evolution over time with parallel, convergent 
and divergent (and differential) episodes being interspersed 
" exponential increases in complexity if more than two firms are members of 
the strategic alliance with all the firms, and the strategic alliance, being 
subject to co-evolution of their respective strategic intents. All six 
classifications of co-evolution (and many intermediate positions) may 
subsist at the same time in a multi-member alliance 
" the differential effects of the internal and external forces that tend towards 
inspiration, innovation, and conversely, complacency and atrophy in firms' 
strategic intents 
" the further increase in complexity of co-evolution in alliances in few-party 
and many-party situations. 
In an increasingly dynamic and (often discontinuous) change orientated 
commercial environment, a firm's ability to re-configure its strategic intent 
rapidly, and to implement this intent, is a core competence as suggested earlier. 
The strategic alliance is one mechanism to assist in this process. If the alliance 
provides no collaborative advantage then it will be abandoned or allowed to 
atrophy. 
The co-evolution model presented here is our own idea rather than something 
taken from the academic literature. We feel it has been helpful here in throwing 
light on alliance persistence and alliance termination. At the same time, precisely 
because it is new this model may benefit from critical development by others. 
7.3.2.1 The Co-Evolution Model and Real Option Theory. It is possible that 
valuable insights into the process of effective co-evolution in both strategic and 
infrastructure alliances can be obtained by combining the proposed research on 
the new `The Co-Evolution Model' with the existing `Real Option Theory'. A 
migration of `option models ... from 
financial markets to corporate decision 
making' has been seen (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2004). In `strategically interesting 
settings... having made an initial investment, firms can actively engage in follow- 
on activities that can influence outcomes and identify new possible actions and 
goals. ' (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). The Co-Evolution Model by the author 
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allows for the continuous re-configuration of an alliance (or set of alliances) - at 
all levels from strategic intent to operational delivery - and adds to the current 
debate. Adner and Levinthal (2004) suggest that real options, should not be used 
only to `engage in some prespecified opportunity set' but rather they should be 
used in a more flexible way, combining `a real options logic for initiating 
investments... [with]... an organisational design that can abandon initiatives 
efficiently' thereby allowing rapid and fluid co-evolution. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to exam this confluence of interest and models, but others may well 
wish develop this area. 
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Banking Centre 
Strategic Alliances in Banking Survey 
e questionnaire aims to elicit information regarding the attitudes of the banking sector in the UK towards 
Strategic Alliances. ., 
Phase would you complete this questionnaire and return it in the enclosed reply-paid envelope. ' 
VC thank you in advance for taking the time and effort to complete the questionnaire. 
ID4 C Morison 
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How many strategic alliances does your company have? 
Please circle one answer number 
1.1 to 4 
2.5 to 9 
3.10 to 15 
4. More than 15 
We do or are willing to enter into strategic alliances with our competitors: 
Please circle one answer number 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
omcc use 
only 
4 
5 
6 
7 
office use 
only 
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We consider that there is a direct positive relationship between ownership, in equity terms, and 
management control and influence in strategic alliances. 
Please circle one answer number 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
Office use 
only 
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I, 4. We consider that our strategic alliances have met or are meeting our strategic objectives. 
Please circle one answer number 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree ' 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
S. Strongly disagree 
116 
office use 
only 
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S. Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree 
`- 4 disagree 
(Please circle one answer number per question). office use 
only 
At The objectives of our alliances 1 2, 3 4 5 11 
_ are specific b" Our strategic alliances identify 12 
and undertake specific tasks in 12 3 4 5 
\ý support of these objectives 
'C We encourage our strategic 13 
alliances to take calculated 12 3 4 5 
\i ` itiatives 
d We are strongly committed to 12 3 4 5 14 
our strategic alliance partners 
r 
ý. When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial time to establishing: 
Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
agree agree nor disagree 
disagree 
= (Please circle one answer number per questi on). om« use 
d 
1ýtethods for making decisions 12 3 4 5 
only 
15 
" Methods for monitoring the 12 3 4 5 16 implementation of decisions 
Method for resolving, conflicts 12 3 4 5 17 
Other (please indicate) 12 3 4 5 18 
12 3 4 5 19 
12 3 4 5 20 
12 3 4 5 21 
12 3 4 5 22 
AL 
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ý'. How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions: .u 
Orracc use 
y UK Number 
ý. 
_ 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
ý. 
_ 
North America 
_ 
South and Central America 
Indian Sub-continent 
Asia 
N 
Africa 
_ 
Middle East 
Others (please indicate) 
4- 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in: 
Yes but no Yes and No and No but 
further possible no future possible 
plans future plans plans future plans 
(Please circle one answer number per question). 
UK 12 3 4 
Weston Europe 1 2, 3 4 
Eastern Europe 12 3 4 
_North 
America 12 3 4 
South and Central America 12 3 4 
Indian Sub-Continent I2 3 4 
\ýAsiý 12 3 4 
Ahica 12 3 4 
Middle East 12 3 4 
Others (please indicate) 
12 3 4 
12 3 4 
2 3 4 
ý_ 12 3 4 
How important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? 
Extremely Very Somewhat Not very Not at all 
important important important important important 
(Please circle one answer number per question). 
"ý 1 ital cost reduction 
ý 
Sharing 
risks 
Entering 
a new nroduc 
Inc` 
g new geographical 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 ." 4 
distribution channels 
market 
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10. In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider the following 
possible characteristics to be? 
Extremely Very Somewhat Not very Not at all 
important important important important important 
(Please circle one answer number per quest ion). Office use 
only 
ýý_ Durability 1 2 3 4 5 51 
fib. Sharing or pooling resources 1 2 3 4 5 52 
ýC_ Creation of a separate company 1 2 3 4 5 53 
ýd. _ 
Strategic importance to partners 1 2 3 4 5 54 
Mutual economic gain 1 2 3 4 5 55 
ýý'. _ 
Own fine economic gain 1 2 3 4 5 56 
Other 
1 2 3 4 5' 57 
1 2 3 4 5 58 
ý_ 1 2 3 4 5 59 
ý_ 1 2 3 4 5 60 
ý_ 1 2 3 4 5 61 
ýýCkse 
provide any additional comments you wish to make in the space below: 
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Would you like us to send you a free copy of the Strategic Alliances in Banking Survey Report? 
0MCC use 
only 
Please tick Yes Q No Q 62 
Would you be willing, in principle, to participate in a follow-up interview? 
orrice use 
only 
Please tick Yes Q No Q [] 63 
'Would 
you please provide the following information for our confidential records. 
OQicc use only 
Title: 
ýPany Name: 
; 
1Pany Address: 
Phone No: 
Assets of Company £million -Q 64 Q 65 Q 66 
Q 67 Q 68 
You for your participation in this survey. 
k4ld Yo reply-paid YOU please return the questionnaire in the enclosed rep yp envelope. 
rn to: R Ul-Ha 9 
Banking Centre 
Loughborough University 
FREEPOST LE3677 
LOUGHBOROUGH 
Leicestershire 
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How many Into manageme alliances undertake 
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does your with our Infulence In our of our support of 
company competitor strategic strategic alliances these 
have ? S alliances objectives are specific objectives 
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Missin 10 8 0 8 7 7 
Statistics 
\ý 
When 
entering 
into When 
When strategic entering 
entering alliances Into a 
Into a we devote strategic When 
strategic substantial alliance we entering 
We alliance we time to devote into a 
encourage We are devote establishing substantial strategic 
our strongly substantial methods for time to alliance 
strategic committed time to monitoring establishing we devote 
alliances to to our establishing the a method sustantial 
take strategic methods for implementa for time to 
calculated alliance making tion of resolving establishin 
initiatives artners decisions decisions conflicts - Other 
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Missing 7 7 7 7 7 60 
Statistics 
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How many of your of your 
of your How many How many strategic strategic 
How many strategic of your of your alliances alliances 
of your alliances strategic strategic are with are with 
strategic are with alliances alliances partners in partners In 
alliances partners in are with are with the the 
are with the partners in partners in following following 
partners in following the the regions-So areas-India 
the regions-We following following uth and n 
following stem regions-Eas regions-Nor Central Sub-contine 
regions -UK Euro tern Europe th America America nt 
N Valid 18 39 7 15 4 3 
Missing 50 29 61 53 64 65 
Statistics 
ýý 
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of your of your of your of your We are using or 
strategic strategic strategic strategic using or intend to 
alliances alliances alliances alliances Intend to use 
are with are with are with are with use strategic 
partners In partners in partners in partners In strategic alliances to 
the the the the alliances to expand our 
following following following following expand our capability in 
regions-Asi regions-Afri regions-Mid regions - capability in -Western 
a ca die East Other -UK Europe 
N Valid 9 3 1 17 38 56 
Missing 59 65 67 51 30 12 
L 
Statistics 
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We are 
using or 
We are intend to 
We are We are using or use 
using or using or intend to strategic We are We are 
intend to intend to use alliances using or using or 
use use strategic to expand intend to intend to 
strategic strategic alliances to our use use 
alliances to alliances to expand our capability strategic strategic 
expand our expand our capability in in the - alliances to alliances to 
capability in capability in - South and Indian expand our expand our 
- Eastern - North Central Sub-contin capability in capability in 
Europe America America ent - Asia - Africa 
N Valid 34 34 30 28 34 30 
Missing 34 34 38 40 34 38 
Statistics 
E 
F 
How How 
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How How are the are the 
We are important important following following 
using or We are are the are the reasons for reasons for 
intend to using or following following entering entering 
use intend to reasons for reasons for into into 
strategic use entering entering strategic strategic 
alliances to strategic into into alliances? - alliances? - 
expand our alliances to strategic strategic Entering a Entering a 
capability in expand our alliances? - alliances? - new new 
the - Middle capability in Capital cost Sharing product geographic 
East - Others reduction risks market al market 
Valid 29 5 63 64 62 64 
Missing 39 63 5 4 6 '4 
Statistics 
In respect In respect In respect In respect 
of strategic of strategic of strategic of strategic 
In respect alliances alliances alliances alliances 
of strategic you have you have you have you have 
alliances entered, entered, entered, entered, 
How you have how how how how 
important entered, important important Important Important 
are the how do you do you do you do you 
following Important consider consider consider consider 
reasons for do you the the the nthe 
entering consider following following following following 
Into the possible possible possible possible 
strategic following characterist characterist characterist characterist 
alliances? - possible ics to be? - ics to be? - Ics to be? - Ics to be? - 
Accessing characterist Sharing or Creation of Strategic Mutual 
distribution Ics to be? - pooling a separate Importance economic 
channels Durability resources company to partners gain 
N Valid 63 59 59 59 58 57 
Missing 5 9 9 9 10 11 
Statistics 
r 
in respect 
of strategic 
alliances In respect 
you have of strategic 
entered, alliances 
how you have 
important entered 
do you into, how 
consider important 
the do you 
following consider 
possible the 
characterist following 
Ics to be? - possible 
Own firm characterist Name of Country of 
economic ics to be? - Additional Responds Respondin 
gain Other comments ng Bank Bank 
N Valid 57 6 11 68 68 
Missing 11 62 57 0 0 
Frequency Table 
How many strategic alliances does your company have ? 
Frequency_ Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid I to 4 39 57.4 67.2 67.2 
5 to 9 13 19.1 22.4 89.7 
10 to 15 3 4.4 5.2 94.8 
More than 15 3 4.4 5.2 100.0 
Total 58 85.3 100.0 
Missing System 10 14.7 
Total 68 100.0 
We do or are willing to enter into strategic alliances with our competitors 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly Agree 4 5.9 6.7 6.7 
Agree 31 45.6 51.7 58.3 
Neither agree nor 14 20.6 23.3 81.7 
disagree 
Disagree 5 7.4 8.3 90.0 
Strongly disagree 6 8.8 10.0 100.0 
Total 60 88.2 100.0 
Missing System 8 11.8 
Total 68 100.0 
We consider that there is a direct positive relationship between ownership, in 
equity terms, and management control and Infulence in strategic alliances 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 14 20.6 20.6 20.6 
Agree 38 55.9 55.9 76.5 
Neither agree 12 17.6 17.6 94.1 
nor disagree 
Disagree 4 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 68 100.0 100.0 
We consider that our strategic alliances have met or are meeting our strategic objectives 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 11 16.2 18.3 18.3 
Agree 37 54.4 61.7 80.0 
Neither agree 10 14.7 16.7 96.7 
nor disagree 
Disagree 1 1.5 1.7 98.3 
Strongly agree 1 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 60 88.2 100.0 
Missing System 8 11.8 
Total 68 100.0 
to 
The objectives of our alliances are specific 
,/ 
Fr uenc Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 27 39.7 44.3 44.3 
Agree 32 47.1 52.5 96.7 
Neither agree 2 2.9 3.3 100 0 
nor disagree . 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
Our strategic alliances identify and undertake specific tasks in support of these objectives 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 22 32.4 36.1 36.1 
Agree 37 54.4 60.7 96.7 
Neither agree 1 1.5 1.6 98.4 
nor disagree 
Disagree 1 1.5 1.6 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
We encourage our strategic alliances to take calculated initiatives 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 10 14.7 16.4 16.4 
Agree 30 44.1 49.2 65.6 
Neither agree 17 25.0 27 9 93 4 
nor disagree . . 
Disagree 4 5.9 6.6 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
We are strongly committed to our strategic alliance partners 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 11 16.2 18.0 18.0 
Agree 29 42.6 47.5 65.6 
Neither agree 16 23.5 26.2 91 8 
nor disagree . 
Disagree 5 7.4 8.2 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial time to establishing methods for making decisions 
ýý 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 11 16.2 18.0 18.0 
Agree 40 58.8 65.6 83.6 
Neither agree 8 11.8 13.1 96 7 
nor disagree . 
Disagree 2 2.9 3.3 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
When entering into strategic alliances we devote substantial time to 
establishing methods for monitoring the implementation of decisions 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 11 16.2 18.0 18.0 
Agree 32 47.1 52.5 70.5 
Neither agree 16 23.5 26 2 96.7 
nor disagree . 
Disagree 2 2.9 3.3 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
Missing System 7 10.3 
Total 68 100.0 
When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial time to 
establishing a method for resolving conflicts 
v 
LN 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
'slid Strongly agree 9 13.2 14.8 14.8 
Agree 34 50.0 55.7 70.5 
Neither agree 17 25.0 27.9 98 4 
nor disagree . 
Disagree 1 1.5 1.6 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0 
lissing System 7 10.3 
Otal 68 100.0 
ken 
entering into a strategic alliance we devote sustantial time to establishing - Other 
M 
IT( 
Valid Cumulativ 
Freuen Percent Percent e Percent 
Mid See text of Questionnaire 8 11.8 100.0 100.0 
issing System 60 88.2 
)tal 68 100.01 1 
iý-, 
Now many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions -UK 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid 1 6 8.8 33.3 33.3 
2 2 2.9 11.1 44.4 
3 2 2.9 11.1 55.6 
4 3 4.4 16.7 72.2 
5 2 2.9 11.1 83.3 
6 1 1.5 5.6 88.9 
10 2 2.9 11.1 100.0 
Total 18 26.5 100.0 
Missing System 50 73.5 
Total 68 100.0 
NOW many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Western Europe 
" 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid 1 12 17.6 30.8 30.8 
2 5 7.4 12.8 43.6 
3 6 8.8 15.4 59.0 
4 5 7.4 12.8 71.8 
5 7 10.3 17.9 89.7 
6 1 1.5 2.6 92.3 
7 1 1.5 2.6 94.9 
11 1 1.5 2.6 97.4 
19 1 1.5 2.6 100.0 
Total 39 57.4 100.0 
Missing System 29 42.6 
Total 68 100.0 
'NOW many of your strategic alliances are with partners In the following regions-Eastern Europe 
\ 
," 
u 
T 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
alid 1 4 5.9 57.1 57.1 
2 1 1.5 14.3 71.4 
3 1 1.5 14.3 85.7 
4 1 1.5 14.3 100.0 
Total 7 10.3 100.0 
issing System 61 89.7 
Otal 68 100.0 
How 
many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-North America 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
lid 1 11 16.2 73.3 73.3 
2 2 2.9 13.3 86.7 
3 1 1.5 6.7 93.3 
4 1 1.5 6.7 100.0 
Total 15 22.1 100.0 
ssing System 53 77.9 
I 
tal 68 100.0 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-South and Central America 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
Valid 1 4 5.9 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 64 94.1 
Total 68 100.0 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following areas-Indian Sub-continent 
Valid Cumulativ 
Freuen Percent Percent e Percent 
Valid 1 3 4.4 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 65 95.6 
Total 68 100.0 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Asia 
Freuen Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid 1 4 5.9 44.4 44.4 
2 2 2.9 22.2 66.7 
3 2 2.9 22.2 88.9 
5 1 1.5 11.1 100.0 
Total 9 13.2 100.0 
Missing System 59 86.8 
Total 68 100.0 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Africa 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
Jalid 1 3 4.4 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 65 95.6 
total 68 100.0 
%How 
many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Middle East 
1 
1 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
falid 1 1 1.5 100.0 100.0 
Hissing System 67 98.5 
'otal 68 100.0 
IIOW 
many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions - Other 
M 
T, 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
lid-See text of Questionnaire 17 25.0 100.0 100.0 
lissing System 51 75.0 
otal 68 100.0 
, 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in -UK 
Missing System 
Total 
30 
68 
44.1 
100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in -Western Europe 
p. 
Lotal 68 + 100.0 I 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability In -Eastern Europe 
ýI 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes but no further plans 11 16.2 28.9 28.9 
Yes and possible future 10 14.7 26.3 55 3 plans . 
No and no future plans 13 19.1 34.2 89.5 
No but possible future 4 5.9 10.5 100 0 plans . 
Total 38 55.9 100.0 
Missing System 30 44.1 
Total 68 100.0 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes but no further plans 9 13.2 16.1 16.1 
Yes and possible future 32 47.1 57.1 73 2 
plans . 
No and no future plans 6 8.8 10.7 83.9 
No but possible future 9 13.2 16 1 100 0 
plans . . 
Total 56 82.4 100.0 
Missing System 12 17.6 
Total 68 100.0 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
'alid Yes but no further plans 1 1.5 2.9 2.9 
Yes and possible future 9 13.2 26.5 29 4 
plans . 
No and no future plans 14 20.6 41.2 70.6 
No but possible future 10 14.7 29 4 100 0 
plans . . 
Total 34 50.0 100.0 
lissing System 34 50.0 
otal 68 100.0 
M 
T 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - North America 
Mh 
To, 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
lid Yes but no further plans 7 10.3 20.6 20.6 
Yes and possible future 5 7.4 14 7 35 3 plans . . 
No and no future plans 15 22.1 44.1 79.4 
No but possible future 7 10.3 20.6 100 0 plans . 
Total 34 50.0 100.0 
Xing System 34 50.0 
tal 
ft- 1 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - South and Central America 
S 
\" 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes but no further plans 1 1.5 3.3 3.3 
Yes and possible future 3 4.4 10.0 13.3 
plans 
No and no future plans 18 26.5 60.0 73.3 
No but possible future 8 11.8 26.7 100.0 
plans 
Total 30 44.1 100.0 
Missing System 38 55.9 
Total 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in the - Indian Sub-continent 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes but(no further plans 1 1.5 3.6 3.6 
Yes and possible future 3 4.4 10.7 14.3 
plans 
No and no future plans 19 27.9 67.9 82.1 
No and possible future 5 7.4 17.9 100.0 
plans 
Total 28 41.2 100.0 
Missing System 40 58.8 
Total 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Asia " 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes but no further plans 4 5.9 11.8 11.8 
Yes and possible future 6 8.8 17.6 29.4 
plans 
No and no future plans 15 22.1 44.1 73.5 
No but possible future 9 13.2 26.5 100.0 
plans 
Total 34 50.0 100.0 
Missing System 34 50.0 
Total 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Africa 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Yes and possible future 3 4.4 10.0 10.0 
plans 
No and no futuure plans 22 32.4 73.3 83.3 
No but possible future 5 7.4 16.7 100.0 
plans 
Total 30 44.1 100.0 
Missing System 38 55.9 
Total 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in the - Middle East 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid No and no future plans 19 27.9 65.5 65.5 
No and possible future 10 14.7 34.5 100.0 
plans 
Total 29 42.6 100.0 
Missing System 39 57.4 
total 68 100.0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Others 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
Val d See text of Questionnaire 5 7.4 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 63 92.6 
Total 68 100.0 
%4Ow Important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Capital cost reduction 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
alid Extremely important 6 8.8 9.5 9.5 
Very Important 15 22.1 23.8 33.3 
Somewhat important 19 27.9 30.2 63.5 
Not very important 16 23.5 25.4 88.9 
Not at all Important 7 10.3 11.1 100.0 
Total 63 92.6 100.0 
lissing System 5 7.4 
otal 68 100.0 
I-- 
Now Important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Sharing risks 
ýI 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
alid Extremely important 7 10.3 10.9 10.9 
Very important 24 35.3 37.5 48.4 
Somewhat important 20 29.4 31.3 79.7 
Not very Important 10 14.7 15.6 95.3 
Not at all important 3 4.4 4.7 100.0 
Total 64 94.1 100.0 
Iissing System 4 5.9 
otal 68 100.0 
Ll 
How important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Entering a new product market 
1 
1 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
lalid Extremely important 12 17.6 19.4 19.4 
Very important 29 42.6 46.8 66.1 
Somewhat important 8 11.8 12.9 79.0 
Not very important 13 19.1 21.0 100.0 
Total 62 91.2 100.0 
Hissing System 6 8.8 
otal 68 100.0 
Now Important are the following reasons for entering Into strategic alliances? - 
Entering a new geographical market 
V 
N 
1 
16 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
'alid Extremely important 13 19.1 20.3 20.3 
Very Important 26 38.2 40.6 60.9 
Somewhat important 9 13.2 14.1 75.0 
Not very important 12 17.6 18.8 93.8 
Not at all Important 4 5.9 6.3 100.0 
Total 64 94.1 100.0 
iissing System 4 5.9 
otal 68 100.0 
Now Important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Accessing distribution channels 
Fre uen Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
lid Extremely important 12 17.6 19.0 19.0 
Very Important 29 42.6 46.0 65.1 
Somewhat important 15 22.1 23.8 88.9 
Not very important 5 7.4 7.9 96.8 
Not at all Important 2 2.9 3.2 100.0 
Total 63 92.6 100.0 
using System 5 7.4 
tal 68 100.0 
Mr 
10 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Durability 
Val 
tot 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
id Extremely important 14 20.6 23.7 23.7 
Very Important 34 50.0 57.6 81.4 
Somewhat important 10 14.7 16.9 98.3 
Not at all important 1 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 59 86.8 100.0 
ging System 9 13.2 
al 68 100.0 
66, 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Sharing or pooling resources 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Extremely important 4 5.9 6.8 6.8 
Very important 38 55.9 64.4 71.2 
Somewhat important 15 22.1 25.4 96.6 
Not very important 2 2.9 3.4 100.0 
Total 59 86.8 100.0 
Missing System 9 13.2 
Total 68 100.0 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Creation of a separate company 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Extremeiy. important 2 2.9. 3.4 3.4 
Very Important 9 13.2 15.3 18.6 
Somewhat Important 24 35.3 40.7 59.3 
Not very important 18 26.5 30.5 89.8 
Not at all important 6 8.8 10.2 100.0 
Total 59 86.8 100.0 
Missing System 9 13.2 
Total 68 100.0 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Strategic importance to partners 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Valid Extremely important 13 19.1 22.4 22.4 
Very Important 29 42.6 50.0 72.4 
Somewhat important 9 13.2 15.5 87.9 
Not very important 6 8.8 10.3 98.3 
Not at all important 1 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 85.3 100.0 
Missing System 10 14.7 
total 68 100.0 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
nthe following possible characteristics to be? - Mutual economic gain 
N 
T 
Fr uen Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
alid Extremely important 16 23.5 28.1 28.1 
Very important 30 44.1 52.6 80.7 
Somewhat Important 10 14.7 17.5 98.2 
Not very important 1 1.5 1.8 100.0 
Total 57 83.8 100.0 
lssing System 11 16.2 
otal 68 100-04 1 
khkl 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Own firm economic gain 
I, - 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
alid emely important 18 26.5 31.6 31.6 
Very Important 34 50.0 59.6 91.2 
Somewhat important 4 5.9 7.0 98.2 
Not very Important 1 1.5 1.8 100.0 
Total 57 83.8 100.0 
Missing System 11 162 
Total 68 100.0 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered into, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Other 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
Valid See text of Questionnaire 6 8.8 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 62 91.2 
Total 68 100.0 
Additional comments 
Valid Cumulativ 
Frequency Percent Percent e Percent 
7ail Id e text of Questionnaire 11 16.2 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 57 83.8 
Total 68 100.0 
Country of Responding Bank 
,ý 
\ýý` 
t, 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulativ 
e Percent 
Austria 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Belgium 4 5.9 5.9 7.4 
Denmark 1 1.5 1.5 8.8 
France 3 4.4 4.4 132 
Germany 16 23.5 23.5 36.8 
Greece 1 1.5 1.5 38.2 
Holland 5 7.4 7.4 45.6 
Ireland 3 4.4 4.4 50.0 
Italy 4 5.9 5.9 55.9 
Luxembourg 1 1.5 1.5 57.4 
Norway 2 2.9 2.9 60.3 
Portgual 1 1.5 1.5 61.8 
Spain 2 2.9 2.9 64.7 
Sweden 3 4.4 4.4 69.1 
Switreriand 4 5.9 5.9 75.0 
UK 17 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 68 100.0 100.0 
.. 
Appendix Three 
Postal Survey Questionnaire 
Non-Parametric - Chi Squared Test - Frequencies 
(Analysis of Data via SPSS for Windows v. 9.0) 
I. 
NPar Tests 
Chi-Square Test 
Frequencies 
Now many strategic alliances does your company have ? 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 to 4 39 14.5 24.5 
5 to 9 13 14.5 -1.5 
10 to 15 3 14.5 -11.5 
More than 15 3 14.5 -11.5 
total 58 
We do or are willing to enter into strategic alliances with our competitors 
ýý 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly Agree 4 12.0 -8.0 
Agree 31 12.0 19.0 
Neither agree nor 14 12.0 2 0 disagree . 
Disagree 5 12.0 -7.0 
Strongly disagree 6 12.0 -6.0 
Total 60 
We consider that there Is a direct positive relationship between ownership, In 
equity terms, and management control and Infulence In strategic alliances 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 14 17.0 -3.0 
Agree 38 17.0 21.0 
Neither agree 12 17.0 -5.0 or disagree 
Disagree 4 17.0 -13.0 
Total 68 
We consider that our strategic alliances have met or are meeting our strategic objectives 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Ztrongty agree 11 12.0 -1.0 
agree 37 12.0 25.0 
either agree 
for disagree 10 12.0 -2.0 
)isagree 1 12.0 -11.0 
strongly agree 1 12.0 -11.0 
total 60 
Lý 
The objectives of our-alliances are specific 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 27 20.3 6.7 
Agree 32 20.3 11.7 
Neither agree 2 20.3 -18.3 nor disagree 
Total 61 
Our strategic alliances identify and undertake specific tasks in support of these objectives 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 22 15.3 6.8 
Agree 37 15.3 21.8 
Neither agree 1 15.3 -14.3 nor disagree 
Disagree 1 15.3 -14.3 
Total 61 
--- #We encourage our strategic alliances to take calculated initiatives 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 10 15.3 -5.3 
Agree 30 15.3 14.8 
Neither agree 17 15.3 1.8 
nor disagree 
Disagree 4 15.3 -11.3 
Total 61 
r 
We are strongly committed to our strategic alliance partners 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 11 15.3 -4.3 
Agree 29 15.3 13.8 
Neither agree 16 15.3 .8 nor disagree 
Disagree 5 15.3 -10.3 
total 61 
When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial time to establishing methods for making decisions 
U 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
strongly agree 11 15.3 4.3 
Agree 40 15.3 24.8 
'either agree 8 15.3 -7.3 for disagree 
disagree 2 15.3 -13.3 
rota) 61 
hh, 
When entering into strategic alliances we devote substantial time to 
establishing methods for monitoring the implementation of decisions 
is 
4- 
6 
V 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 11 15.3 -4.3 
Agree 32 15.3 16.8 
Neither agree 16 15.3 .8 nor disagree 
Disagree 2 15.3 -13.3 
Total 61 
When entering into a strategic alliance we devote substantial 
time to establishing a method for resolving conflicts 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly agree 9 15.3 -6.3 
Agree 34 15.3 18.8 
Neither agree 17 15.3 1.8 
nor disagree 
Disagree 1 15.3 -14.3 
Total 61 
When entering into a strategic alliance we devote sustantial time to establishing - Other 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
See text of Questionnaire 
Total 
8 
8a 
8.0 .0 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions -UK 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 6 2.6 3.4 
2 2 2.6 -. 6 
3 2 2.6 -. 6 
4 3 2.6 .4 
5 2 2.6 -. 6 
6 1 2.6 -1.6 
10 2 2.6 -. 6 
Total 18 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Western Europe 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 12 4.3 7.7 
2 5 4.3 .7 
3 6 4.3 1.7 
4 5 4.3 .7 
5 7 4.3 2.7 
6 1 4.3 -3.3 
7 1 4.3 -3.3 
11 1 4.3 -3.3 
19 1 4.3 -3.3 
Total 39 
i 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Eastern Europe 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 4 1.8 2.3 
2 1 1.8 -. 8 
3 1 1.8 -. 8 
4 1 1.8 -. 8 
Total 7 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-North America 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 11 3.8 7.3 
2 2 3.8 -1.8 
3 1 3.8 2.8 
4 1 3.8 -2.8 
Total 15 
SHOW many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-South and Central America 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Total 
4 
48 
4.0 .0 
i 
f 
G 
F 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
Now many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following areas-Indian Sub-continent 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 
Total 
3 
3a 
3.0 .0 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions Asia 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 4 2.3 1.8 
2 2 2.3 -. 3 
3 2 2.3 -. 3 
5 1 2.3 -1.3 
Total 9 
Now many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Africa 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Total 
3 
3a 
3.0 .0 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions-Middle East 
JS 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 
Total 
1 
1a 
1.0 .0 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
How many of your strategic alliances are with partners in the following regions - Other 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
See text of Questionnaire 
Total 
17 
17a 
17.0 .0 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in -UK 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 11 9.5 1.5 
Yes and possible future 10 9.5 .5 plans 
No and no future plans 13 9.5 3.5 
No but possible future 4 9.5 -5.5 plans 
Total 38 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in -Western Europe 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 9 14.0 -5.0 
Yes and possible future 32 14.0 18.0 
plans 
No and no future plans 6 14.0 -8.0 
No but possible future 9 14.0 -5.0 plans 
Total 56 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Eastern Europe 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 1 8.5 -7.5 
Yes and possible future 9 8.5 .5 plans 
No and no future plans 14 8.5 5.5 
No but possible future 10 8.5 1.5 
plans 
Total 34 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - North America 
\ 
\ý 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 7 8.5 -1.5 
Yes and possible future 5 8.5 -3.5 plans 
No and no future plans 15 8.5 6.5 
No but possible future 7 8.5 -1.5 plans 
Total 34 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances. to expand our capability in - South and Central America 
Observed N Ex peeled N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 1 7.5 -6.5 
Yes and possible future 3 7.5 -4.5 plans 
No and no future plans 18 7.5 10.5 
No but possible future 8 7.5 .5 plans 
total 30 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability In the - Indian Sub-continent 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 1 7.0 -6.0 
Yes and possible future 3 7.0 -4.0 plans 
No and no future plans 19 7.0 12.0 
No and possible future 5 7.0 -2.0 plans 
Total 28 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Asia 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Yes but no further plans 4 8.5 -4.5 
Yes and possible future 6 8 5 -2.5 Plans . 
No and no future plans 15 8.5 6.5 
No but possible future 9 8 5 .5 Plans . 
total 34 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability In - Africa 
p 
p 
1 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
'es and possible future 3 10 0 -7 0 lans . . 
lo and no futuure plans 22 10.0 12.0 
lo but possible future 
lans 5 10.0 -5.0 
otal 30 
kLý 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in the - Middle East 
.ý 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
No and no future plans 19 14.5 4.5 
No and possible future 10 14.5 -4.5 plans 
Total 29 
We are using or intend to use strategic alliances to expand our capability in - Others 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
See text of Questionnaire 
Total 
5 
5a 
5.0 .0 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
How important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Capital cost reduction 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 6 12.6 -6.6 
Very important 15 12.6 2.4 
Somewhat important 19 12.6 6.4 
Not very important 16 12.6 3.4 
Not at all important 7 12.6 -5.6 
total 63 
How important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Sharing risks 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 7 12.8 -5.8 
Very important 24 12.8 11.2 
Somewhat important 20 12.8 7.2 
Not very important 10 12.8 -2.8 
Not at all important 3 12.8 -9.8 
Total 64 
HOW important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Entering a new product market 
i 
i 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
E3ctremely important 12 15.5 -3.5 
Very important 29 15.5 13.5 
Somewhat Important 8 15.5 -7.5 
Not very important 13 15.5 -2.5 
dotal 62 
hhh, 
How important are the following reasons for entering into 
strategic alliances? - Entering a new geographical market 
~ý 
r 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 13 12.8 .2 Very Important 26 12.8 13.2 
Somewhat Important 9 12.8 -3.8 
Not very important 12 12.8 -. 8 
Not at all Important 4 12.8 -8.8 
Total 64 1 
-j 
How important are the following reasons for entering into strategic alliances? - Accessing distribution channels 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 12 12.6 -. 6 
Very important 29 12.6 16.4 
Somewhat important 15 12.6 2.4 
Not very Important 5 12.6 -7.6 
Not at all Important 2 12.6 -10.6 
Total 63 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do 
You consider the following possible characteristics to be? - Durability 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 14 14.8 -. 8 
Very important 34 14.8 19.3 
Somewhat important 10 14.8 4.8 
Not at all important 1 14.8 -13.8 
Total 59 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Sharing or pooling resources 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 4 14.8 -10.8 
Very important 38 14.8 23.3 
Somewhat important 15 14.8 .3 Not very important 2 14.8 -12.8 
Total 59 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Creation of a separate company 
E 
n 
I 
t 
observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 2 11.8 -9.8 
'ery important 9 11.8 -2.8 
iomewhat Important 24 11.8 12.2 
lot very important 18 11.8 6.2 
lot at all Important 6 11.8 -5.8 
otal 
ftft 
59' 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you consider 
the following possible characteristics to be? - Strategic importance to partners 
4 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 13 11.6 1.4 
Very important 29 11.6 17.4 
Somewhat important 9 11.6 -2.6 
Not very important 6 11.6 -5.6 
Not at all important 1 11.6 -10.6 
Total 58 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you 
consider nthe following possible characteristics to be? - Mutual economic gain 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 16 14.3 1.8 
Very important 30 14.3 15.8 
Somewhat important 10 14.3 -4.3 
Not very important 1 14.3 -13.3 
Total 57 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered, how important do you 
consider the following possible characteristics to be? - Own firm economic gain 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Extremely important 18 14.3 3.8 
Very important 34 14.3 19.8 
Somewhat important 4 14.3 -10.3 
Not very important 1 14.3 -13.3 
Total 57 
l Total I 6° 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
Additional comments 
In respect of strategic alliances you have entered into, how important 
do you consider the following possible characteristics to be? - Other 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
See text of Questionnaire 
Total 
6 
6a 
6.0 .0 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
See text of Questionnaire 
Total 
11 
Il a 
11.0 .0 
a. This variable is constant. Chi-Square Test cannot be performed. 
61 
Test Statistics 
We 
consider 
that there is 
a direct 
positive 
relationship 
between We Our 
We do or ownership, consider strategic 
are willing in equity that our alliances 
to enter terms, and strategic Identify and 
How many into manageme alliances undertake 
strategic strategic nt control have met or The specific 
alliances alliances and are meeting objectives tasks in 
does your with our infulence In our of our support of 
company competitor strategic strategic alliances these 
have ? s alliances objectives are specific objectives 
Chi-8quarea. , 59.793 42.833 37.882 72.667 25.410 60.639 
df 3 4 3 4 2 3 
As 
, Sig. . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
v 
r 
Test Statistics 
When 
entering 
into When 
When strategic entering 
entering alliances into a 
into a we devote strategic 
strategic substantial alliance we How many 
We alliance we time to devote of your 
encourage We are devote establishing substantial strategic 
our strongly substantial methods for time to alliances 
strategic committed time to monitoring establishing are with 
alliances to to our establishing the a method partners in 
take strategic methods for implementa for the 
calculated alliance making Lion of resolving following 
Initiatives partners decisions decisions conflicts regions -UK 
hi-Squarea, . 24.574 20.508 56.311 31.131 39.131 6.111 
df 3 3 3 3 3 6 
As 
. Sig. . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 411 
aw 
Test Statistics 
-_4 
How many 
of your How many How many How many We are 
strategic of your of your of your We are using or 
alliances strategic strategic strategic using or intend to 
are with alliances alliances alliances intend to use 
partners in are with are with are with use strategic 
the partners in partners in partners in strategic alliances to 
following the the the alliances to expand our 
regions-We following following following expand our capability in 
stern regions-Eas regions-Nor regions-Asi capability in -Western 
Europe tern Europe th America a -UK Europe 
Chi-Squarea, . 26.308 3.857 18.867 2.111 4.737 31.286 
df 8 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. . 001 . 
277 . 000 . 550 . 192 . 000 
r 
Test Statistics 
ýý 
" 
ý 
_ý 
We are 
using or 
We are intend to 
We are We are using or use 
using or using or intend to strategic We are We are 
intend to intend to use alliances using or using or 
use use strategic to expand intend to intend to 
strategic strategic alliances to our use use 
alliances to alliances to expand our capability strategic strategic 
expand our expand our capability In in the - alliances to alliances to 
capability in capability in - South and Indian expand our expand our 
- Eastern - North Central Sub-contin capability in capability in 
Europe America America ent - Asia - Africa 
Chi-Squares- . 10.471 6.941 23.067 28.571 8.118 21.800 
df 3 3 3 3 3 2 
As . Si . . 
015 . 074 . 000 . 000 . 044 . 000 
Test Statistics 
How How 
important important How 
How How are the are the important 
We are important important following following are the 
using or are the are the reasons for reasons for following 
intend to following following entering entering reasons for 
use reasons for reasons for Into Into entering 
strategic entering entering strategic strategic Into 
alliances to into into alliances? - alliances? - strategic 
expand our strategic strategic Entering a Entering a alliances? - 
capability in alliances? - alliances? - new new Accessing 
the - Middle Capital cost Sharing product geographic distribution 
East reduction risks market al market channels 
Chi-Squares.. 2.793 10.571 24.594 16.581 20.844 35.333 
df 1 4 4 3 4 4 
Asym p. Sig. . 095 . 
032 . 000 . 001 . 000 . 000 
_-0 
r 
F 
E 
f 
Test Statistics 
In respect in respect In respect In respect In respect 
of strategic of strategic of strategic of strategic of strategic 
In respect alliances alliances alliances alliances alliances 
of strategic you have you have you have you have you have 
alliances entered, entered, entered, entered, entered, 
you have how how how how how 
entered, important important important important important 
how do you do you do you do you do you 
important consider consider consider consider consider 
do you the the . the nthe the 
consider following following following following following 
the possible possible possible possible possible 
following characterist characterist characterist characterist characterist 
possible ics to be? - ics to be? - ics to be? - ics to be? - ics to be? - 
characterist Sharing or Creation of Strategic Mutual Own firm 
ics to be? - pooling a separate importance economic economic 
Durability resources company to partners gain gain 
hi-Squares, 39.508 55.508 27.525 39.241 31.211 48.053 
df 3 3 4 4 3 3 
As 
. Sig. . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 14.5. 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 12.0. 
C. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.0. 
d. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.3. 
e. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 15.3. 
f. 7 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than S. The minimum expected cell frequency is 2.6. 
9.9 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 4.3. 
h. 4 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 1.8. 
I. 4 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 3.8. 
1.4 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 2.3. 
k. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than S. The minimum expected cell frequency is 9.5. 
1.0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 14.0. 
M. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 8.5. 
n. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than S. The minimum expected cell frequency is 7.5. 
o. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 7.0. 
p. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 10.0. 
q. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 12.6. 
r. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 12.8. 
S. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 15.5. 
t" 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 14.8. 
U. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 11.8. 
ý" 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 11.6. 
W. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 14.3. 
hkl 
Appendix Four 
Summary of Strategic Alliances Readings 
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